Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly

Vol. 43, Nos. 3-4 Fall-Winter 2020

COLUMNS

FROM THE 2019 CONVENTION

ARTICLES

BOOK REVIEWS

Letter from the President of the Fellowship

Dear Members of the Fellowship,

"For good reasons, an atheist might prefer to live in a Christian society, with Christian neighbors, rather than in an atheist society with atheist neighbors."

Some will find this to be an absurd suggestion. A Christian society, it is claimed, would be a narrow, oppressive society, in which freedoms are limited and harmful superstitions form the basis of legal theory. An atheist society, on the other hand, would be open and tolerant. Laws would be based on reason and fairness, not on some dark and stale belief system.

Yet, might not an atheist say to himself, "My Christian neighbor thinks that I have infinite value, that I am a blessed creation of God, and that my judgments about ultimate questions are important and should remain free. Moreover, he feels duty bound (on pain of eternal damnation!) to treat me with great respect even if he does not agree with me or even like me. Indeed, and this is somewhat shocking, he wants me to be truly 'free,' and to find real and lasting happiness. My atheist neighbor may happen to like me, but there is nothing in his 'rational' system of thought that provides a substantial foundation for treating me with such respect, for viewing me as the kind of being who is *owed* such high regard."

Much more could be written to elaborate on this topic. Suffice it to say that getting it right intellectually is only the beginning. Friendship, mutual respect and support, indeed *fellowship* of the highest order, is much needed and deeply to be desired. Such fellowship can be a compelling and consequential witness to others.

It is my privilege to have been elected the new president of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. Dr. Grattan Brown was elected vice president. Together with the board we are committed to the founding principles of the Fellowship and to each member of the Fellowship whom we serve. I encourage you to review our founding principles. Among other things, we pledge to "help one another to work through, in scholarly and prayerful fashion and without public dissent, any problem that may arise from magisterial teaching." Also, "with the grace of God for which we pray, we hope to assist the whole Church to understand its own identity more clearly, to proclaim the joyous Gospel of Jesus more confidently, and to carry out its redemptive mission of all humankind more effectively."

It would appear that the "world" of 2020 is upside down. To be sure, the world has *always* been upside down one way or another. The Catholic intellectual tradition has an immense store of wisdom that can be brought to bear on our

current situation. On economic affairs and the political order, borders and nations, subsidiarity and an adequate understanding of private property, love and marriage. And the Church is also the home of wondrous works of art and literature. We in the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars will continue to do our part to bring forth the wisdom and beauty of our tradition, that others "may have life, life to the full."

I look forward to our convention in Saint Louis next Fall (2021) and to the continued great work done by Fr. Joe Koterski, Dr. Elizabeth Shaw, and Fr. John Gavin on the *Fellowship Quarterly* and the *Teaching the Faith* series. I extend my great gratitude to Prof. Bill Saunders who served so well as president these past six years, and to Prof. Susan Traffas, who has been a great vice president. And indeed, we are all indebted to our past presidents, who remain steadfast and humble in their support and service of the Fellowship.

Anthony Giampietro, C.S.B.
President, FCS

From the Editor's Desk:

The Love of Learning and the Desire for God

Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.[*]

AS MEMBERS OF the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, we do well to ponder both the scholarly work and the prayer lives of our forebears. We do well, for instance, to ponder the devotion that a previous editor of this journal, Ralph McInerny, had to St Thomas Aquinas. In Aquinas (as in McInerny) we find a man with a zealous love for learning and an intense desire for God. Each of these loves is important by itself. Some people pursue one and not the other. Some pursue both of these, but as separate enterprises. For Aquinas, they are deeply connected, and he is clear about which of them is the higher end.

I draw the title for this essay from a book that I love to read and reread: *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God* by Jean Leclercq, O.S.B.[1] The author is a Benedictine monk whose aim is to provide an understanding of the heart of monasticism by introducing his readers to a rich array of medieval authors. His method is to show the profound interconnection that these authors saw between – of all things! – grammar and spirituality.

For the proper study of revelation as it is found in the scriptures, the monks needed to be able to read, to comprehend what they were reading, and to read what was deeply nourishing. Leclercq traces his theme as it appears in such well-known figures as Benedict and Gregory the Great and Bernard of Clairvaux, as well as in a vast range of lesser lights, all of whom were committed to living out the Benedictine motto: *ora et labora* (work and pray).

The writers under study in Leclerq's volume composed learned commentaries

[*] *Fr. Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.* teaches philosophy at Fordham University (Bronx, NY) and is the editor of the *International Philosophical Quarterly* as well as of the *FCSQ*. An earlier version of this essay was delivered at Thomas Aquinas College in Northfield, MA on January 28, 2020.

[1] Jean Leclercq, O.S.B., *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God*, translated by Catharine Misrahi (Bronx NY: Fordham University Press, 1982 [1961]) from *L'Amour des lettres et le désir de Dieu: Initiation aux auteurs monastiques du moyen age* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1957).

on the bible. But not all those who entered monasteries had yet mastered the art of reading anything, and so they also composed countless grammars and other aids useful for advancing in the monastic practice of *lectio divina*. To use a phrase found frequently in their grammar books, their goal was to help individuals with what they needed in order to pray: *meditari aut legere* (to meditate or to read). In the spirit of Leclercq's focus on the connection between grammar and spirituality, I will return in due time to a consideration of the interesting conjunction used in the phrase *meditari aut legere* – the word *aut* (or) is more significant than one might at first think.

Thomas Aquinas, to be sure, was not a monk but a mendicant friar. His education, however, began in the great Benedictine abbey of Monte Cassino, where he was an oblate from about age seven to about age twelve. The wars then ravaging the region led his parents to bring him home. A bit later he was sent to the newly founded university in Naples. There he met the Order of Preachers and decided to join their ranks. Mindful that there might be family opposition, the friars immediately moved to take Thomas north, to their *studium* in Cologne. They were right to suspect family opposition, for his own brothers kidnapped him from the Dominicans and imprisoned him in the family castle at Monte Sangiovanni (nowadays, a delightful wedding palace that is a much sought after venue in Frosinone and that I have had the chance to visit twice when taking Fordham students on a study tour called "Italy in the Footsteps of Dante and Aquinas"). The year that he had to spend waiting there failed to dull his desire to join the ranks of the new order. What he had learned of the *trivium* from the Benedictines proved to be of abiding value to his life as a Dominican friar and to all his subsequent theological work.

Before I turn to a consideration of just how the monks and later the friars were accustomed to read and pray the scriptures and the interesting use of the conjunction *aut* in the phrase *meditari aut legere*, let me turn to some important aspects of Thomistic theology. One point to consider is just what Aquinas thought theology was. Another is the character of his doctrine of God. And a third is a surprising argument that he makes in the opening question of the *Summa theologiae*.

1. Thomistic Theology

A. The proper subject of theology: God and the things of God.

As Jean-Pierre Torrell shows in detail in his masterful biography of Aquinas,[1]

[1] Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, translated by Robert Royal, 2 vols. Volume 1: *The Person and His Work* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996). Volume 2: *Spiritual Master* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003). On the theme of apophatic theology in Aquinas, see

there was something quite bold in Thomas's understanding of what it is to do theology.

For the most influential Christian thinker of the first millennium of the Christian West, Augustine of Hippo, theology consisted in the work of the interpretation of the scriptures. Bringing to bear the rich resources of his studies in literature and rhetoric, Augustine (like many a patristic writer) envisions the work of theology to be primarily a matter of understanding the various levels of meaning in the texts of the scripture, the better to draw fruit for the life of faith. From his first Christian works, such as *On the Sermon on the Mount*, through no less than four commentaries on Genesis and an extensive commentary on the psalms, to such monumental works as *On the Trinity* and *City of God*, there is a preponderance of attention given to the task of interpreting the bible. For Augustine, the Word of God is the central concern of the theologian.

For Bonaventure and many in the Franciscan tradition, the proper subject of theology is Christ and the sacraments. Whether we look to such speculative works as *Tree of Life* or the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, or to such scholastic projects as the *Reduction of All the Arts to Theology*, Bonaventure's approach to theology is deeply Christological. The central image of the *Mind's Journey into God*, for instance, is the seraphic Christ. Bonaventure takes this image to provide both a map of the soul's powers and a route for the progress of a soul to eternal rest in God. Likewise, his *Life of St. Francis* has a Christological structure. To be sure, this book served as an official replacement for those biographies of the saint whose authors were so enthusiastic about Francis as to risk turning him into the new center for the Christian religion. But it is also a spiritual theology that sees the saint as offering a reliable new charism to which his followers can reliably entrust themselves. This is so precisely because Francis let his life wholly be shaped on the life of Christ.

Under the influence of Aquinas, however, theology came to be understood as the study of God and the things of God. Every other topic that is to be included in theology has the warrant for its presence by its relation to God, including creation, the fall, the redemption, the way to understand scripture using its fourfold senses, the Church, heaven, and salvation. In this schema such vital topics as the nature of Christ, the persons of the Trinity, the sacraments, and the relation of nature and grace all have their place within the *scientia* of theology considered as a field whose proper subject matter is God and the things of God. If we still take it for granted that theology properly understood is about God, it is because of what Aquinas accomplished.

---

especially vol. 2, pp. 25-52.

B. The first question of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*.

The perspective that Aquinas chose to take in the opening question of the *Summa* can be surprising. It might even make us wonder whether we have read it wrong, or perhaps whether some error has crept into the text. He boldly asks whether knowing God requires anything besides philosophy!

However curious that notion might strike us, it is his opening gambit. What he assumes is that the philosophical insight that is built up by human reason is enough for many purposes! What he feels the need to argue for is that human beings do still need divine revelation for their salvation!

In this way, what he takes as obvious seems to be just the opposite of what we might think obvious. But the reasons that he gives for holding that we also need revelation are powerful: some truths about God exceed the reach of human reason. And even with regard to those that human reason can in principle discover for themselves, it will take a long time, not all will be up to the task, and there is the ever present possibility of error. These are indeed good and solid reasons. Granted, it is doubtful that most people would start where he starts or would anywhere near so much credit to philosophy for achieving a knowledge of God.

For many believers, to use a starting point such as this is to start the project on the wrong foot! But Thomas provides in the *Summa* a sustained effort to show the sufficiency of human reason for answering a vast number of questions. The topics he investigates range from the demonstrations offered for the existence of God, through the attributes of God, the hierarchy of angelic intelligences, the powers of the human soul, the differentiation between the acts by which human beings move toward their end (free choices) and the passions of the soul (eleven in total, systematized into concupiscible and irascible passions) that can be molded into our natural moral virtues, and so on.

On the other hand, he is not afraid to point out questions where he finds human reason insufficient to decide a question and where we need to depend on revelation, e.g., whether the universe is eternal or created in time, how may persons there are in the Trinity, the workings of grace.

From the perspective of this topic – the love of learning and the desire for God – what he presents to us in much of the *Summa* falls heavily on the side of the love of learning – learning about God's existence, about the world, and about human nature. He uses the ways that Aristotelian philosophy often employs: reasoning from effects back to causes, from plurality back to unity, from experiences back to the principles that make them possible.

What about the desire for God? Where and in what ways do we find it in his approach?

C. Aquinas's doctrine of God

On any fair estimate, Aquinas's doctrine of God (as found, for instance, in the first part of the *Summa*) is deeply *apophatic*. This technical term is used in contrast to *kataphatic*, as a way of differentiating between the position that reason must be extremely cautious and reserved in what we say about God (apophatic theology) and the position that we can be bold and effusive in our language about God on the basis of biblical revelation (kataphatic theology).

In question two of the first part of the *Summa* Aquinas presents his views on the question of whether one can demonstrate the existence of God. After raising his objections to Anselm's ontological approach, he sets out his famous five ways. But then his apophaticism quickly comes to evidence. He shows that it is impossible for us to know the essence of God. In a sustained review of the traditional attributes of God, he argues forcefully that there are severe limits to what we can discover about God by reason. And yet his awareness of the limits of our mind when it tries to understand what God is does not in any way dull his desire for God.

In brief, St. Thomas holds by reason that we can know more about what God is *not* than about what God is. God is not finite, not composite, not material, not limited. But as regards what we can know about God, we need to practice a deep-seated and far-ranging humility. In any effort to speak about things like God's knowledge, God's power, God's goodness, God's justice, God's mercy, and so on, the best strategy that we have is to start with what is familiar to us from our experience.

Thus, the *first* step is to consider things like *knowledge, power, goodness,* and so on. But as a *second* step, we must then deny that God is in any way limited. We use these words easily when we ponder human cognition or animal cognition, or when we ponder human power, animal power, machine power. But when we use them of God, what we must say is that God is not limited in knowing, or in power, or in goodness. We know most of the things we know by knowing the limits of things, but God has no limits. *Third*: we can, however, point out the direction in which divine perfection lies: God is all-knowing (omniscient) even though we do not really understand what it is to know everything. God is all-powerful (omnipotent) even though we do not really understand what it is to have all possible power.

By following the pathways of epistemic humility (that is, by admitting that God is not limited in any way and that the best that we can do is to point out the direction in which God's infinity resides), Aquinas can avoid claiming to know what we do not know and cannot know, and at the same time escape the agnosticism that results from supposing we can know absolutely nothing about God.

It may help to use some images here, so long as we remember that they are but images. We know the direction in which divine perfection lies by pointing toward infinity. Normally, we know things by knowing their limiting forms, their borders, their boundaries. But in this case there are no such limits, no borders, no boundaries, and so we cannot, as it were, ever in principle get our intellectual arms around what those infinite perfections are. By pointing toward infinity in a given direction, we avoid the hubris of thinking that we can comprehend God. We can be grateful to know something about God, even though we do not know all that we would like to know.

On this subject there is an extremely fine book that you should know about: Josef Pieper's *The Silence of St. Thomas*.[1] In that book Pieper examines the time in 1273, a year before Aquinas's death, when he mysteriously ceased writing and gave as his only explanation: "All that I have previously written seems like straw."

While some biographers think that the problem was some physiological event – perhaps a stroke – Pieper proposes a deeper explanation: that Thomas's desire for God grew ever greater and at this point he recognized that his desire for God entirely outstripped the possibilities of speech and reason to say anything adequate on the subject.

There is a beautiful stained glass window in the University Church at Fordham that shows a miraculous vision that Aquinas had of Christ from an earlier time, a time when he was back in Naples. It shows Jesus appearing to Aquinas and saying to him: "You have written well of me, Thomas. What do you wish of me?" Aquinas's simple answer: "Only yourself, Lord." Now, at this later point of his life, it was not some further philosophical distinctions or some careful treatises that he needed to construct. It was a time for prayer. Let us then turn to that question.

II. Medieval Practices of Reading and Praying

It is amazing how effortless medieval authors seem to quote a wide range of scriptural texts. Did they have the whole of the bible memorized? No matter what is under discussion, there always seems to be relevant passages to cite. And it is not just Aquinas who manages this, but Anselm and Bonaventure, Scotus and Ockham, and many less famous figures. The deeper one looks into the literature, the more one sees how widespread the practice was. Their familiarity with the bible was much more than most of us can claim.

The explanation is not, of course, that they had nothing else to read or nothing better to do with their time. Rather, it comes from the nature of the education that had been developed in the monastic schools. Part of what made it

[1] Josef Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, translated by John Murray, S.J. and Daniel O'Connor (South Bend, In.: St Augustine's Press, 1999 [1957]).

possible for Aquinas to make his mark by developing a new synthesis for integrating faith and reason and by using even works once thought to be dangerous to the faith (the works of Aristotle) was that he knew the scriptures in a way that is astounding both for its breadth and for depth.

In addition to the formal study of the bible in an academic context, the medieval figures whom we delight in studying knew the bible from their praying, and especially through *lectio divina* – a reading (*lectio*) of scripture that is oriented toward *meditatio* (meditation) and *oratio* (prayer).

As Fr. Leclercq shows us in great detail in his study of monastic culture, reading (even the simplest reading) usually involved pronouncing the words with one's lips – if not aloud, then at least in a low tone, so that one would hear the sentence that one sees with the eyes. As a result, there comes to be more than a visual memory of the written word. There is also a muscular memory of the words one has pronounced and an aural memory of the words one has heard oneself pronounce.[1]

The figures that Leclercq cites come from across the medieval period. One of the texts that (I presume) you have read is the *Confessions* of Augustine. It includes a famous scene of Augustine standing in admiration at Bishop Ambrose's ability to read silently – a skill so unusual in his day that it stopped Augustine from disturbing the bishop with the questions that he was so eager to pose. Augustine read whatever he read aloud, or at least by subvocalizing what he was reading.[2]

This appears to have been the way virtually everyone then read. That Ambrose was not even moving his lips amazed Augustine and held him back from pressing the bishop for conversation that day. I cannot help but think that the experience also gave Augustine certain insights about the inner life, insights that contributed to his understanding that the mind is a power of the immaterial soul and to his conviction that there is a whole world that is real but immaterial, in fact even more real than the passing parade of material objections and actions that had held him bound by their fascinating allure.

Until the practice of silent reading became dominant,[3] the standard way of reading through subvocalization resulted in a certain muscular memory and aural memory, as Leclercq notes.

Part of the situation, of course, was a technical problem. Before the practice of putting spaces between the words became common, reading required that one sound out a text – that one had to parse it out as one went along. Just as when we

---

[1] Leclercq, 72-73.

[2] Augustine, *Confessions* VI.3.3.

[3] For that topic, see Paul Sanger, *Space between Words: The Origins of Silent Reading* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1998).

speak, we run all the words together without separating them, manuscripts were written in much the same fashion. If you should ever choose to study paleography, or perhaps just to make a visit to the Met or the Cloisters or the Morgan, you will have the chance to see for yourself how sounding out the text is vital to reading it, even for a familiar text.

How does the monastic style of *lectio divina* help to answer the desire for God? Fr. Leclercq offers considerable insight about this in his description of how it works as an approach to prayer. By pronouncing the words (either aloud or through subvocalization) in the slow and deliberate repetition of a scriptural text, the one praying can develop a muscular memory of the words pronounced as well as an aural memory of the words heard, not just a visual memory of the written words on the page. In his view, "the *meditatio* consists in applying oneself with attention to this exercise.... It is what inscribes, so to speak, the sacred text in the body and in the soul."[1]

A number of the monastic authors whom Fr. Leclercq quotes in this regard describe the practice of repeating the words of scripture in this way by such phrases as "mastication" and "spiritual nutrition." By borrowing the vocabulary here from eating, from digestion, and especially from the chewing typical of flocks and herds, the medieval authors come to speak of prayer as "meditation" and "rumination." To meditate, Leclercq explains, is "to attach oneself closely to the sentence being recited and to weigh all its words in order to sound the depths of their full meaning. It means assimilating the content of a text by means of a kind of mastication which releases its full flavor."[2]

To take just one of the many examples Leclercq cites, the Cistercian Arnoul of Bohériss offers this account of *lectio divina* as prayerful reading:

> When he reads, let him seek for savor, not science. The Holy Scripture is the well of Jacob from which the waters are drawn which will be poured out later in prayer. Thus there will be no need to go to the oratory to being to pray; but in reading itself, means will be found for prayer and contemplation.[3]

The effect of this way of uniting reading, meditation, and prayer is to promote a habit of reminiscence. The verbal echoes of a word can arouse the memory in such a way that a mere allusion will spontaneously evoke whole quotations. A scriptural phrase will naturally suggest allusions elsewhere in the sacred books. Each word is like a hook, so to speak. It catches hold of one or several others that are linked to it. For Leclercq, this habit of association explains much about

---

[1] Leclercq, 73.

[2] Ibid.

[3] *Speculum monachorum* I, PL 184.1175, quoted by Leclercq on p. 73.

medieval writers and their facility with scriptural texts. When their citations of scripture differ from what is now the standard text of the bible, it is not that they are quoting from some unknown manuscripts or deliberately modifying the text, but simply that they are quoting from memory.[1]

An important part of the background here is the culture of silence that typified monastic life. Keeping the silence was a principal obligation of the monks. When they speak, the sound of the voice has an importance greater than we might be inclined to give it in a noise-filled culture like our own. This phenomenon strikes me as similar to the situation with regard to images. Monasteries have relatively few images in comparison with our normal circumstances, and so the images that are shown have greater effect.

The constant flurry of images that is present in our lives has effects that we could easily overlook. It seems to me that we are less affected by images than our forebears were precisely because we have so many of them. And yet we get so used to having the flurry of images constantly about us that we have a hard time even imagining life without all these images. Particularly when we get used to the internet and other electronic media, we can easily acquire the habits of looking mindlessly at a panorama of images. Even though we find few of them satisfying, we tend to scroll through the clusters of images, looking for something exciting or titillating. Yet nothing really fills us.

With a proper consideration of the Middle Ages, we can get a taste of what it must have been like to live in a world where images were fewer, and what images there were could be better treasured. Likewise, in monastic life we find a world that is primarily silent. In this ambience, it is all the more possible to appreciate the sound of a voice, especially when it is used on texts that speak to the desire for God, and to hear them repeated, over and again, in words that speak to this desire.

While we cannot completely replicate the experience for ourselves, there are interesting things that we can do. For myself, in an effort to engage more deeply in the daily recitation of the divine office, I cherish a practice that I learned from the School Sisters of Christ the King in Lincoln, Nebraska. Whether they are reciting the psalms or chanting them, they have the interesting practice of stopping at the end of each line for two beats before going on to the next verse.

I find it amazing how even that the use of that simple device makes for a more meditative reading of the psalms. After they get used to this rhythm, they don't need even to tap their finger on the book in the way I had to do at first in order to get used to it. The pause to listen to what they have just read and to get its meaning makes the reading meditative. I find now that I simply prefer this way,

[1] See Leclercq, 73-74.

whether by myself or with friends to whom I have introduced the practice.

Perhaps we might take a minute to experience this by reading a couple of stanzas of a psalm together. As my example, we might consider a psalm that is rather familiar – psalm 42. Let me invite anyone reading this essay to make the effort to try the method I have described. Go ahead and say it aloud, at least softly, and be sure to include the two-beat count at the end of each line:

Like the dear that yearns
for running streams,
so my soul is yearning
for you, my God.

My soul is thirsting for God,
the God of my life;
when can I enter and see
the face of God?

My tears have become my bread,
by night, by day,
as I hear it said all the day long:
"Where is your God?"

These things will I remember
as I pour out my soul:
how I would lead the rejoicing crowd
into the house of God,
amid cries of gladness and thanksgiving,
the throng wild with joy.

Now that is just a brief exercise, but imagine making it a habit, such that you prayed this way all the time, and that you repeatedly prayed the psalter in this way. The monks prayed the psalms meditatively at various hours of the day (lauds, matins, tierce, none, vespers, compline). In addition to the visual memory that is probably stronger in our typical way of reading, there would come to be an aural memory through hearing the words sounded, and a muscle memory, and a grasp of what the text means, and a savoring of these words about God that would respond to our desire. The learning that we love in this way could become responsive to our desire for God.

III. Meditation and Contemplation

Now, of course, this sort of meditation is only a starting point for the many ways in which the love of learning can be linked to the desire for God. One of the reasons why this is so important is that a diet of largely apophatic theology and its sense of how little we can properly say about God can end up leaving one skeptical about the prospects of ever knowing God, let alone of enjoying the real friendship with God to which Christ restores us. One might never develop a habit or a taste for real prayer. Thomas shows us the way to real prayer and to real friendship with God, and many who have followed in the steps of St Thomas have gladly followed his lead. To develop this point let me turn to some of the other parts of the long tradition of mental prayer as a way to link the love of learning and the desire for God.

The Ignatian tradition that is my own sphere of experience grew out of this

starting point, and so I will use the terminology that is distinctive of St. Ignatius rather than Benedictine terminology in my efforts to describe it. We share with the Benedictine tradition the habit of describing meditation as a kind of rumination or thoughtful chewing on the material. We also recommend the mental prayer of contemplation that does something comparable with images.

Meditation as mental prayer can well begin with the slow repetition of the words of the text but can equally well refer to the thinking that we do about some theme or idea that comes from a biblical passage. For meditation in this sense to work well, it generally proves important to prepare for one's period of mental prayer by identifying some points for prayer beforehand. If, for instance, one wants to do meditation in the morning, it can be very helpful to look over the text the evening before and to select three or four ideas for one's rumination.

Then, when we settle down for prayer, what we do is to begin by thinking about the first of the items that we have chosen as points for our period of prayer: what the words mean, what the events are, what their significance is. We continues this for a while, in order to fill the mind with that point. And yet the goal is not simply to keep thinking, but eventually to stop thinking and to start speaking to God about it. That is, to raise mind and heart to prayer from what we have been thinking about.

Just as the monks and the friars spoke of savoring what they read, it is perfectly appropriate to cease speaking and to savor what we have thought and what we have said. We can then stay at a given point through a judicious use of the practice of thinking and listening and speaking. We then stay as long as a given point seems fruitful. It is important to be comfortable with a bit of quiet and then to resume the conversation when it seems right to do so. And when one is ready to move on to the next point that one has prepared, then we are free to do so. This is to make use of the mind in prayer, without letting mental prayer simply become bible study. It is to use the mind for praying.

Where the Ignatian tradition uses the word "meditation" for this ruminative thinking and the prayer to which it leads, we use the word "contemplation" for a ruminative imagining. Now, admittedly, some people have a vivid imagination and can practically see the events in a given biblical story unfold as if it were a kind of film that is running within the mind. But many people – myself included – do not have that sort of imagination. Even so, contemplation remains a real possibility for us. In fact, I think that it has special potential as a way to move from the love of learning to the desire for God.

In entering into any form of mental prayer, it is valuable to prepare before hand. Below I will offer some practical remarks on the practice of contemplative prayer. But first let me focus on another aspect of this preparative stage. For both contemplation and meditation in the Ignatian tradition, the preparation really

should begin by deciding on the grace that I want to ask God for. It may be obvious to us what we need, and if so, we do well to start the period of prayer by asking for that grace, and to stick with this aspect of praying for as long as we need to. On the other hand, it may not be so obvious to us about what to ask for.

For this purpose, it can be helpful to have another important type of mental prayer in our quiver: a daily prayerful examination of conscience. In the Ignatian tradition, this is intended as a daily prayer of about ten minutes. It has its own structure: (1) gratitude to God, (2) request for his life, (3) an account of our actions and attitudes and sorrow for any sins that we discover, (4) charting a course for the next day by forming a resolution, and (5) entreating the Lord for the energy and enthusiasm that we need to follow the resolution we have made. I would love to discuss the fine points of this form of prayer, but rather than risk any confusion by going into the details of several different approaches to mental prayer at once, let me simply ask you to focus on just the fourth point. After reflecting on how our day has gone and talking things over with Jesus, we need to chart a course for the next day.

Suppose that we did this prayerful examination of conscience every day, and suppose that the one part of it that we wrote done in a little notebook were our resolution for the next day – something like "Be more patient with Joseph" or "Spend a little more quiet time in the chapel" or "Be more thankful about the gifts God has given me" or "Get creative about how to change the topic and avoid gossip" – the possibilities are endless! If we were to write down that resolution – some crisp and clear statement about what we want to remember to do or to avoid – I suspect that we would find that over the course of a month, we would probably have written down virtually the same resolution a dozen times. Discovering how frequently something needs to be our daily resolution could easily point us to the grace that we need to ask for at the start of our periods of our mental prayer.

Identifying a grace that we want to ask God for at the start of our prayer period is an important part of our preparations for mental prayer. After we choose the grace we want to ask God for at the beginning of a period of meditation or contemplation, the next step is to decide on a topic for the period of prayer. Here the daily Gospel can be a help. Sometimes it is about the words of Jesus, sometimes about his deeds.

When we come to the actual time for contemplative prayer, what we might then do is to mention (out loud, or subvocalizing) a couple of details, and then try to imagine them. For instance, in the gospel passage that the Church uses for Tuesday on the third week of the year (Mark 3: 31-35), we could begin by imagining the Blessed Mother and some of Jesus's relatives coming to look for him and finding him inside a house, with the crowd that is trying to get inside the house spilling out onto the porch and the into the yard. We might start by imaging

what the house looks like and how the porch is arranged. Then we might see the people – some standing, some sitting, and no way for Blessed Mother even to get close. If seeing that much in our imagination leads us to raise mind and heart to God, no need to go any further in picturing anything so long as we find it possible to do some praying.

When we are ready, we can move on to a few more details. Seeing Blessed Mother, in her discrete and lovely maternal way, whispering a message to one of the disciples whom she recognized, a message that she wants him to pass along to others, and eventually to Jesus, who is inside. Then we stop on that image, and watch her and watch them. If there is fruit for prayer, we stay with that as long as it is fruitful.

There is no need to rush even to the second verse, but there is much more available in the text that can be material for our imagination, and a resting place to us, a place where we can stop and pray. Imagine one person passing the message to the next, and to the next, and eventually it gets to Jesus: "Your mother and your brethren are outside, asking for you." At any of these stages, we can focus on the vocal as well as on the visual. Perhaps while all the message passing is taking place, we can also hear Our Lord's voice in the house. We might imagine hearing him explain something to those seated around. And then suddenly we imagine another voice, this time someone giving him the message: "Your mother and your brethren..." – We can stop at this point and try to raise our minds and hearts in prayer, saying whatever we want to say in prayer.

In this style of praying with the mind, the point is not to get to the end of the passage. And yet the ending of the passage is there awaiting us when we want it. In this case, it is a phrase that combines Jesus's incredible praise for his mother with an invitation to us to be as good a disciple of his as she was: "Who are my mother and my brethren? ... Here are my mother and my brethren, for whoever does the will of God is my brother and sister and mother."

There is much to ponder here, and much to be a springboard for prayer. *Doing the will of God* – what does it mean in my present circumstances? Perhaps gratitude for having been made his brother or his sister by our adoption in baptism? Perhaps, with our own version of the associative patterns that the medieval monks and friars loved to cultivate, just looking at Blessed Mother and her utter and complete fidelity to her son over the years. Perhaps asking her to let us accompany her in doing God's will.

IV. Praying with Aquinas

There are many ways of uniting our love of learning with our desire for God, and many ways of cultivating our desire for God by making good use of our love of learning. Let me close by returning to the last period of Thomas's life, in the

spirit of Josef Pieper's *The Silence of St. Thomas.*

During various period of Aquinas's life he had worked as a papal theologian. When Thomas suddenly stopped writing, the pope at one point intervened, hoping to shake him from his doldrums by sending him to the Council of Lyons that was to meet in 1274. It was most unusual for a friar to ride anywhere in those days, for the asceticism of the Dominican order required that the friars were to walk wherever they went. In his affliction, however, Thomas was riding and inadvertently hit his head on a low-lying tree branch. They immediately carried him to an inn at Maenza to recover, but once he regained consciousness he asked to be taken to a religious house.

The closest place was a Cistercian Abbey at Fossa Nuova. I have had the chance to visit there twice, and thus to see a small set of rooms in the guest house where they carried him. As he started to recover, the monks begged him for some conferences. Thomas tried to decline and urged them to study the works of Bernard of Clairvaux, but at the monks' insistence he agreed to give some talks on a book very dear to St Bernard, the *Song of Songs*.

The two conferences he gave are the very last things he composed before death took him. They are, of course, instances of his meditations on a text about love of God, and they reflect his deep-seated desire for God. It is a theme that clearly filled Thomas's prayer all his life and one that is frequently to be found in important places within works like the *Summa* as well as in his various commentaries on scripture, as well as in this highly incomplete set of texts on the *Song of Songs*. Thomas used his love of learning, even in a phase of his life when he could not operate in the way that he had been accustomed to do. Even at the end, he remained a student of the Benedictine tradition in which he had been brought up. *Meditari aut legere* – to meditate or to read. Learning how to read well can be a way of learning how to meditate. It is not a matter of reading quickly or reading a lot of things but a case of reading well – *non multa sed multum* – not many things but going into much depth. For Aquinas, this is the union of the love of learning and the desire for God.

A Tale of Two Thomisms: Francisco Marín-Sola and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange on Divine Causality, Human Freedom, and God's Permission of Sin

R.J. Matava[*]

ABSTRACT: I examine some salient aspects of the debate between Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and Francisco Marín-Sola over whether God's motion of the human free will ("physical premotion") can be impeded by the human person, or is infallibly efficacious. While agreeing with Marín-Sola's general insight into God's permission of evil, I also agree with the general thrust of Garrigou-Lagrange's critique of impedible premotion. I propose that shared problematic assumptions about God's causal action both generate the debate and lead to inconsistencies on each side. I close by suggesting that the logic of redemption demands a stronger view of human freedom than either thinker grants, while maintaining that such freedom falls under the universal causality of God, which both thinkers affirm.

ONE OF THE GREAT UNSETTLED QUESTIONS of Christian theology is how to understand human free choices within the larger scheme of God's transcendent, omnipotent, universal causality. What gives this question urgency and importance are the implications that its answer has for understanding God's permission of sin and other related mysteries of the faith, such as predestination and merit, reprobation and hell.

Within Catholic theology since the Council of Trent, the two predominant alternatives in the debate over how to conceptualize God's causation of human free choices are the theory of physical premotion (advanced mainly by Thomist theologians of the Dominican order) and the theory of indifferent concurrence (advanced mainly by Molinist theologians of the Jesuit order). However, the variations within the Dominican and Jesuit schools have seldom received much attention.[1] Here, I examine some salient aspects of one important twentieth-

[*] *R. J. Matava* is associate professor and dean of the Notre Dame Graduate School of Christendom College.

[1] I treat the context of these debates in two earlier works. Most recently is the abridged version of a longer essay: "An Historical Sketch of the Controversy *de Auxiliis,*" *Journal of Jesuit Studies* 7 (2020): 417-46. I briefly treat variations within the two schools of thought in §5 of the original unabridged version of this essay. See also chapter 1 of

century debate within the Dominican school, namely, that between Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. (1877-1964) and Francisco Marín-Sola, O.P. (1873-1932).

This examination proceeds in three stages. First, I will introduce the idea of physical premotion in the context of sketching of Garrigou-Lagrange's position. Second, I will introduce Marín-Sola's modification of the dominant understanding of physical premotion as represented in thinkers such as Garrigou-Lagrange. I will begin with Marín-Sola's principal criticism of the received view, since that criticism is the starting point for the originative features of Marín-Sola's position.[1] Third, while agreeing with Marín-Sola's criticism of Garrigou-Lagrange's position and with Marín-Sola's general insight into God's permission of evil, I will propose three reasons why I nevertheless think that Marín-Sola's alternative theory of premotion is unacceptable.

1. Infallible Premotion: The Position of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange

Starting from the principle of God's universal primary causality and following St. Thomas, Garrigou-Lagrange teaches that God is the efficient cause of human free choices by operating within the human agent to move the individual's free will from potency to act. According to this view, the human person is a secondary cause whose agency is metaphysically subordinate to God's because a human person is not the unmoved mover. This subordination extends even to the human person's agency of free choice: While the human person is free, this freedom does not make the individual a creator *ex nihilo* of any free choices.

According to Garrigou-Lagrange, God's operation in the human agent does not cancel the human person's real agency or freedom, because God's operation is precisely what makes free human action possible: Insofar as the human agent as free and capable of action is in potency to pursuing any one of a variety of alternative ends, that individual must be reduced from potentially pursuing any of

---

Divine Causality and Human Free Choice: Domingo Báñez, Physical Premotion, and the Controversy de Auxiliis *Revisited*, Brill's Studies In Intellectual History, 252, ed. Han van Ruler (Leiden: Brill, 2016).

[1] My presentation of these two authors' positions here is necessarily brief and takes several details for granted. For a more detailed treatment of Garrigou-Lagrange's position, see, for example, his works, "Premotion physique," in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, ed. A. Vacant et al. (Paris: Librarie Letouzy et Ané, 1935), 13-1:31-77; *God, His Existence, and His Nature: A Thomistic Solution of Certain Agnostic Antinomies* (from the 5th French ed.), trans. Dom Bede Rose, OSB (St. Louis: Herder, 1936), 2:144-61, 268-396 (esp. 354 ff.), 465-562; *Grace: A Commentary on the* Summa Theologica *of St. Thomas*, trans. The Dominican Sisters of Corpus Christi Monastery, Menlo Park, CA (St. Louis: Herder, 1952); and *Predestination*, trans. Dom Bede Rose, OSB (St. Louis: Herder, 1939). For a detailed introduction to the position of Francisco Marín-Sola, see the works of Michael Torre cited in n. 8 below.

these alternatives to actually pursuing some specific one of them. According to Garrigou-Lagrange, human freedom is preserved under God's causal influence because the individual remains the kind of agent that is indifferently disposed by nature toward a variety of goods, even when the individual is, in the moment, moved to pursuing one specific good among this range of possible ends. Apart from God's causal influence, there is no human action at all. But how are we to understand God's causal influence on the will?

According to Garrigou-Lagrange, God reduces the created will from potency to act by a physical premotion.[1] A physical premotion is understood as an impulse or influx of God's causal action. In the supernatural order, physical premotion is called "actual grace." Premotion is called "physical" because it is real and objective, and works by way of efficient (rather than formal or final) causality. Because this motion is antecedent in the order of nature to the human person's own operation, it is called a "pre"-motion. Physical premotion is, therefore, distinct from the action of the secondary cause and accounts for it. Yet, insofar as premotion is a created reality, it is also distinct from God. Nevertheless, while premotion is created, it is not fairly portrayed as a secondary cause between God and the human agent, but must rather be understood as God's transeunt *causality*, linking God and the human action that God causes *through* his causality. Premotion is intrinsically and infallibly efficacious for bringing about whatever good (however great or limited) that God intends to bring about through that premotion.[2] Moreover, as Garrigou-Lagrange conceives of it, physical premotion is a divine *predetermination* of the will. On the condition that God premoves someone to a certain act, that person is necessarily moved to that act (even though in abstraction from God's premotion, the person is not necessitated to the act in question). The

[1] In what follows, I will typically shorten "physical premotion" to "premotion" with no intended difference in meaning. Following Garrigou-Lagrange ("Premotion physique," 34-35), T.C. O'Brien considers the nomenclature to be pleonastic. See his "Premotion, Physical," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed., ed. Berard Marthaler, O.F.M. Conv. et al. (Detroit: Gale, 2002), 11:669. For a convergent discussion of the historical development of the nomenclature and its import for the theory of premotion, see the work of David Torrijos Castrillejo, "Suárez y la premoción física," *Cuadernos Salmantinos de filosofía*, 44 (2017): 71-94; and "Was Báñez a Bánecian?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 94/3 (2020): 431-58. While I am not yet persuaded that the classical interpretation of premotion is foreign to Báñez, Torrijos's impressive historical work sheds light on an important and neglected aspect of the development of the idea of premotion. For the genealogy of physical premotion, see A.M. Dummermuth, *Thomas et doctrina praemotionis physicae seu responsio ad R.P. Schneemann S.J. aliosque doctrinae scholae Thomisticae impugnatores* (Paris: Ephemeridis L'anée Dominicaine, 1886), 427-558.

[2] Thus, while defenders of premotion customarily distinguish "sufficient" and "efficacious" grace, all grace (understood as premotion in the supernatural order) is efficacious for its intended end, though not all grace is efficacious for salvation.

upshot is that if God does not premove someone to a particular act, then the individual infallibly does not perform that act.

While such a view of the causal subordination of the human person raises some thorny questions about moral responsibility and the nature of human freedom, Garrigou-Lagrange's view does have an advantage over the view of Luis de Molina (1535-1600), Jesuit originator of the theory of middle knowledge, in at least one important respect. In order to save human freedom, Molina argues that human persons must be able to do one thing or another, to act or not to act, given all requisite conditions for acting, whether creaturely or divine.[1] Molina does not deny that human persons need God's concurrence in order to act, but what distinguishes his view of concurrence from premotion is that concurrence is not antecedent to the human action, and it is also nondetermining.[2] An upshot of this view, however, is that it seems to create a metaphysical vacuum within which human persons determine themselves *apart from* divine assistance. According to opponents, human persons are thus made out to be uncaused causes of their own acts, a view that at least seems to tend problematically toward Pelagianism when it comes to human cooperation in justification and the question of merit.[3]

Despite this advantage, a crucial weakness remains in Garrigou-Lagrange's account: Not only does God's premotion determine human choice, but because God's causality is intrinsically efficacious, God's granting a premotion necessitates the occurrence of the corresponding human action (even while the human action is not *in itself* necessitated). Conversely, his not granting a premotion necessitates the nonoccurrence of the corresponding human act. God does not

[1] Middle knowledge is the linchpin of a wider theory of divine providence and human freedom (called "Molinism" after its founder). For an introduction to Molinism, see for example, Alfred J. Freddoso, "Preface" and "Introduction," in Luis de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge* (*Part IV of the* Concordia), trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). See also, Vansteenberghe, "Molinisme," *Dictionnaire de théologie Catholique*, ed. A. Vacant et al. (Paris: Letouzy et Ané, 1929), 10-2:2094-187; and Part I of *A Companion to Luis de Molina,* ed. Matthias Kaufmann and Alexander Aichele, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition: A Series of Handbooks and Reference Works on the Intellectual and Religious Life of Europe, 500-1800, 50, ed. Christopher M. Bellitto (Leiden: Brill, 2015). One example of a contemporary appropriation of Molina's thought is Mark Wiebe, *On Evil, Providence, and Freedom: A New Reading of Molina* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2017). Both Garrigou-Lagrange and Marín-Sola vehemently reject Molinism.

[2] There is also a question about whether and in what sense God's general concurrence is distinct from the human action. I explore this matter in chapter 7.4 of *Divine Causality and Human Free Choice.*

[3] Molinism was formally exonerated of Pelagianism by the Holy See in 1607 (see DS 1997) and subsequent popes reaffirmed this position (see DS 2008, 2331, 2509-10, 2564, 2679). However, this does not mean that the Holy See endorsed the theory of Molina, nor is it a declaration against the problems identified by Molina's opponents.

directly cause sin, for the evil that makes an action to be sin is a privation; it is something tolerated, but not something positively caused by God. However, insofar as God does not supply the necessary premotion, his antecedent permission of evil conditionally necessitates sin given the creature's inherent defectibility as a finite, dependent cause.

2. Impedible Premotion: The Position of Francisco Marín-Sola

Marín-Sola accepts the idea of premotion and even grants that premotions are predetermining, but he rejects the idea that all premotions are infallibly efficacious, holding instead that some premotions can be impeded by the human person.[1] Marín-Sola develops this view primarily as an attempt to correct what he considers to be the unacceptable aspects of Garrigou-Lagrange's view on the sufficiency of sufficient grace and on the relationship between God's permission of evil and the occurrence of a sinful act. Revealingly, he does not develop his view in order to correct a deficiency in Garrigou-Lagrange's view of human freedom.[2]

Marín-Sola argues that God's nonpermission of efficacious grace does not entail sin because God's sufficient grace will infallibly result in a good act unless the human person, on his or her own, introduces a defect, thereby blocking the operation of sufficient grace.[3] Thus, the human person's failure to act as he or she should is not the result of God's nonprovision of the premotion necessary to avoid sin. Because of the metaphysical asymmetry between good as positive reality and evil as privation, even a sinful act has some underlying positive aspect, however minimal (after all, an act of sin is still an action). God is the first cause in respect to whatever existence there is of the human action, whereas the human person is the first cause in respect to whatever evil distorts that action, making it to be a sin. The human person's causal contribution is to introduce what is non-act; it is a withdrawal from God's positive causal influence, which moves the human agent to the good.

Marín-Sola maintains a traditional notion of providence, and although he

---

[1] For an excellent presentation of the thought of Francisco Marín-Sola, see Michael D. Torre, *God's Permission of Sin: Negative or Conditioned Decree?* Studia Friburgensia 107 (Academic Press Fribourg, 2009) and *Do Not Resist the Spirit's Call: Francisco Marín-Sola on Sufficient Grace* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013).

[2] See Francisco Marín-Sola, "New Observations Concerning the Thomist System Regarding the Divine Motion," trans. Michael Torre, in Torre, *Do Not Resist the Spirit's Call*, 218-19.

[3] See Francisco Marín-Sola, "A Reply to Some Objections Concerning the Thomist System Regarding the Divine Motion," trans. Michael Torre, in Torre, *Do Not Resist the Spirit's Call*, 72 ff.

admits impedible premotions, Marín-Sola rejects middle knowledge. He instead explains God's infallible knowledge of future contingents by a two-phase application of the classical distinction between simple knowledge and knowledge of vision: Through the presentiality of future contingents to God's eternity, God knows by a knowledge of vision what his sufficient grace actually achieves (and by negation, what it does not achieve) in what to our way of knowing is a first "logical phase" (my term, not Marín-Sola's).[1] In light of this "first-phase" *scientia visionis* of the extent of his (sufficient) grace's effects (and of the creature's resistance), God, in a second logical phase, knows what he could further do and what is the ultimate actual future he determines.[2]

These two logical phases correlate to a sequence of God's permissive decrees and allow for God's permission of sin to be understood in a way that circumvents the problematic implication of Garrigou-Lagrange's view that God's antecedent nonprovision of an efficacious grace necessitates human sin. Marín-Sola's view, as I understand it, can be at least sufficiently approximated for present purposes by the following diagram.[3]

---

[1] So-called simple knowledge (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*) is principally God's knowledge of his own essence and so, by extension, of all possible things he could create (insofar as these possibilities are enveloped by his essence and creative power). This knowledge is conceptually prior to God's creative act in our way of thinking and so it is customarily called "prevolitional" knowledge. So-called knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*) is God's knowledge of the actual world in itself. This knowledge is conceptually posterior to God's creative act in our way of thinking and so it is customarily called "postvolitional" knowledge. The background for the conceptual distinction of these two modes of divine knowledge is found in Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 14. Molina's "middle knowledge" (which is prevolitional, but more limited than the domain of the purely possible, insofar as it is conditioned by the de facto but hypothetical self-determinations of possible persons) is called "middle" because, conceptually, it falls between God's simple knowledge and God's knowledge of vision.

[2] What I call the "first phase" corresponds to God's general providence and antecedent will, whereas the "second phase" corresponds to God's special providence and consequent will. As noted above, the antecedent/consequent will distinction traces back through Aquinas (*ST* I, q. 19, a. 6) to John Damascene (*De fide orthodoxa* II.29). On Marín-Sola's avoidance of middle knowledge through the two-phase application of the traditional distinction of *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* and *scientia visionis*, see Marín-Sola, "The Thomist System Regarding the Divine Motion," trans. Michael Torre, in Torre, *Do Not Resist the Spirit's Call*, 47-55; and Marín-Sola, "A Reply to Some Objections," 82-88.

[3] This is my attempt at a pragmatic reconstruction of Marín-Sola's view. It does not attempt to capture every detail, and I welcome the correction of any misrepresentation. In what follows, I aim to present Marín-Sola's view, not endorse every aspect of it. Besides his account of divine causality, several aspects of Marín-Sola's view deserve closer (and perhaps critical) examination, such as the stages of a human action and the relationship between the stages, the genesis of sin, moral responsibility of the human subject at stages of action preceding choice (especially when these follow from prior choice), and the

First Phase

God	Human Person	God
Simple knowledge of possibilities Impedible premotion to the initial stages of human action Because premotion is impedible, God both wills the initial stages of the human act, and permits the human person to fail at these *pre-choice* (and so pre-sin) stages of action. This permission is the initial permissive decree that allows the human person's failure to attend to the demands of the moral law (which failure is a requisite for sin, but not itself necessarily a sin).	Is moved infallibly to (some) beginning stage(s) of a complete action. This may include the following: understanding of the end, simple willing of the end, deliberation concerning the means, final practical judgment. Is moved – fallibly – to consider the moral law at the stage of deliberation Is *not* moved infallibly to a complete human action. May terminate God's motion at his or her own initiative Good complete action *will* infallibly follow from these initial stages *if* the human person does not terminate God's premotion.	Knowledge of vision concerning the human person's correspondence to or termination of God's initial premotion (including whether the human person actually attends to the moral law or fails to advert to the moral law in rendering a final practical judgment about what is to be done).

concept of "indeliberate free" acts. For a complimentary discussion, see Torre, *God's Permission of Sin*, 109-10.

Second Phase

God	Human Person	God
Will to concur in the continuance of a good action flowing from a truthful final practical judgment	Is moved to the final stages of a complete action, focally, choice, but also command, use, and enjoyment	Knowledge of vision of what good act the human person completes with God's concurrent aid, or knowledge of vision of what sin into which the human person falls following from his or her termination of God's initial premotion.
Simple knowledge of possible intervention following man's failure/deviation from moral law	The choice is good if the final practical judgment was truthful, or if God overcomes initial moral deviation	
Actual intervention (infallible premotion), in some special cases, to interrupt and overcome the course of sin following from an erroneous practical judgment	The choice is sinful if the final practical judgment was erroneous and there was no special divine intervention	
In other (typical) cases, the consequent permissive decree to *not* intervene to correct the course of a deviant human action		
This second permissive decree presupposes the initial human failure to attend to the demands of the moral law		
Will to concur in the positive aspects of a distorted act – an act that is a sin		

On Marín-Sola's account, like on that of Garrigou-Lagrange, God's permission of sin antecedes human sin. Sin would not occur were God not to put up with it, and, for both thinkers, God does not have to put up with it: He always has the option of intervening antecedently to move the human person to a good act. However, Marín-Sola's account differs insofar as God's antecedent permis-sion of sin is *consequent* to the human practical intellect's culpable failure to at-tend to the rule of reason – the demands of the moral law – in rendering a final judgment concerning what is to be done. It is for this reason that Marín-Sola, following Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P. (1616-1681) and Charles-René Billuart, O.P. (1685-1787), sometimes calls the premotion to the act that is sin (insofar as it is an act at all) a "post-determination" rather than a "predetermination" (as is more customary for defenders of premotion).[1] God's permission of sin and movement of the human will to the positive act that is a sin *follows* the defective human self-determination to sin as such. The failure of the practical intellect to attend to moral truth in rendering judgment presupposes a distinct, *earlier*, antecedent permission of God in order to occur.

Why then does this not simply retard the problem by one step and leave Marín-Sola in no better position than Garrigou-Lagrange? The answer is threefold: First, insofar as the practical intellect is not morally required to be always actively attending to the rule of reason, God's permission of the practical intellect to not attend to the rule of reason is not per se a permission to sin. Second, even given God's "first-phase" permission of the failure of the practical intellect, the human person also has, at that stage, a premotion sufficient to attend to the rule of reason. Because God's premotion is defeasible, the practical intellect has both the assistance it needs to deliver a sound judgment *and* the possibility of failure to deliver a sound judgment. If one attends to the rule of reason and makes a sound final judgment about what is to be done, a corresponding good act of free choice necessarily follows from this judgment. God's premotion goes through in this case and bears fruit in the culmination of a good action. On the other hand, if one thwarts God's initial, defeasible premotion, one fails to judge in accordance with the moral truth and a wrong choice necessarily follows from this erroneous judgment. Third, while sin – an act pertaining to the second phase – presupposes God's antecedent permission of sin *in the second phase*, and while God *could* intervene with an intrinsically infallible premotion to overcome man's deviation even after an erroneous practical judgment to sin (thus interrupting the otherwise necessary consecution of sin from a false practical judgment), God is not bound to intervene in this special way (even if he occasionally does), and he permits the failure of the human person to go through only in light of the human person's own

[1] See Marín-Sola, "The Thomist System Regarding the Divine Motion," 16-17.

initial, avoidable failure to attend to moral truth.

Thus, it is not God's permission of sin or nonprovision of an additional or continued "second-phase" premotion that necessitates sin but, rather, the human person's failure to attend to moral truth – a failure that God permits, but which failure (intellectual, not yet volitional!) is not itself a sin, and which man has the necessary premotion to avoid if only he does not negate that initial premotion. On Marín-Sola's theory, the human person's resistance to God's premotion antecedes rather than follows God's nonprovision of the premotion necessary for a good act to occur. This is the most crucial difference of his system from that of Garrigou-Lagrange.

Still, Marín-Sola's view is not a wholesale revision of or departure from Garrigou-Lagrange's view, particularly insofar as both thinkers are committed to the idea of physical premotion. In fact, Marín-Sola strives to show that his view is not a complete innovation but an organic development of the Thomist tradition with an established pedigree. Antecedents to his view can be found in Thomist authors of the previous several centuries. Like other Dominicans in the debate, Marín-Sola is critical of Molinism and profoundly motivated by loyalty to his order and to Thomism.[1] Accordingly, he does not criticize the idea of physical premotion as such or the conception of the relationship between divine and creaturely action it supposes, and he does not think that human free choice is incompatible with the divine predetermination of human choice. One might therefore argue that Marín-Sola has not gone far enough to correct foundational inadequacies of Garrigou-Lagrange's view.

3. A Critique of Impedible Premotion

Marín-Sola attempts to correct the shortcomings of Garrigou-Lagrange's view while avoiding the shortcomings of Molina's view. While Marín-Sola's position appears to be less internally consistent than Garrigou-Lagrange's, Marín-Sola sees the problems with Garrigou-Lagrange's position and tries to overcome them in a manner that is consistent both internally and with respect to the external data of the faith, including especially the Church's condemnations of Jansenism. Moreover, as I will argue below, Garrigou-Lagrange's view suffers from a fatal inconsistency in its own way. Marín-Sola's project is therefore the most plausible attempt of the last four centuries to articulate a theory of premotion, and it is very

[1] Marín-Sola had a profound grasp of the issues as they had been treated within Thomism – perhaps better than anyone to his day, and possibly ever since. Torre notes Marín-Sola's encyclopedic knowledge of the commentatorial tradition on this issue (see *Do Not Resist*, 317-18).

difficult to criticize when understood from the inside, on its own terms.[1]

Notwithstanding the merits of Marín-Sola's work, I will now consider three objections against his theory of impedible premotion. The first objection is that impedible premotion conflicts with divine impassibility. The second objection is that the idea of impedible premotion is internally inconsistent. The third objection is that the logic of redemption rules out predetermination of the will.

I will consider the first objection only briefly because it is a typical objection that has been treated by others, because the charge is simple and clear, and because Marín-Sola may have a way to respond to it, as I will suggest in passing when considering the second objection.[2] Whether this line of response is effective will also be considered there. My treatment of the second objection will be considerably more detailed because the complexity of the matter – a matter that has been the source of great debate – requires this. While this objection is also not originative, I hope to bring fresh clarity to the debate and especially to its underlying causes. In considering the third objection, I sketch a line of argument that is more originative and could, I think, be profitably developed at greater length.

3.1. Impedible Premotion Conflicts with Divine Impassibility

Recall Marín-Sola's two-phase understanding of God's knowledge and will: God, willing a person to be saved, for example, gives him or her the sufficient grace for conversion. In this first logical phase of divine action, God both gives sufficient grace (a premotion) and from eternity knows – postvolitionally – whether that sufficient grace actually goes through, resulting in conversion, or whether it is impeded by the recipient. If in this first phase it is impeded, God, in a second logical phase, can, in light of his eternal knowledge of the recipient's initial resistance, overcome that resistance by giving a further, infallibly efficacious grace (premotion), which he sees from eternity results in the conversion of the recipient.

---

[1] A view essentially like that of Marín-Sola has also been defended by others in the wake of his contributions. For example, M. John Farrelly, O.S.B.; Charles Journet, O.P.; Jacques Maritain; William Most; Eleonore Stump; and Philippe de la Trinité, O.C.D. have all defended views more or less like that of Marín-Sola (notwithstanding some important differences both with Marín-Sola and among one another). Torre discusses in detail the reception of Marín-Sola's thought (see *Do Not Resist,* 227-57). I will not attempt here to enter into an evaluation of the respective merits of these more or less originative appropriations of Marín-Sola's thought.

[2] See p. 273 note 3 below. For a more detailed recent development of this essential line of reasoning, see Taylor Patrick O'Neill, *Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin: A Thomistic Analysis* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019), 196-200, 251-56.

While it is true that Marín-Sola avoids Molina's postulation of a divine knowledge of extrinsically determined hypotheticals (middle knowledge), it nevertheless seems that on Marín-Sola's view, God's "second-phase" knowledge and will are nevertheless passive and conditioned by what the human person does. In fact, Marín-Sola admits as much when he says,

> [S]ome rigid Thomist or some timid Thomistic neophyte will say, this is equivalent to conceding that in some sense the created will *determines* God, from the moment that one concedes that the free creature, with his impediment, modifies the course of the divine determination or moves God to modify it.
>
> To this we respond, and every true Thomist ought to respond, that if one wants really to save the responsibility of the creature in sin, and differentiate oneself radically from Calvinism and Jansenism, there is no other remedy than to concede that, *in some sense the created will determines the divine will*.
>
> This sense is that the creature, *with his actual defect, objectively or occasionally determines God* to interrupt the course of divine motion to the honest good, changing it into the motion to the material of sin.[1]

Setting aside rhetoric about Thomism, the principal way Marín-Sola defends against the charge of admitting divine passibility is by pointing up the even less palatable consequences of denying it. Rather than showing how his view of premotion does not compromise divine impassibility, Marín-Sola bites the bullet on this point, grasping the other horn of the dilemma that Garrigou-Lagrange rightly framed as "God determining or determined."[2]

3.2. The Idea of Impedible Premotion Is Internally Inconsistent

Critics have long charged Marín-Sola's doctrine of impedible premotion with inconsistency. Moreover, the apparent logical consistency of Garrigou-Lagrange's view of premotion tends to so transfix its adherents that it galvanizes them against the force of Marín-Sola's critique of the implications that view has for understanding of God's permission of sin. The alleged inconsistency in Marín-Sola's view can be summarized as follows: Either God moves an agent *P* to act *A*

---

[1] See Francisco Marín-Sola, "Some Translations from the *Concordia Tomista,*" trans. Michael Torre, in Torre, *Do Not Resist the Spirit's Call,* 354. Marín-Sola also concedes this difficulty in his article "New Observations," 184-85. There he identifies the charge of inconsistency with divine impassibility as virtually the only difficulty with his system, and in a footnote, suggests how the difficulty regarding the apparent passivity of God's knowledge might be resolved (insofar as the creaturely act, with its privation, is known *ut obiecum in quo materiale*). However, there still seems to be an unresolved question about how God's will is not rendered passive. As in the passage from the *Concordia Tomista* cited above, the main thrust of the defense in "New Observations" is to show the inadmissibility of the alternative.

[2] See epilogue in Garrigou-Lagrange, *God, His Existence, and His Nature*, 529-62.

or not. If God moves *P* to act *A*, then *A* occurs, since (putatively) this is just what it means for *P* to be moved *to A* (*A* being the terminus of the motion). A motion is defined by its termini. Furthermore, if *A* does not occur, it implies that God did not move *P* to *A*, since according to modus tollens, a negation of the consequent implies the negation of the antecedent. Let *M* be God's premotion of agent *P* and let *A* be *P*'s action that follows. According to Marín-Sola's critics,

If M *then* A.
~ A.
~ M.

It cannot be the case that *P* is both moved to *A* and not moved to *A*, because these two possibilities contradict each other.[1] However, such a contradiction is implied by idea of impedible premotion, for if *P* impedes God's motion of *P* to *A*, then God would move *P* to *A*, and yet *A* would not be attained. According to Marín-Sola's critics, it is a matter of simple logic that a motion to *A* that does not actually attain *A* as its terminus is not truly a motion to *A* after all.

Before exploring and evaluating how a follower of Marín-Sola could reply to the above objection, I wish to lay out the following five claims that I will defend in this section (though I will visit these points in a different order, summarized below): (1) The above objection against Marín-Sola is essentially sound. (2) The fatal inconsistency in Marín-Sola's theory of impedible premotion is rooted in a more foundational inconsistency in the very idea of premotion (whether impedible or not).[2] One implication of (2) is that, (3) the view of Garrigou-Lagrange suffers equally from this foundational inconsistency insofar as he also accepts the idea of physical premotion. So long as premotion can be reasonably considered a Thomist idea, a second implication of (2) is, (4): Even if Marín-Sola's theory of impedible premotion is unsound, it should nevertheless be seen as an organic development of certain latent potentialities (or principles) of the Thomist view, rather than as a wholesale deviation from Thomism, even if aspects of his view conflict with other principles that Thomists accept. Finally, from (1) and (2), I conclude, (5) that the idea of physical premotion as such is unsound and therefore that a view of divine *auxilium* more faithful to Aquinas's

[1] A follower of Marín Sola could reply, of course, that *P* is not both moved to *A* and not moved to *A in the same sense*. One might elucidate this reply by distinguishing being *moved to* (where the terminus is actually attained) from being *moved toward* (where it is not). While this line of response is viable in principle, what must be established is whether the distinction holds up: Can *P* be said in any true sense to be moved to *A* if *P* does not actually attain *A*? This will be explored further in subsection 3.2.4 below.

[2] Here, I number propositions for the sake of clarity, but not to indicate the order in which the discussion proceeds in this section. That order is clarified below.

own mind must be so refined as to dispense with the idea of physical premotion, even if certain true principles behind the idea of physical premotion ought to be retained.

In this section, I will first explore the tension alluded to in (2), touching here also upon claims (4) and (5). Second, I will revisit the charge of inconsistency in light of this tension in order to defend claim (1). Third, I will lay out how a follower of Marín-Sola could respond to the charge explored in (2). Fourth, I will explain how the original charge, explored in (2) remains sound, despite this rejoinder. Finally, I will close this section by showing how the underlying tension undermines not only Marín-Sola's view, but also Garrigou-Lagrange's (3).

3.2.1. The Inherent Tension in the Idea of Physical Premotion

The tension inherent within the idea of premotion originates from two features. First, premotion is understood to be a motion. Second, premotion is understood to be a created entity distinct from and antecedent to the recipient's own operation.

As a motion, premotion has a "*de dicto*" necessary efficacy – that is, an efficacy characterized by "necessity of consequence."[1] While it is true that God is omnipotent, the necessary efficacy of premotion is primarily due to its being a motion, pure and simple, rather than to its being from God. The inherent modal features of motion are the immediate explanation for its efficacy, not the universality of divine power.[2] While created causes do not exhibit the universal efficacy of the Creator, it is not because they, unlike God, move patients but the patients fail to move. It is that finite, created causes sometimes fail to move patients. Because "action" and "passion" (both denominations of motion) are relative terms, if a putative "patient" is not moving, then there is no agent moving it, and there is no agency or patiency – no motion – at all. Action and passion are

[1] The distinction between "necessity of consequence" and "necessity of the consequent," or the "*de dicto*" (composed) and "*de re*" (divided) senses of a conditional proposition was a commonplace of medieval philosophy. For one introduction to this topic, see Anthony Kenny, "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom," in *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Anthony Kenny (London: Macmillan, 1969), 258-60.

[2] Though admittedly, at a deeper level, divine power explains the modal features of motion as much as it also explains everything else. Advocates of premotion maintain, of course, that God is omnipotent and that his causality is universal in scope. However, the relevance of the distinction between the sheer modal necessity of (any) motion and divine omnipotence (in the case of God's *auxilium*) for explaining the efficacy of premotion is often overlooked. One who does attend to this distinction (though in the context of making his own argument, different from my point here) is William Matthew Diem, "Why Not To Be A 'Thomist': A Critique of the Bañezian Reconciliation of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom," *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 22, no. 2 (2020): 199-203.

mutually entailing. If God, or any agent, imparts a motion to a patient, then by sheer logical necessity, that patient is moved. Now, whereas a finite cause cannot always impart a motion to a subject that is potentially mobile because of the limited scope of the finite cause's power, God, whose causal purview over what may positively exist is unlimited, can always move a potentially mobile subject. Thus premotion, simply as motion, is necessarily efficacious by force of consequence, even if some putative "movers" are not necessarily efficacious in their activity because their essences (and therefore, their active powers), unlike God's, are finite.

As a created influx, physical premotion is a finite reality distinct from both the cause and the effect. Its role is to link the cause and effect as such. God's premotion of a creaturely agent, therefore, is not the divine essence. But neither is it the created agent, nor the created agent's act. Rather, it is the *causality* of God, the transeunt action of God, passively received into the patient, reducing the patient from potency to act. Although this motion is not called "physical" in the sense of being a quantifiable exchange of energy between bodies, like a wave of radiation or a collision of particles (understanding "energy" in a modern scientific sense), premotion is characterized by its purveyors as an "active force" (*vis activa*), an "impulse" (*impulsus*), or an "influx" (*influxus*) – "something created" (*aliquid creatum*), "something really existing in the nature of things" (*aliquid reale in rerum natura existentes*) that is "prior" (*praeviam*) and "really distinct" (*realiter distinctum*) from the created agent's own action and potencies for action.[1]

This second way of conceptualizing causality – causality as influx – is surely the reification of a metaphor based on observations of ordinary causal interactions in the visible world that at least seem, on the commonsense level, to involve some transfer of matter or force that is observable or quantifiable in principle. For example, wind fills the sail of a ship, and the sails in turn impart the wind's force to the mast, beams, and keel of the ship, gliding it forward across the water. Pressurized hydraulic fluid passes through a valve actuated by the construction worker's hands, thereby flowing into the large hydraulic rams on an excavator, mediating the movements of the operator's hands to the power shovel, causing it to dig. A bull expresses semen into the reproductive tract of a cow and nine

[1] Diego Alvarez, *De Auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus, et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia liberi duodecim* (Cologne: Antonius Boetzerus, 1622), III, d. 18, §9 (136a); d. 19, §§4, 8-9 (149a, 152b-153a, 155a-b); d. 23, §§9, 13 (211b, 213a-b), §27 (222a); Domingo Báñez, "Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei efficaciter moventis humanam voluntatem," in *Comentarios inéditos a la prima secundae de Santo Tómas, Tomo III: De gratia Dei (qq. 109-114)*, ed. Vicente Beltran de Heredia, O.P. (Salamanca: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1948), II, c. 1, §§5-6 (378-79), c. 4, §7 (407); Garrigou-Lagrange, "Prémotion physique," 36-39.

months later, calves are born. An archer's chest and arm muscles contract, applying a 40-pound draw to his bowstring, compressing the bow. He releases, and the potential energy in the bow becomes kinetic, pulling the bowstring, which thrusts the arrow into flight toward a deer, which the arrow, by its force of impact and direction of flight, mortally wounds.

None of the above descriptions are metaphorical accounts of interactions between bodies. They are straightforward observational accounts of the interactions of bodies. But such observational accounts provide a basis for conceptualizing causality in a metaphorical way. Causality as such is not the wind that fills the sail, the hydraulic fluid that presses against the ram piston, the bull semen that is released into the cow, or any of the complex exchanges of force detailed in the example of the bowhunter. Causality is not literally the influx of some entity from an agent into a patient. Yet it can initially seem to be.

The catalyst that accelerated the highly intuitive reification of this radically metaphorical conceptualization of causality was Jesuit scrutiny of the Dominican account of actual grace (*auxilium*) during the Controversy *de Auxiliis*. Under pressure from the Jesuits to clarify the reality and precise ontological status of premotion (of which actual grace was a species), the Dominicans doubled down on what was originally more of a concession: namely, that the premotion was a created antecedent to creaturely operation – a literal influx. The distinct creaturely status of the premotion, considered as an influx, was never the centerpiece of the Dominican account of divine causality. Rather, the central aim of the Dominicans was simply to defend the universal causality of God. They understood this essential datum of faith to be threatened by the Jesuit idea of human freedom, according to which human free choices were putatively outside the range of God's direct efficient causality.[1] In order to defend God's causal purview over human free choices, the Dominicans postulated the existence of physical premotion, developing certain features of St. Thomas's account of God's application of created causes.[2] The premotion was assumed to be a created *tertium quid* (what else could it be?) simply in order to preserve the idea that God's causality was real and operative – something objectively identifiable – even though the distinct metaphysical status of premotion was initially marginal and left somewhat implicit.

[1] In fact, Jesuits did affirm that God causes human free choices and developed nuanced accounts of divine concurrence with created causes. See Part II of Molina's *Concordia* and Francisco Suárez's *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, d. 22. The question is whether the Jesuits' attempt to account for the divine causation of human free choices is ultimately successful. I argue elsewhere that it is not (see *Divine Causality and Human Free Choice*, 315-21), though I do think their work advances the conversation in important directions.

[2] The *locus classicus* is Aquinas, *QDP*, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7.

However, the Jesuits objected that the Dominican account undermined human freedom, thereby implicating God in creaturely sins. When pressed by the Jesuits (who were even more the focus of scrutiny during the Controversy *de Auxiliis* and resultantly went on the offensive) to clarify the ontological status of premotion, the Dominicans and their allies generally did not refine their notion but, in the heat of conflict, merely clarified and solidified it. As a result, the affirmation that God's movement of the human will was a created influx became more explicit within the Dominican theological tradition, with the effect of reinforcing Jesuit misgivings and protracting the ideological stalemate of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* as late as the second half of the twentieth century, when questions of divine causality and human freedom ceased to occupy much attention from theologians and philosophers.

The essential point to take away from the foregoing inductive sketch of the psychological dynamics of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* is this: The idea that premotion is a created *tertium quid* enters the Dominican account by way of the back door, as a side effect of articulating their focal concern, which is the universal causality of God. Nevertheless, the influx idea of causality enters their account and henceforward becomes a staple of Thomism. Authors in this tradition lay claim to the influx idea without noticing its novelty or how the influx idea stands in tension with the more purely Thomistic (and Aristotelian) idea of causation reflected in the first conceptual feature of premotion detailed above. This oversight is understandable in light of the pragmatic and political impulse of thinkers to consolidate a party around their position and hold a unified line in the midst of divisive conflict. But this impulse is, or at least often can be, at cross purposes with the pursuit of sound theory.

How does the influx idea of causality stand in tension with the idea of causality as motion? Motion is a fully relational concept insofar as it is specified by the mutually entailing ideas of action and passion.[1] Influx, by contrast, is not so thoroughly a relational concept.[2] Rather, "influx" focalizes the idea of transference, specifically of *what* is communicated between an agent and a patient. Admittedly, it is not that influx (or its cognate concepts) are totally nonrelational. After all, influx mediates a relationship and cannot be understood outside the context of a relationship insofar as to "flow in" signifies a transference whereby something is communicated or imparted from a source to a recipient. But the influx idea does not focalize the relationship. Rather, it focalizes *something* that is passed between the agent and the patient, linking them as such.

There are two principal implications of this for the investigation at hand. The first is that, insofar as influx is not as thoroughly a relational concept as action and

[1] The same thing could be said about "cause" and "effect," *mutatis mutandis*.

[2] The same thing could be said for the cognate concepts of "force" and "impulse."

passion are, it does not have the *ratio* of logical consequence as motion has. For it is the relational complementarity of action and passion that explains why necessity of consequence is an inherent modal feature of motion. The second is that, insofar as influx is "*aliquid creatum*" passed between the agent and the patient, it is necessarily something finite, and so lacks the transcendence and universal power of God. Because of these two implications, the prospect of the in-principle defeasibility of premotion enters the stage.

The influx idea may have some place in fully developed accounts of causal interactions between bodies. But the influx idea is certainly inadequate to the task of speaking literally about divine causality.[1] Premotion, insofar as it is inextricably linked to the influx idea of causality, is a vestige of legacy Thomism left behind from the Dominicans' post-Reformation dispute with the Jesuits. It should be abandoned and the notion of God's movement of the human will refined.[2]

3.2.2. The Charge of Logical Inconsistency in Light of the Tension in the Idea of Premotion

It is now possible to review in greater detail the objection that a theory of impedible premotion is logically inconsistent. According to Marín-Sola, God's application of secondary causes to act is premotion. Premotion is motion. Necessity of consequence is an inherent modal feature of motion. Since premotion is motion, necessity of consequence is also an inherent modal feature of premotion. But to be impeded is inconsistent with necessity of consequence: A premotion cannot both fail to go through to its intended end and infallibly go through to its intended end. Therefore, no premotion is impedible. But according

[1] It is probably also inadequate for speaking about the causality of any noncorporeal cause (such as the soul's movement of the body or the action of angels in the visible world).

[2] The idea of premotion pre-dates the *De auxiliis* disputes, but my point is that the idea took full form, hardened problematic directions, and became central especially through the *De auxiliis* disputes. Premotion theory got going not because of the Jesuits, but because it is highly intuitive, both as a reading of Aquinas and as a way of thinking about causality. The debates with the Jesuits were a catalyst for the development of the idea. Advocates of premotion will argue that premotion is Thomas's own view, is central to his account of divine action, and is not a vestige left by a certain phase of the reception of Aquinas. Critics of premotion will point out that nowhere in the corpus of his works does Thomas use the term "premotion" and that the concept it signifies is a product of the later interpretive tradition. My own view is that however inextricably enmeshed with Thomism and central to *it* the idea of premotion became (as a matter of historical contingency), Thomists do not need premotion in order to do justice to their (and Aquinas's) foundational principles. Moreover, because the idea of premotion is problematic, Thomists should not waste their efforts in trying to retain and defend it, but should instead give fresh expression to the contemplation of their true and more foundational principles, such as the universality and transcendence of divine action.

to Marín-Sola, some premotions are impeded. The inconsistency is to maintain both that God's application of secondary causes is both a motion and impedible. The *ratio* of motion and the *ratio* of impedibility pull against each other, but Marín-Sola's theory of divine *auxilium* combines them.

This feature of Marín-Sola's account is what allows critics of impedible premotion to charge that a premotion that is impedible is "inconceivable" or absurd – something that of its very form cannot be in reality, like the impossibility of three-sided squares, dry rain, or married bachelors.[1]

Now, Marín-Sola responds to this critique, and foundational to his response is the presumption that it is not only conceivable, but obvious that there are impedible premotions.[2] I will discuss Marín-Sola's response in greater detail below. But the crucial thing to notice first is that Marín-Sola's defense focalizes the second aspect of premotion detailed above – that premotion is a created *influxus* – whereas his critics focalize the first aspect of premotion detailed above – that premotion is a motion and motion is infallible in the composed sense. The success of the criticism of impedible premotion theory hinges on (1) the inherent *de dicto* necessity of a motion reaching its terminus, (2) the fact that Marín-Sola assumes motion as the conceptual framework for understanding divine application of secondary causes, and (3) Marín-Sola's affirmation that secondary causes can sometimes resist (block, defeat, impede) this divine application (motion).

3.2.3. How a Follower of Marín-Sola Could Respond to the Allegation of Logical Inconsistency

The charge of logical inconsistency turns on the connection between action and passion as mutually entailing denominations of motion. There is no action where there is no passion, and there is no passion where there is no action. To postulate a motion of the mover is to postulate a movement of the moved.

But one might reply: That action and passion are logically correlative is not false but impertinent. It is impertinent because to maintain that action implies passion does not commit one to the idea that an action must be uninterrupted.[3] Insofar as an action is an action, there is a corresponding passion, but the action may not reach its intended terminus due to the interference of some other causal

---

[1] See, for example, Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 231; Nicholas, "La permission du péché," *Revue Thomiste* 60, no. 1 (1960): 33-34; *Mystery of Grace* (Dubuque, IA: The Priory Press, 1960), 10-12. Note that toward the end of his life, Nicholas shifted away from the dominant Thomist view and toward the view of Maritain, while confessing the overarching mysteriousness of God's causal involvement in sin. For Nicolas's later view, see "La volunté salvifique de Dieu contrariée par le péché," *Revue Thomiste* 92 (1992): 177-96.

[2] Torre, *God's Permission of Sin*, 267.

[3] Torre, *Do Not Resist*, 253; cf. Torre, *God's Permission of Sin*, 93.

vector. To deny this and to insist that motion (or action) necessarily attains its terminus seems tantamount to denying the obvious.[1] There are many examples in everyday experience of the action of a cause being impeded such that a patient is moved toward an end, but the end is not actually attained. Such examples seem to invalidate the principle on which the charge of inconsistency turns, namely, that necessity of consequence is an inherent modal feature of motion.

For example, consider two cases of a woman imparting a motion to her refrigerator in order to slide it out of its place. In one case, she applies a force of 200 N-m to the refrigerator in order to slide it out so that her son can recover a lost toy. In another case, she applies a force of 200 N-m to the same refrigerator in order to slide it out so that she can clean up an old spill, except in this case, the refrigerator does not budge because it is stuck to the floor with dried up food. Admittedly, the application of a force of 200 N-m infallibly brings about changes in both cases (as we would expect from Newton's third law), though in the latter case the changes are more noticeable in the woman than in the refrigerator (which might merely flex or rock in place). Despite this fact, however, it is clear how in the second case the woman's action does not reach its end, for the refrigerator does not slide out of place, despite an equal force being applied as in the other case where the woman was successful. Arguably, it is not that in the second case a motion is not imparted, or that (from her side) the woman imparted a different motion or did a different action than in the first case. The difference between the cases lies not with the woman's motion (or action, or applied force – her "work" or the energy she imparted to the refrigerator), but in the disposition of the refrigerator. It is not that the refrigerator in the first case is moved more but, rather, that it resists less the woman's push than in the second case. Whatever movement there is of the stuck refrigerator is from the woman, and the failure of the refrigerator to move further is not from the woman – who is applying enough force in the right direction to move such a refrigerator – but from the refrigerator itself, which is indisposed, because of its own faulty disposition, to receive the woman's movement.

Likewise, human resistance to grace – God's premotion – is a defect. Because this resistance is a defect, it is a privation that originates with the human agent. Insofar as privation is entitatively negative – real but lacking in positive being – it is not caused by God. All the positive reality of a human action is caused primarily by God and secondarily by the human agent under God's influence. This includes the human agent's consent to God's premotion, which premotion is antecedent to human consent. The further condition for this consent is not some positive act introduced by the human agent *ex nihilo* but merely the

[1] See Torre, *God's Permission of Sin*, 267.

human person's passive nonresistance or "quiescence" of will, to borrow a term of art from Eleonore Stump, who defends what at least seems to be an essentially similar account of God's motion of human free will.[1] Thus, everything positive in a human action is first from God. All that originates from the human agent is non-act, considered either as privation (in the case of sin) or as passive receptivity (in the case of meritorious action).

It is true that there is more positive reality in the case where a patient does not resist premotion than in the case where the patient does resist. But none of that additional positive reality is *independently* introduced by the patient (who, of itself and as a finite cause, has only the power for nonaction). Marín-Sola can therefore admit that God is doing more in the case of a patient that is effectively moved to a meritorious good act than in the case of one who resists. However, the "more" that God is doing in the case of a person's meritorious good act is not antecedent; rather, it is consequent to human nonresistance and is concurrent with the person's good act. Because the human person does not resist, God's antecedent causality (operation) goes through and becomes concurrent (cooperation). This concurrent causality is not present where the patient has, by resisting, cut short God's premotion. The one who cuts short God's premotion does so autonomously (as he or she can, insofar as to cut short is to introduce privation), and not because he or she antecedently was given less assistance (or not enough assistance to avoid resistance). Privation in the human act does not need to be (and indeed cannot be) explained by premotion. It is true that God is doing less in the case of one who fails than in the case of one who performs a meritorious good act. But the less he is doing is putatively consequent to and conditional on the privation introduced by the human person who resists.

Moreover, Marín-Sola can still maintain that action and passion are mutually entailing even when action is cut short. Thus, he can grant the principle on which his opponents' objection hinges. On Marín-Sola's view, it is not that there is no corresponding movement of the patient when God imparts a resistible premotion and that premotion is resisted. There infallibly is *some* movement of the patient, insofar as God actually imparts a motion. Like the woman in the above example who can rock but not slide the stuck refrigerator, God, through a premotion that is resisted by the human agent, infallibly brings about the *beginning* of the good action he wants the human agent to perform. However, because of the human agent's resistance, God does not cause the complete meritorious action of the human agent. Just as for Marín-Sola's opponents, necessity of consequence remains an essential feature of premotion for Marín-Sola.

The factor that explains the difference between Marín-Sola and his critics is

[1] See Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (London: Routledge, 2003), 393-404.

his ontology of premotion.[1] According to Marín-Sola, it is crucial to recognize that a human action is a unitary reality, even while it comprises a sequence of distinct stages of related operations of intellect and will.[2] The upshot is that the corresponding premotion to an action is likewise unitary.

To illustrate: Some bodily behavior executed by the will presupposes the intellect's command of such behavior. The intellect's command presupposes free choice of the will. Free choice of the will presupposes a final practical judgment of the intellect that terminates deliberation. Deliberation of the intellect presupposes the will's desire for the general human good concerning whose concrete instantiation the intellect is deliberating. The will's desire of a basic human good presupposes the intellect's practical understanding that the object of that desire is worthy of pursuit.[3] According to Marín-Sola, it is not that there are distinct premotions of the intellect or of the will for each of the distinct operations of intellect or will that make up a complete human action, precisely because these operations are properly conceived of not as actions in their own right but as integral stages of a single action.[4] Accordingly, the premotion for this unitary action is also unitary, comprising in one sweep all of action's stages.

For this reason, Marín-Sola understands premotion to be like a continuous current and not like discrete strokes or pulses corresponding to each distinct operation of intellect or will at each of an action's stages.[5] Like a current of electricity that, flowing in from the street to the utility panel of a house, can be shut off at the panel to a certain region of the house, so too, God's continuous-stream premotion flows in to the recipient and moves him or her to the lower stages of a meritorious good action, but can be cut off so that it does not attain to the higher stages which complete that action.[6] Resistance to God's premotion (which, so far as it goes, infallibly attains *some* effect) is like cutting the electricity to the upstairs of a house while the downstairs remains energized. Like the homeowner who does not have control over whether power comes in from the street but can shut it down only from within the house, the human agent is

---

[1] Torre, *God's Permission of Sin*, 98, mentions that Marín-Sola never had the opportunity to fully develop his ontology of premotion. Still, his view can be put together from what he wrote (cf. 119).

[2] See Marín-Sola, "A Reply to Some Objections," 70-73.

[3] This is meant to be not an exhaustive analysis of human action but just detailed enough to support the present discussion. For a more detailed discussion of the stages of human action, see Aquinas, *ST* I-II, qq. 8-17. For an elucidation, see John Finnis, *Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 62-71.

[4] See Torre, *God's Permission of Sin*, 112-27, Marín-Sola, "A Reply to Some Objections," 78-79.

[5] See Marín-Sola, "A Reply to Some Objections," 72.

[6] See Marín-Sola, "New Observations," 200-01 n. 53.

infallibly moved at God's initiative to the beginnings of a good action but can consequently, on his own initiative, negate God's influence.[1]

3.2.4. An Assessment of the Response

As suggested above, what lends considerable strength to the above line of defense is that Marín-Sola admits the principle on which his critics' objection hinges (namely, that necessity of consequence is an intrinsic feature of motion), even while denying the fatal implication of this principle for the idea of impedible premotion. It is crucial to recognize that two factors allow Marín-Sola to deny the fatal implication of the principle on which he and his opponents agree.

The first factor is that Marín-Sola conceptualizes premotion as an influx – a kind of force, impulse, stream, or current. This does not by itself entail that premotion is resistible, but it does establish the possibility that premotion is resistible insofar as it locates premotion within the domain of created and, therefore, finite entity.[2] Whereas God cannot change, what is created is in principle defeasible.[3] Thus, what was initially a marginal feature of the Thomist account in its earliest years is leveraged to do heavy lifting in Marín-Sola's later, retrospective account, which, looking back at premotion through the lens of Jansenism, tries to compensate for the shortcomings of more primitive articulations.

The second factor is the context of intentionality within which the influx idea of causality is understood. Because causality is understood as an influx – a kind of entity in its own right – it can be distinguished from the intention it enacts. The intention, as such, is something internal to the agent, whereas the influx is a reality distinct from and external to the agent insofar as the influx flows forth from the agent. This distinction allows in principle for an incongruity between the intention and the influx: An agent may intend a certain end and emit a causal influx toward

[1] In oblique contrast to Marín-Sola's analogy, see Nicholas, *The Mystery of God's Grace*, 9-10.

[2] See Torre, *God's Permission of Sin*, 268, 310.

[3] This may provide Marín-Sola with an avenue for replying to the objection, reviewed above in §3.1, that impedible premotion compromises divine impassibility: Creatures do not determine God by resisting his premotion, they determine (in respect to efficacy, not specification) his premotion, which, as created, is extrinsic to God. Still, this move may not ultimately dissolve the problem: One reason is that the success of this move depends on the plausibility of conceptualizing God's causality as a created influx antecedent to God's effects, and a question about that is how such an influx, insofar as it is a created reality, could determinately bring about a choice that is free. As indicated in §3.4 below, Marín-Sola thinks that God can determinately and efficaciously overcome human resistance by a premotion that is infallibly efficacious with no detriment to human free choice. Moreover, he denies that the resistibility of grace is required for human freedom (see Marín-Sola, "New Observations," 218-19, cf. 192).

that end, yet the influx fails to reach the intended end. Viewed against the backdrop of intention, which supplies a hypothetical end in reference to which the influx can be evaluated, the influx can be judged to have succeeded or failed. But note that the influx is not then judged against its own de facto terminus – where it actually ends – but against the intended end. The hypothetical terminus of the intention is projected onto the influx as definitive of it such that the influx (or motion) is said to be toward that (hypothetical) end simply because it goes in the direction of that end, even though it is not an influx (or motion) that actually reaches that (hypothetical, intended) end, but terminates in some more proximate, actual end along the same path.

This distinction between the de facto and hypothetical termini of a motion (which presupposes the conceptualization of motion as influx or some cognate idea) allows Marín-Sola to accept logical consequence as a modal feature of motion while denying that motion is irresistible. The motion of the mover necessarily implies the movement of the moved, but, just as the motion of the mover can be incomplete, so too the movement of the moved can be correspondingly incomplete.

However, the distinction between the hypothetical and de facto termini of a motion raises a problem. Insofar as an agent's intention is one thing and the created influx that is his causality is another, the end belonging to his intention is one thing and the end belonging to the influx is another. Even if there is an alignment of these ends (as when premotion is successful and what is intended is actually achieved), they differ ontologically insofar as the former pertains to the existential order and exists in the will, whereas the latter pertains to the order of nature and exists outside the agent, as a feature of the influx itself.[1] One implication of this is that a motion that does not go through to the intended end differs in itself from a motion that does go through to the intended end. Moreover, the motion that does not go through to the intended end differs in itself *antecedently* – as it must, being a *pre*motion – not just concomitantly from the motion that does not go through to the intended end. This is a problem because on Marín-Sola's account – if I have understood it – two individuals receiving the same antecedent motion can respond differently to it, resulting in two different outcomes for that antecedent motion. According to Marín-Sola, the difference is not on the side of the premotion, but on the side of the recipient. But precisely insofar as (a) premotion is antecedent to and distinct from the recipient's

[1] One might also urge (whether additionally or instead) that insofar as the intellect presents the will's object to it, the intended end exists intentionally, as a logical entity in the agent's intellect. Even so, this serves only to reinforce the point I am making, which is that the end as it exists in the agent is one thing, and the end as it is actually achieved objectively is another.

operation; (b) the recipient can do nothing without this antecedent premotion; (c) premotion as such has a corresponding passion by force of logical consequence; and (d) a premotion that is thwarted is, by that very fact, entitatively less than a premotion that goes through; therefore (e), a premotion that is less is less *antecedently* (and not just consequent to the human response), and a premotion that is less results in less, whereas a premotion that is more results in more. On the above tenets of premotion, when the result is more, the premotion (which is antecedent!) has to be greater. It seems impossible to maintain what Marín-Sola maintains, as long as premotion is assumed as a way of thinking about divine action.

Both Marín-Sola and his critics can admit that in the case of a premotion that goes through there is more concomitantly from the side of the primary cause. But the point suggested above is that there must also be more antecedently because that is implicit in the very idea of premotion. On any theory of premotion, whenever there is more on the part of the moved, there has to be more antecedently on the part of the mover to explain that "more" on the part of the moved. It is true that no premotion is needed to positively explain the creature's failure, but Marín-Sola's critics can also maintain that. They hold that whatever positive contribution there is from the side of the creature is from God, but Marín-Sola can also maintain that. Marín-Sola denies the implication that when there is more from the side of the creature, as when a premotion goes through, there must be more antecedently from the side of God. Yet, unless there were more antecedently (and not just concurrently) from the side of God, it would be impossible on the very premises of a premotion theory to explain the creature's "more" in accepting God's premotion. However much the nonaction or resistance of the secondary cause can be explained, privatively or causally, by the secondary cause's own defects, it must correspond, logically and permissively, to antecedent nonaction on the part of God. The cost of denying this is to give up on two principles to which Marín-Sola is committed as a Thomist: namely, that any action of a secondary cause, insofar as it is positive, depends on God's premotion, and that de dicto necessity is an inherent modal feature of premotion. On these principles the charge of inconsistency is sound and, it seems to me, fatal to the idea of impedible premotion.

3.2.5. The Influx Idea Is Also Fatal to the Idea of Infallible Premotion

However, the soundness of the charge against Marín-Sola's theory does not exonerate the alternative position of his critics. For Marín-Sola's critique of their position – specifically, that it fails to adequately preserve human responsibility for

sin – is also essentially sound.[1] Additionally, the position of Marín-Sola's Thomist critics is inconsistent in its own way on account of the tension – which they accept – inherent in the very idea of physical premotion. For, whereas Marín-Sola leverages the influxus dimension of premotion in order to develop the idea of premotion in a direction that is sensitive to the condemnations of Jansenism, his opponents leverage the modal-logical dimension of premotion in order to preserve the universality and infallibility of divine agency. But they do so while retaining the influx idea, and they retain the influx idea without realizing either how it is a problem or how it serves as a condition for the possibility of a development like Marín-Sola's. Therefore, they do not recognize that the two dimensions of premotion explored above stand in tension with each other.

It is clear from the discussion above how the influx idea serves the development of a theory of impedible premotion. One reason the influx idea raises a problem for both Marín-Sola (who admits the existence of some infallibly efficacious premotions) and his critics (who maintain that all premotions are infallibly efficacious, at least for their intended end) is that it is impossible to see how a created antecedent to the human act of free choice can causally necessitate an act of choice that is truly free. For while God, who is transcendent, can bring about effects as necessary or free because his agency extends to the very modality (and not just the essence) of what he causes (insofar as esse as such is his proper effect, and an effect's mode is enveloped by its esse), the premotion, as something created, is necessarily finite and lacks the transcendent efficacy of God.[2]

Thus, the attempt to maintain that a free choice remains free under infallible premotion requires an equivocation of "free" so that the freedom characterizing choice as genuine self-determination is reduced to something less, such as noncoercion or the natural disposition of the human agent toward a variety of goods, both of which pick out conditions that are necessary but not sufficient for genuine self-determination.[3]

---

[1] I do not argue here in defense of Marín-Sola's criticism of Garrigou-Lagrange's position; however, I explore in greater detail the related arguments made by others against classical premotion theory in *Divine Causality and Human Free Choice*, chap. 4. For a contemporary expression of a similar line of critique, see Diem (apropos of Marín-Sola, see 195 n. 23).

[2] This point was also noted by Bernard Lonergan as early as the 1940s. See his "De ente supernaturali," in *Early Latin Theology*, vol. 19 of *The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan,* trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 220; and "De scientia atque voluntate Dei" in the same volume, 340.

[3] See Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and Olaf Tollefsen, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 8-25.

3.3. The Intelligibility of Redemption Demands a Libertarian Free Will

While Marín-Sola's view seems to offer a promising remedy for the deficiencies of Garrigou-Lagrange's view, it may not go far enough, as I have just suggested. For while Marín-Sola's position goes further to explain why God is not the cause of moral evil, it only apparently, but not really, goes further toward maintaining human freedom, and what is really needed to explain the origins of moral evil – and so consequently, human redemption – is a strong account of human freedom. In fact, Marín-Sola states about his own view that,

> [i]f we are defending that one must admit fallible or defectible premotions, it is not to save freedom, because the more efficacious a divine motion is, the better saved is freedom, which is a perfection. But it is exclusively to explain sin and the responsibility of man in it, a thing that is inexplicable if all motions are infallibly efficacious as regards everything.[1]

In a similar direction, Michael Torre maintains that human persons have libertarian freedom only for wrongdoing but not for performing morally good action.[2] In Marín-Sola's estimation (and Torre's), free choice is compatible with divine predetermination. While it is clear that Marín-Sola affirms the divine predetermination of the specification of every human action, he also holds that God can predetermine the exercise of free choice. God can, when he wants, override a human person's resistance by an infallible, intrinsically efficacious physical predetermination. Marín-Sola does not deny the kind of physical premotions Garrigou-Lagrange admits; he just denies that all physical premotions are of this kind.

Libertarian freedom has often been invoked in order to explain the origin of moral evil in a universe created good by God. But what is sometimes eclipsed – by reaction against the Pelagian heresy – is that not only sin but redemption requires some kind of libertarian account of freedom. I say "some kind" of libertarian account, because standard versions of libertarianism will not do insofar as they deny that a person's free choices can be caused by any variable (including God) other than the agent him- or herself. The Pelagianism inherent to that kind of libertarianism makes it as incompatible with the logic of redemption as any kind of determinism, including compatibilism, though for different reasons. However, libertarians are right to maintain that free choices are settled just in the very act of choosing, and that a free choice has no other sufficient reason beyond

[1] Marín-Sola, "New Observations," 218-19.

[2] See Torre, "Afterword," in *Do Not Resist*, 284-85 n. 47. Torre suggests that human persons have compatibilist freedom for good action and libertarian freedom for bad.

the choice itself.[1] One who affirms this is not compelled to deny that human choices are caused by God, as Matthews Grant and others have ably shown.[2]

While there is an entitative (and therefore causal) asymmetry between good and evil acts, this is sometimes focalized at the expense of recognizing the modal symmetry between good and evil acts: Both good and evil acts are equally up to the human person. An action's goodness or badness as such is not a determinant of the freedom or necessity with which it is performed or of the consequent moral responsibility the human agent bears for that action.[3] The human person is not more responsible for his evil acts than for his good acts, simply because he is the first cause of the privation of his evil acts. Similarly, the human person is not any less the author of his good acts than his evil acts simply because God is the primary cause of the good acts.[4] To deny this requires ignoring the difference that divine simplicity makes for conceptualizing the relationship between God and secondary causes. It requires one to erroneously imagine this relationship as a zero-sum balance that splits the work between God and the human person.

The reason why redemption, as it actually happens in the real world, requires libertarian freedom in the sense I have described is that, as with any other repair

[1] This is true at least insofar as "sufficient reason" is typically understood. Typically, the sufficient reason for a choice is understood as some antecedent factor other than the very act of choice that explains why the choice is of this rather than that, such that a difference in the effect (the choice) corresponds to a difference in the cause (the sufficient reason).

[2] See for example, W. Matthews Grant, "Can a Libertarian Hold that Our Free Acts Are Caused by God?" *Faith and Philosophy* 27, no. 1 (2010): 22-44 and *Free Will and God's Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account*, Bloomsbury Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Stewart Goetz (London: Bloomsbury, 2019).

[3] Moral genus (the good/bad quality of the act) is not a modal determinant of the act. Moreover, both good and bad actions equally last as determinations of the agent's character.

[4] "More" and "less" depend on a shared frame of reference (univocity of being), which cannot be assumed in the case of God and creatures. The relevant comparison is between good and evil acts in a single metaphysical plane of reference (from one agential perspective – either God's or the creature's), not between God's agency and a creature's agency. The above points do not negate the true sense in which a good or a bad action can be more or less "free." There are virtues and vices, and external circumstances can condition the ease or difficulty with which we act. Even so, it remains the case that in one fundamental sense of "freedom," an act either is free or it isn't – the question of freedom is, in this strict sense, binary. Moreover, while good action and bad action can be more or less "free" in a different sense, it isn't the goodness or the badness as such that makes it to be more or less free. A person might be "freer" to perform one good act rather than another good act (the way a pianist is "freer" to play a concerto than a game of tennis), just as a virtuous person is "freer" to perform a good act than a vicious person (who is "freer" to perform a bad act). Freedom understood as an ability to act admits of degrees within a moral genus; it does not necessarily correspond to moral genus.

job, the solution has to be proportioned to the essential reality of the problem. Sin is a free self-determination against the law of God. Therefore, what reverses the privation that makes sin to be sin is a freely willed turning toward God. This turning toward God must be as much the human person's own as was the turning away, if it is to reverse sin. The logic of this divine reordering of the human person can be seen clearly in the Pauline theme of the New Adam, and it is a recurrent theme in the Letter to the Hebrews: The death of Jesus saves us because it externalizes – one might say it "sacramentalizes" – the invisible, interior reality of Jesus's human love for and obedience to the Father. This orientation of Jesus's human will is the fundamental sacrifice – the res – that cancels or reverses Adam's disobedience, reintroducing into the human race a comprehensive pattern of correspondence to the loving will of God. This correspondence adapts the human person for, establishes him or her in, and is the fruit of his or her saving communion with God. This redemptive, covenantal communion is unintelligible apart from the gift of self that can occur only on the supposition of the kind of libertarian freedom I have described. Thus it is no surprise that we find this notion of freedom originating from within a biblical Jewish thought context, not the Greek philosophical tradition.

Conclusion

By advancing an idea of resistible premotion, Marín-Sola attempts to correct the unacceptable implications of Garrigou-Lagrange's view while maintaining substantial continuity with its assumptions about divine causality. However, while many of the basic motivations behind the theory of physical premotion are sound, that theory itself, held in common by Garrigou-Lagrange and Marín-Sola, misconstrues God's causal action as if it were a transference of some kind of created energy between God and his effect. Insofar as Marín-Sola does not break free from this problematic assumption about God's causal action, his position is beleaguered by a twofold difficulty: It is less internally consistent than Garrigou-Lagrange's while still liable to the objection that it is deterministic. Following the lead of several other thinkers, I would suggest that Aquinas's teaching on creation provides an alternative conceptual framework for thinking about the relationship of God and secondary causes that is more adequate insofar as it does justice to the sound basic motivations behind both premotion accounts considered above while forestalling the dilemmas that confronted Garrigou-Lagrange and Marín-Sola.

Heresy *secundum quid* in Light of St. Thomas Aquinas

Basil Cole, O.P.[*]

ABSTRACT: This short study is an attempt to explain that heresy, as detailed by St. Thomas Aquinas, is not merely a denial of solemn definitions of faith by a pope or general council but also, in lesser degrees, includes statements that would lead someone by further reasoning to deny the ecclesiastical pronouncements of dogmas of faith. Heresy is also found when contradicting the more easily understood passages of sacred scripture, especially concerning moral doctrines such as denying the veracity of one or more of the commandments as universally taught by the Church. Further, Thomas speaks of heresy as a false choosing of what to believe, manifestly contrary one or many articles of faith. Indirectly and more often, some assertions deny truths that would lead to contradicting articles of faith. However, it is one thing to call a statement heresy or heretical, and quite another to call a person a heretic. Christians and others can and do hold many false opinions of faith and morals in ignorance but not necessarily in an obstinate manner. Unlike a juridical trial for heresy, Thomas would hold that there are many lesser degrees of heresy, which should not be treated univocally but analogously, that can corrupt a person's understanding of Catholic faith.

IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH the faithful tend to accuse someone of heresy on the basis of false teaching that they may have found in sermons, conferences, or writings. St. Thomas Aquinas himself often called false statements heretical, but he makes a distinction between the sin of heresy and heretical statements. As we shall see, he does not limit heretical statements simply to those against creeds or solemn definitions of faith (the highest degrees of heretical statements). He also includes errors, theological or philosophical, that indirectly undermine the content of faith.

This short study attempts to show that statements that are false philosophically or theologically, which can be enunciated by anyone, do not necessarily make one a formal heretic. In using the term "heretical" for a broader range of ideas than simply statements that are opposed to creeds, Aquinas explains that the term "heretical" is analogous and that varying degrees of error in matters of faith or morals are often seeds that sprout denials of solemn definitions of faith

[*] *Rev. Basil Cole, O.P.* is professor of moral, spiritual, and dogmatic theology at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, DC.

by popes or general councils. As prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Ratzinger made many clarifications on these matters, as this study will show. Truths that are declared definitive teachings of the Church, but fall short of solemn definitions of faith, are also to be held by Catholic Faith. To deny these teachings means to distance oneself from the Church. Doing so corresponds to Aquinas's notion of indirect heresy.

Doctrinal confusion in the Church – that is, major or minor dissent in matters of faith and morals – dates from her very beginning and is found here and there down the ages. Some periods had more of their share of doctrinal error than others. However, from dealing with the confusion there arose clear and true propositions of faith and morals from careful reflection on sacred scripture, the writings of the fathers of the Church, the general councils of the Church, and the writings of sound theologians. Even the fact of certain heretical writings indirectly helped the Church to refine her teaching, making for a deeper response to erroneous thought. In doctrinal confusions concerning faith and morals, there are generally notions that are true but hidden by formulations that are poorly expressed. They easily lead to errors about faith and morals. Yet, the care given to resolve such questions eventually produces greater clarity and understanding of divine faith, both doctrinally and pastorally, when these matters are authoritatively clarified.

Doctrinal/moral confusion emerges in the pews when preachers introduce ambiguous statements, or use the works of learned theologians like Aquinas without making proper distinctions or having regard for the context, or fail to provide an adequate account when discussing moral teachings of the Catholic Church that are taught by the universal ordinary magisterium. Admittedly, the priest or deacon who preaches at Mass is not a spokesman for the universal ordinary magisterium of the Church, and so his teaching is neither infallible nor part of the universal magisterium. However, if his preaching manifestly contradicts, obfuscates, relativizes, or speaks ambiguously about previous teachings of the universal magisterium, whether of popes, general councils, or doctors of the Church, most people will simply forget what he said. But such failures can lead to confusion.

Eventually, if certain loosely worded assertions from the pulpit are repeatedly misinterpreted, the repetitions could lead others to deny either solemn definitions of faith or definitive propositions of faith and morals of the ordinary and universal magisterium of the Church. This in turn can further lead people to commit grave sins in the practical order of daily living under the guise of doing God's will, if, for example, the preacher is encouraging proportionalism or promoting the fundamental option in moral teaching. These confusions can result in genuinely heretical statements, even though the preacher is not formally a heretic because

he does not persistently deny truths of faith. On account of some intellectual confusion, he may think in good faith that he is "evolving" the understanding of faith and morals when in fact he appears to be "devolving" it. St. Thomas warns that theologians and preachers who wish to subordinate faith to reason manifest the queen of the vices, pride:

> [F]or it pertains to error to approve the false as true; heresy, however, adds over and above error something both on the part of the matter, since it is an error concerning truths pertaining to faith, and on the part of the person erring because heresy implies obstinacy, which alone give rise to a heretic, which obstinacy arises from pride, for it is a sin of great pride that person prefer his own opinion to divinely revealed truth.[1]

In the answer to the first objection, Aquinas includes statements on matters of morality as subject to heresy:

> The judgment of reason is corrupt in two ways: in one way universally, in another way in some particular matter on account of great passion. The corruption then of true judgment about things that directly pertain to faith or to good morals, if it be universally, pertains to the sin of heresy.[2]

Through many documents from St. John Paul II, the Church has been carefully instructed on the consequences of heresy and error.[3] It is clear that there are three categories of sacred teaching: (1) divinely revealed truth based on the Word of God[4]; (2) definitive and infallible Catholic truth defined with the Holy Spirit's guidance; and (3) truths defined by the authentic or ordinary magisterium of bishops and popes, which (unlike the ordinary and universal magisterium) is derived from speeches and writings that, while not definitive, still require loyal assent of the mind and heart without yet being infallible.[5] This third category of sacred teaching may include medical moral theology, social teachings of the Church, and reasons given for a solemn definition of the faith within the document promulgating it.

---

[1] *On Evil*, 8, 1 ad 7, trans. Jean Oesterle (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).

[2] Ibid. ad 1.

[3] See the 1983 Code of Canon Law; John Paul II, 1998 Apostolic Letter, *Ad Tuendam Fidem* (*ATF*); Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF): *Profession of Faith and the Oath of Fidelity on Assuming an Office to Be Exercised in the Name of the Church* (*PF*) and the explanatory *Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio Fidei* (*DC*); and the CDF's 1990 document *Donum Veritatis*, or *Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian.*

[4] Rom 16:26, cited by *LG*, 25, 2.

[5] *DC* 11.

A Further Refinement of Teaching Authority

These distinctions were made clear in the *Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio Fidei*:

5. ... The first paragraph states: "With firm faith, I also believe everything contained in the word of God, whether written or handed down in tradition, which the Church, either by solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal magisterium, sets forth to be believed as divinely revealed." The object taught in this paragraph is constituted by all those doctrines of divine and catholic faith which the Church proposes as divinely and formally revealed and, as such, as irreformable.

These doctrines require the assent of theological faith by all members of the faithful. Thus, whoever obstinately places them in doubt or denies them falls under the censure of heresy, as indicated by the respective canons of the codes of canon law.[1]

These two categories of teachings are, in the first place, solemn definitions of faith and creeds and, in the second place, teachings that are wider in scope yet require an assent of faith as well:

6. ... "I also firmly accept and hold each and everything definitively proposed by the Church regarding teaching on faith and morals." The object taught by this formula includes all those teachings belonging to the dogmatic or moral area which are necessary for faithfully keeping and expounding the deposit of faith, even if they have not been proposed by the magisterium of the Church as formally revealed.

Such doctrines can be defined solemnly by the Roman pontiff when he speaks "ex cathedra" or by the college of bishops gathered in council, or they can be taught infallibly by the ordinary and universal magisterium of the Church as a "*sententia definitive tenenda*". Every believer therefore, is required to give firm and definitive assent to these truths, based on faith in the Holy Spirit's assistance to the Church's Magisterium and on the Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the magisterium in these matters. Whoever denies these truths would be in the position of rejecting a truth of Catholic doctrine and would therefore no longer be in full communion with the Catholic Church.

It is clear that these first two categories of sacred teaching are infallible and owe an assent of the mind, but the items in one category are to be distinguished from items in the other:

8. With regard to the nature of the assent owed to the truths set forth by the Church as divinely revealed (those of the first paragraph) or to be held definitively (those of the second paragraph), it is important to emphasize that there is no difference with respect to the full and irrevocable character of the assent which is owed to these teachings. The difference concerns the supernatural virtue of faith: in the case of truths of the first paragraph, the assent is based directly on faith in the authority of the Word of God

[1] http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_ cfaith_doc_1998_professio-fidei_en.html.

(doctrines *de fide credenda*); in the case of the truths of the second paragraph, the assent is based on faith in the Holy Spirit's assistance to the Magisterium and on the Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the magisterium (doctrines *de fide tenenda*).[1]

Concerning the third category, those writings or speeches of the ordinary magisterium of a bishop, including his magisterium as delegated to the teachings of his priests, are for clarifying defined dogmas and Catholic teaching. These explanations are neither infallible nor definitive, especially when using rhetoric, examples, metaphors, and philosophical insights. However, it is clear that

> 10b. To this paragraph belong all those teachings on faith and morals presented as true or at least as sure, even if they have not been defined with a solemn judgment or proposed as definitive by the ordinary and universal Magisterium. Such teachings…require religious submission of will and intellect….
>
> A proposition contrary to these doctrines can be qualified as erroneous or, in the case of teachings of the prudential order, as rash or dangerous and therefore "*tuto doceri non potest*". [Cf. Canons 752, 1371; Eastern Churches Canons 599, 436 §2][2]

A fourth category was introduced by the then Cardinal Ratzinger in *Donum vitae* concerning decisions made concerning a prudential matter not immediately connected with dogmatic or definitive teaching.[3]

St. Thomas and Heresy Revisited

In the first part of the *Summa theologiae,* St. Thomas has an article that clarifies how one could teach heretical ideas in principle. A preacher or teacher can sin gravely or venially against the virtue of faith directly or indirectly:

> Anything is of faith in two ways; directly, where any truth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and unity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like; and concerning these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if it be held obstinately.[4]

Interestingly, it is one thing to have a false opinion about things "divinely taught," which "involves" heresy, and another to hold such a false teaching obstinately (a subjective disposition). Today, canonists would say that if teaching false opinions in the first two categories is heretical, and if the person who wrote or taught these opinions is obstinate in holding them, he or she could be judged by the

---

[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] *DV*, 24-31, [42] where its contents are called "interventions in the prudential order."

[4] *ST* I, q. 32, a. 4. *The Summa theologiæ* of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, 1920, literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Online edition © 2017 by Kevin Knight.

ecclesiastical authority and excommunicated formally or punished in another way.

On the other hand, it does not require anyone to be a trained theologian to hear someone teach that the Blessed Virgin Mary is the fourth person of the Blessed Trinity and know that this is heretical teaching. The author or preacher of such error may subjectively be on the border of formal heresy because of his exaggerated devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary. However, it may not be so easy for an ordinary person to know that it is erroneous to claim that the whole Trinity became incarnate. That statement could lead to heresy since it is false *prima facie* even if further distinctions are made. It is true that only the Second Person of the Trinity assumed a human nature, since he is God. Therefore, God the Father and God the Holy Spirit by concomitance are present in the Incarnation also, even though neither of them became incarnate (that is, assumed a human nature).

St. Thomas continues to speak of heresy being caused indirectly:

> A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial of it involves as a consequence something against faith; as, for instance, if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, for it follows that the divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such things anyone may have a false opinion without danger of heresy, before the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences against faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown; whereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church has decided that consequences follow against faith, then the error cannot be free from heresy. For this reason, many things are now considered as heretical which were formerly not so considered, as their consequences are now more manifest.[1]

Those more manifest consequences involve doctrinal or definitive teachings in sacred scripture especially.

Are Creeds Alone Enough to Possess Divine Faith?

It is not enough for someone to claim that he or she follows and accepts the Nicene or Apostles Creed to be considered an orthodox Catholic, because there are many propositions that have been declared by the ordinary and universal magisterium to be definitive teaching and so infallible, in addition to texts of sacred scripture that are not ambiguous. Some teachings of the ordinary and universal magisterium may simply be probable but still require a submission of the mind to the authority of the papal magisterium, even if they seem contrary to sacred sources of the past. If someone is unable to give assent after prayer and reflection to a probable teaching of one's bishop because his teaching seems to contradict what has always been taught as true, then he or she can withhold assent until the particular problem is further clarified. Objections based on sacred sources of constant, universal tradition, and sound philosophy must be

[1] Ibid.

conceptually objective, not merely subjective feelings of the objector.[1] Yet it may be the case that doctrines previously taught may be understood and expressed more deeply, with new insight, yet not in clear contradiction to what has always been taught by the Church. This may often happen in homilies or writings of sound authors of spiritual or moral theology.

For example, concerning probable teaching, it is not clear that the Church teaches that the adoption of frozen embryos by a couple or an individual is intrinsically evil. On this question there is a dispute among theologians who speculate or think in the field of bioethics. At present there is no clear and specific teaching given by the bishops or popes of the past or present, and agreed upon by a substantial number of orthodox theologians, that this is morally right or wrong. This problem of bioethics does not appear to be treated clearly in sacred scripture or Tradition, so as to suggest a definitive solution, whether right or wrong, at this present time – though some thinkers would dispute this on grounds of the meaning of a one flesh union. They would assert that pregnancy and birth are intrinsically connected to authentic conjugal intercourse, a union open to life and personal love. Like contraception itself, adopting an embryo breaks the union of intercourse and the child to its biological father and mother and so is an unnatural act chosen for a good end.

Just as there is an evolution of dogma, that is, further penetration into a deeper understanding of the faith by means of the Church's authoritative decisions, so one could say that there also can be an evolution of heresy, whereby the Church's authorities with the help of orthodox and approved theologians discover new or old errors that were not previously understood as definitively false or heretical, but now are more clearly seen to be contrary to faith and morals. Moreover, when Aquinas teaches that if an error has consequences that go against faith, this error "is not free from heresy," as cited above, he is referring not to a person's subjective dispositions but to what a particular sentence on a given page actually says. This suggests, then, that "heresy" is not a univocal but an analogous term, having degrees of falsity because errors less than absolute denials of faith and definitive teaching can share in a denial of gospel teaching, though in a lesser way. They are like seeds or sprouts but not full blooms of heresy. In the development of theological method, after St. Thomas these seeds and sprouts, or (in Aquinas's terminology) "consequences" against faith and morals, have been given names other than simply heretical statements, as cited below.

In an example of possible false teaching, Thomas adds a further distinction when speaking about the "notions" of the Blessed Trinity:

---

[1] Germain Grisez, *The Way of the Lord Jesus*, *General Moral Principles,* http://www.twotlj.org/G-1-V-1.html, 853.

So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with faith. If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the notions, knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would follow, he would lapse into heresy.[1]

Thomas is giving what may be called a swath of freedom to theologians. For example, because the notions of the Trinity had not yet been settled by the Church in previous times, one could come up with differing ideas about them. However, Thomas warns that if the theologian could see that his theological theories would in some way lead to the denial of faith in the Trinity, then he would be teaching heretical ideas even before an official determination by the authority of the Church. The ideas used to posit the notions and properties of the Persons of the Trinity were settled by the creeds of two councils of the Church[2] but were called neither "properties" nor "notions."[3]

More in the pastoral life of the Church, before the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* was published, Trinitarian theologians and preachers would often say that each Person of the Trinity totally participates or shares in the very essence of God, that is, they possessed the same divine essence. More astute thinkers would have perhaps argued that "totally participate" is a contradiction of terms. In the case of bread, I either eat the whole loaf myself or I share a portion of it with someone else; but in the case of immaterial things, I can totally share someone else's ideas. So the *Catechism* clarifies this when it asserts:

253 The Trinity is One. We do not confess three Gods, but one God in three persons, the "consubstantial Trinity"…. The divine persons do not share the one divinity among themselves but each of them is God whole and entire.

Now, if professors or authors or preachers were to say the persons of the Trinity "totally share the one divinity," they would not be asserting a strictly heretical statement but misusing language by introducing a contradiction of terms. If each totally shares, then even the Son could be called the Father. To share is to give a

[1] Ibid. The five notions of the Trinity are each Person's unique characteristics: Innascibility, property of the Father, who is from no one; Paternity, property of the Father, from whom the Son originates; Filiation, property of the Son, who is generated from the Father; Common Spiration, property of the Father together with the Son, whom the Holy Spirit is from; Procession (Passive Spiration), property of the Holy Spirit, who is from the Father and the Son.

[2] *DH* 525, 527, 800.

[3] Personal properties of the Trinity are: Innascibility and Paternity (God the Father), Filiation (God the Son), and Passive Spiration (Holy Spirit) (*ST* I, q. 28). Notions based on personal properties are: Innascibility, Paternity, Filiation, Common Spiration (Father and the Son), Procession from the Father and the Son (Holy Spirit) (ST I, q. 32, a. 3).

portion not a totality. This confusion about sharing seems to have something of a degree of heresy but does not seem to rise to a direct denial of the dogma. But it is certainly a beginning, because it does not make clear that each Person of the Trinity is God whole and entire. For that reason, the Persons of the Trinity are called "subsistent relations." (Subsistent relation in the Trinitarian context means that each divine Person is the same Godhead, yet each relation is really distinct [the Father qua Father is not the Son] and unique from each other as Persons. Each possesses the whole Godhead and not in dependence upon one another like a cause and effect.) Inadequate expressions of this kind in other branches of doctrinal or moral theology can also verge on heresy in varying degrees.

Differing Degrees of Error in Matters of Faith and Morals

It is clear that over the centuries after St. Thomas, theologians generally followed the teachings of the popes and the bishops throughout the world, and their various condemnations of false teaching were directed to many degrees of false teaching. According to Ludwig Ott, among other historians of theology, there are a number of ways that statements of faith can be impaired in speech. He made a list of thirteen ways that theological teachings can impair the faith, and this list is usually followed by theologians, though some would add more ways. These types of dubious theological statements are derived from past condemnations of false teachings by the papal magisterium, collections of individual theologians, or the writings of bishops. They are the following:

> Heretical propositions opposed to a formal dogma.
> Propositions proximate to heresy opposed to a definitive teachings proximate to faith.
> Propositions having the flavor of or suspected of heresy.
> Erroneous propositions.
> Propositions contrary to a truth that, though not formally revealed, is related to what has been revealed and definitively set forth by the universal magisterium as true. (For example, an error in ecclesiastical faith can exist when a proposition contrary to a doctrine generally regarded as certain by theologians [*error theologicus*] is asserted.
> False propositions contrary to a dogmatic fact.
> Temerarious or rash propositions that depart from general teaching without reason.
> Propositions offensive to pious ears.
> Propositions offensive to religious sentiment.
> Bad sounding propositions.
> Propositions expressed in an unclear way.
> Captious propositions (perplexing).
> Propositions that are intentionally ambiguous.[1]

[1] Lugwig Ott, *Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma,* rev. Robert Fastiggi (Baronius Press, 2018), 11-12.

From time to time theologians and their followers who write on moral or systematic theology fall into one or more of these thirteen categories of statements that are problematic but not strictly formal declarations of heresy. Their desire to evolve and deepen the understanding of sacred doctrine often fails to check either sacred sources or sound philosophy. This in turn leads them in varying degrees from orthodoxy and orthopraxy (pastoral applications) – that is, from the truth of the formally defined Catholic faith as lived in moral practice. Moreover, false conclusions in lesser matters of faith and morals often lead to formal heresy, strictly speaking.[1] However, it is one thing to be a heretic, strictly speaking, and another to be the author of heretical conclusions, as Aquinas asserts, "[A] heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error."[2]

Another difference between the two categories of doctrines asserted in *Doctrinal Clarification* is the class of censure merited by dissent from each. Those knowingly and obstinately rejecting truths of divine faith merit the canonical censure of heresy, which puts them outside of the Church. Those who similarly reject truths of definitive teaching are "in a position of rejecting a truth of Catholic doctrine and would therefore no longer be in full communion with the Catholic Church."[3] This is an evolution of doctrinal praxis unknown to St. Thomas.

Broader Notion of Heresy in Aquinas, continued

According to Guilluamo de Tocco's biography, St. Thomas taught that there were four new heresies in his time.[4] First was the teaching of Averroes that there is only one intellect for all human persons.[5] Second was William of St. Amor's

[1] Similarly, material sins (done involuntarily or in ignorance) frequently committed often can lead to formal sins, and formal sins can lead further to undermining one's faith by hatred of God. For the person of lust, he can begin to believe that the commandment of chastity is impossible to acquire; or God is asking the impossible and so what is commanded is not obligatory here and now for me. See *On Evil,* 8, 4 where Thomas teaches one would become an unbeliever if he held "universally that fornication is not a sin." This could be caused by the vice of pride and lust combined.

[2] *ST* II-II, q. 5, a. 3.

[3] *DC*, 6.

[4] *Ystoria sancti Thome de Aquinas de Guillaumo de Tocco (1323),* ed. Clarier le Brun-Gouanvic (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1996), 163.

[5] Condemned much later (1521) at the Third Council of the Lateran under Pope Leo X, *DH*, 1440. Thomas called an idea of Avicenna heretical as well: "Avicenna accordingly maintains that our wills are changed by the will of the heavenly souls just as our bodies are changed by the heavenly bodies. This is, however, thoroughly heretical" (*On Truth*, 22, 9).

false understanding of the nature of religious life.[1] Third was Joachim of Fiore's error that the last stage of the Church was age of the Holy Spirit.[2] Finally, the Greek Orthodox were in error concerning their refusal to obey the pope. Aquinas gives his reasons when he says:

Heresy is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This is what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians [In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10]:

> I consider the difference between schism and heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man from the Church. Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is the road to the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: "From which things," i.e. charity and the like, "some going astray, are turned aside into vain babbling," so too, schism is the road to heresy. Wherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that at the outset it is possible, in a certain respect, to find a difference between schism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for separating from the Church.[3]

Further, St. Thomas also teaches that heresy is found from four different perspectives:

Now, when human wisdom is always set up in opposition to the Divine wisdom, when men consider human learning to be paramount in importance, and when they endeavor to make the truths of faith subservient to the teaching of human science. This error is the origin of all heresy.

Jerome says: "We say that man is always able to sin or not to sin, so that we always profess that we have free choice." To say that a man in the state of sin cannot avoid sin is therefore to deny free choice. But this is heretical.[4]

Avicenna accordingly maintains that our wills are changed by the will of the heavenly souls just as our bodies are changed by the heavenly bodies. This is, however, thoroughly heretical.[5]

Moreover, there have been some others who, though not disapproving perpetual continence, have, however, put the state of matrimony on the same level with it. This is the heresy of the Jovinians. But the falsity of this error is quite apparent from the foregoing, since by continence man is made more skillful in raising his mind to spiritual and divine matters, and so he is placed, in a way, above the level of a man and in a certain likeness to

---

[1] Condemned (1256) by Pope Alexander IV, *DH*, 843.

[2] *ST* I-II, q. 106, a. 4 and all objections against Joachim are raised and refuted. He was never declared a heretic but his writings were condemned at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215.

[3] *Apology. For Religious Orders*, pt. 1, chap. 12, trans. John Proctor, (Delhi: Pranava Books, 2018).

[4] *On Evil*, 24, 12, ad 1.

[5] Ibid., 22, 9.

the angels.[1]

Why then were these ideas called heresies by Aquinas, even though they did not deny any creedal expressions of faith? Quite simply because, for Aquinas, heresy can emerge indirectly when errors, if carried forth to their logical conclusion, undermine aspects of the Catholic faith. What would happen to Christology or freedom of the will, if there is only one intellect, or if a mortal sin made it impossible to change one's life? If religious life is not according to the gospel, what happens to the teaching of Jesus on the evangelical counsels? If this is the age of the Holy Spirit, what happens to the Old and New Testament? If the primacy of the Roman pontiff in teaching faith and morals is denied, what happens to the faith except that all contradictory opinions can be freely followed? Then, there is no certain truth to hold onto.

Conclusion

While the Church's *Code of Canon Law* keeps the word "heresy" restricted, or univocally understood as the denial of the creeds and solemn definitions of the Church for juridical purposes, it is clear that false statements against definitive teachings that are below this tier of divine truths, but also to be held by an assent of faith, can be termed heretical analogously because they indirectly cause the eventual denial of the creeds or solemn definitions of the Church based on the Word of God.

[1] *SCG* III, chap. 137, [1].

Catholic Sisters:
Arcadia and the Civil War

Clara Sarrocco[*]

ABSTRACT: The latest iconoclasts, like those before them, want to obliterate the past by destroying monuments and memorials. Why? Because monuments like words mean things. In Washington, DC, there is a little known and rarely visited memorial dedicated to the religious sisters who, as nurses, served both the Union and Confederate soldiers in the Civil War. They did so in peril of their health, lives, and well-being with no remuneration or recognition. They worked simply for the love of God and care for the suffering. It is hoped that this essay will somewhat give lie to the old canard that Catholics cannot be true Catholics and true Americans. In his eloquent letter in defense of Fr. Damien of Molokai from the attack by the Reverend Doctor Hyde, Robert Louis Stevenson wrote: "But sir, when we have failed, and another has succeeded; when we have stood by and another has stepped in…." These same words could be applied to the courageous sister nurses who served our country selflessly.

IT ALL BEGAN with a conversation in April of 1840. The Reverend Horace Conolly, a Boston minister, heard the story from his parishioners and he felt that it needed to be told. He approached Nathaniel Hawthorne with the hope that he would be attracted to the idea. Hawthorne rejected it because it did not contain any of the "strong lights and heavy shadows" that were his trademark. However, Hawthorne approached his friend Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, a writer and a poet as well as a fellow alumnus of Bowdoin College, with the theme. Longfellow was intrigued.

The story is about the Acadians, the residents of Nova Scotia who had left their homeland in France in the mid-1600s to settle in the rugged lands of eastern Canada. They worked as farmers and fishermen, living in peace with the Algonquin tribes. That lasted until the mid-1700s, when the British and the French began warring in what developed into the Seven Years War (also known as the French and Indian War). By 1755 the Great Expulsion began. Three-quarters of the Acadian population were expelled from Nova Scotia and their lands were confiscated. In his poem, Longfellow wrote

[*] *Clara Sarrocco* is Secretary of the New York C. S. Lewis Society.

> Namely, that all your land, and dwellings, and cattle of all kinds
> Forfeited be to the crown; and that you yourselves from this province
> Be transported to other lands.... Prisoners now I declare you....[1]

Some Acadians managed to flee to the south and formed the Cajun culture of Louisiana. Longfellow recorded it as "Those who dwell there have named it the Eden of Louisiana."

The story that so fascinated the Reverend Conolly was the story of the star-crossed Acadian lovers, Evangeline and Gabriel. Longfellow wove their tale into an epic poem using unrhymed dactylic hexameters in the Homeric style. It was published in 1847 and became his most widely read and most often quoted poem.

The story, part legend and part history, tells of the Acadian diaspora. In the tumult that followed, Evangeline and her betrothed Gabriel were separated. She began her lifelong search to find her beloved. Evangeline's odyssey takes the reader on a journey to far reaching parts of America with fascinating descriptions of uncharted places. Finally giving up hope that she would ever be reunited with Gabriel, Evangeline ends her search at the tents of the Jesuit Mission and spends her remaining days working as a Sister of Mercy, nursing and caring for the sick and poor. In Part the Second, Canto V, Longfellow wrote:

> Thus many years she lived as a Sister of Mercy; frequenting
> Lonely and wretched roofs in the crowded lanes...
> Thither, by night and by day, came the Sister of Mercy...
> Moistening the feverish lip and aching brow and in silence
> Closing the sightless eyes of the dead....

But Evangeline's prayers were finally answered when she discovered that one of the dying men was Gabriel, who drew his last breath in her arms.

Because of its Catholic theme, Longfellow received much criticism for *Evangeline, A Tale of Acadie,* even though it is considered the "first important long poem in American literature." It was written at a time when it was considered too dangerous for religious sisters to wear their habits outside of the convent, school, or hospital. Three years before the start of the Civil War the poem had sold 36,000 copies. It revealed to the public the work of the religious sisters that was to become an important service during the Civil War.

Both the works of the Sisters of Mercy and the sufferings of the soldiers were known to Longfellow. His son Charles, a second lieutenant in the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry, was severely wounded near Culpepper, Virginia. It was in the Mine Run Campaign that the Union Army of the Potomac encountered the

---

[1] Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, *Evangeline, A Tale of Acadie* (Cabin John, MD: Wildside Press, 2010), Part the First, Canto IV.

Confederate Army. Charles was brought to New Hope Church, now functioning as a field hospital. The Acadians Longfellow wrote about were known as the "Lafayette Prairie Boys" and served in Company A, 26th Louisiana Volunteers.

Because nurses were desperately needed, the anti-Catholic hostility (at least for this time) began to lessen when the Civil War began. More than 4,000 women worked as nurses. Some were assistants, others worked in the laundry or as cooks in the field kitchen. The nurses dressed the wounds and aided in surgery – not an easy task. Included in that number were 600 nursing sisters.

Among those serving as a Civil War nurse was Louisa May Alcott, the American author most famous for her book *Little Women*. She recorded her nursing experiences in *Hospital Sketches*, first published in 1863 in *The Commonwealth*, an antislavery newspaper of Boston. "I am free to confess that...my hospital bed was not a bed of roses." She continued,

> I spent my shining hours washing faces, giving medicines serving rations...when I peeped into the dusty street lined with what I at first had innocently called market carts, now unloading their sad freight at our door I recalled a sudden chill. There they were! "our brave boys,"...riddled with shot and shell so torn and shattered.... In they came, some on stretchers, some in men's arms, some feebly staggering along propped on rude crutches.... The sight of several stretchers, each with its legless, armless, or desperately wounded occupant, entering my ward admonished me that I was there to work not to wonder or weep.... Round the great stove was gathered the dreariest group I ever saw – ragged, gaunt and pale, mud to the knees, with bloody bandages untouched since put on days before; many bundled up in blankets.[1]

It is no wonder that the work was difficult and the turnover high.

To the suffering the nursing sisters brought their services. By 1861 they were operating twenty-eight hospitals both for Union and for Confederate soldiers. It was a religious ministry for them, and what side a soldier was on did not matter. He was just a suffering soul in great need. They asked for little except necessities. When one of the sisters was asked how she managed to continue, she responded, "I thought of the cruel wound in the side of our dear Lord and my strength was restored." The sisters were probably the first Catholics, certainly the first nuns, the soldiers had ever seen.

There are very few records of the individual names of the nuns who ministered to the soldiers. Their work was done, for the most part, anonymously for the glory of God. Their service is told only as part of the history of their specific Orders. The Orders that served during the Civil War were many: Carmelites, Dominicans, Ursulines, Josephites, Sisters of the Holy Cross, Poor Sisters of St. Francis, Sisters of Mercy, Sisters of Our Lady of Mercy, Daughters

[1] Louisa May Alcott, *Hospital Sketches* (Boston: James Redpath Publisher, 1862), 31.

of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, Sisters of Providence of Saint Mary-of-the-Woods, and Sisters of Divine Providence.

An Irish American journalist and Civil War veteran, David Power Conyngham, kept a record of the work of both the chaplains and nuns who served. He named his work *Soldiers of the Cross*. It remained as an unpublished manuscript until recently, when through the efforts and editing of Daniel J. Endres and William Kurt it came into print. "*Soldiers of the Cross* is the fullest record of the Catholic Church's involvement in the [Civil War] war written during the nineteenth century."[1]

In collecting information for his project Conyngham wrote letters to battlefield commanders of both the Union and the Confederate armies. Among the many positive and laudatory responses he received about the sisters' work were letters from George B. McClellen, Winfield Scott Hancock, William Barry, P. G. T. Beauregard, and Robert E. Lee. The medical director of the U.S. Army of the West, Dr. Samuel DeCamp, wrote: "As a proof of the influence, the truly Christian charity, and faithful services of these good ladies had on me I have since become a member of the Holy Roman Catholic Church as also my little daughter."[2]

An added difficulty for the medical teams during the Civil War was the introduction of the Gatling gun, the forerunner of the modern machine gun. Though used sparingly, it caused terrible injuries never experienced before. The sister nurses did not shun these horrific wounds but rather dressed them, fed the sick with a tube if necessary for months at a time, prayed with the dying, arranged for a minister of their own faith to visit them when possible, and wrote letters to the families back home when the soldiers were not able to write.

Their work did much to fight against the anti-Catholic prejudices existing at the time. According to Conyngham:

> When the Protestant soldier found that the sister did as much to cool his aching wounds and to refresh him by delicacies and luxuries as she did for the Catholic patient who occupied the adjoining bed, he began to think that all his bigotry and prejudices were simply the result of his unchristian education and that it was possible for one to be a Catholic and even a sister and still to possess all the noble attributes of true Christianity.[3]

Many of the sick and wounded suffered from other diseases such as yellow fever, typhoid, and even measles. Some of the sisters caught these malignant illnesses and died as a result.

---

[1] David Power Conyngham, *Soldiers of the Cross* (The Authoritative Text), ed. David J. Endres and William B. Kurtz (Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 2019), xv.

[2] Ibid., 332-33.

[3] Ibid., 325.

> Such was the humble religious. Whether Sister of Charity, Sister of Mercy, Sister of the Holy Cross, or sister of any other order, she cheerfully responded to the call of suffering humanity and devoted her time, her services, her prayers, and in many cases her very life, to relieve the wants and sufferings of her fellow creatures.[1]

When one of the prisoners asked the attending sister if she was Confederate or Union, she replied: "Well my friend! What I have done for the Federal prisoners, I would do for the Confederate. Charity has neither politics nor religion. We try to alleviate the sufferings of the afflicted according to the teachings of our religion and Our Divine Master and from Him alone we expect to reap our reward."[2]

Their services and charity were attested to by the many letters received from the families of the dying and wounded and the many letters of gratitude written by those who were given back some semblance of health and were able to return home.

The sisters were given a general permit to pass through the lines and to visit hospitals and prisons of both North and South.

> Two men were on one occasion brought to hospital from some stockade or prison and they were so ill that they were laid in the piazza. While two of the sisters...were trying to revive the two poor patients, a Confederate office wept over them saying to the sisters, "I could meet these men in the field but I cannot stand this." It was not a rare thing to see the officers...shed tears while they accompanied the sisters in their rounds among the sick in the stockade.[3]

Heroic actions especially in wartime are usually marked in granite and marble. But the true remembrances are in the memories and hearts of those who witnessed the courageous acts. "Their good works have proclaimed the success of their mission, and thousands today, even of different denominations, bless the name and memory of the good, pious and faithful sisters."[4]

The Daughters of Charity, founded by Elizabeth Ann Seton, provided over 300 sister nurses to both the Union and Confederate armies. They comprised the largest group serving as sister nurses during the war.

For today's iconoclasts the past is a blur of confusion. Monuments exist only to be torn down, and they erase what little they know of their history. James Whitcomb Riley, American poet and friend of Longfellow, whose father returned home from the Civil War paralyzed, wrote in "A Monument for the Soldiers":

---

[1] Ibid., 327.
[2] Ibid., 333.
[3] Ibid., 342.
[4] Ibid., 327.

A monument for the Soldiers!
And what will ye build it of?
Can ye build it of marble, or brass, or bronze,
Outlasting the soldiers' love?
Can you glory it with legends
As grand as their blood hath writ...

And the answer came: The figures
Shall all be fair and brave,
And, as befitting as pure and white
As the Stars above their grave![1]

These sisters have left as noble a legacy of service and honor as did the soldiers they nursed. "Simply by endeavoring to do their duty to minister to the comforts of the wretched suffers around them with woman's adroitness and woman's tenderness as well as with the gravity and reserve of the religious...and no doubt by praying earnestly for the accomplishment of the design of Providence, both in themselves and in the poor suffering confided to their care," they served willingly and faithfully.[2]

Probably the least known and least visited monument is in a district known for its memorials, Washington, D.C. It is located in the Northwest quadrant of the city, at Rhode Island Avenue and M Street, across from St. Matthew's Cathedral. It honors the nursing sisters of the Civil War. The bronze bas relief honors the twelve religious orders and 600 sisters who worked as professional nurses providing aid and comfort to soldiers of both sides.

"The Civil War Nurses Memorial" was the brainchild of Ellen Ryan Jolly, president of the Woman's Auxiliary of the Ancient Order of Hibernians. It was approved by Congress in 1918, sixty years after the Civil War, but was not built until 1924. The artist commissioned for the sculpture was Jerome Connor, a noted Irish sculptor.

The brass panel rests on a granite base. Its official title is "Nuns of the Battlefield." It depicts twelve sisters, each wearing the traditional habit of her respective order. An Angel of Peace and an Angel of Patriotism are sculpted on each side of the memorial. At the top is the inscription: "They Comforted the Dying, Nursed the Wounded, Carried Hope to the Imprisoned, Gave in His Name a Drink of Water to the Thirsty." On the lower base the inscription reads: "To the Memory and in Honor of the Various Order of Sisters Who Gave Their Services as Nurses on Battlefields and in Hospitals during the Civil War."

It is not the most magnificent of monuments and does not occupy the "pride

[1] James Whitcomb Riley, *The Complete Poetical Works* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993).

[2] Ibid., 393.

of place." It carries no names but just a long forgotten memory of those who worked only for the glory of God. When the Book of Life is opened, the sisters ask of Christ their King: "When did we see You sick or in prison and visit You?" "And the king answering, shall say to them: Amen I say to you as long as you did it to one of these my least brethren you did it to me."[1]

"Death the consoler, laying his hand upon many a heart had healed it forever."

[1] Mt 25:39-40.

Nihil Creatum: Some Thomistic Concerns about the *Consensus Thomistarum* regarding the *esse* of Christ

Eric A. Mabry[*]

ABSTRACT: This paper examines Cajetan's position that in Christ there is only a single substantial and uncreated *esse* and critiques this claim on Thomist grounds by holding it accountable to the principle that a finite essence always limits what it receives. The ultimate consequence of Cajetan's position is a failure to provide a metaphysical account for why the human nature of Christ is created. Because Cajetan's position on the *esse* of Christ is substantially the same as that of the majority of Thomist commentators, this critique raises questions not simply about Cajetan but also about the *consensus Thomistarum* as a whole, at least as it pertains to the question of a secondary act of existence in Christ.

ALTHOUGH THE QUESTION of Christ's *esse* is a *locus* frequently visited by scholastic theologians following in the wake of Thomas Aquinas, only a handful of them advert to the textual discrepancy within the Angelic Doctor's own corpus. Hence, while the *consensus Thomistarum* is that there is only one substantial *esse* in Christ, namely, the divine and uncreated *esse*, Thomists such as Capreolus and Báñez make no mention of the one place where St. Thomas speaks of "another *esse*" in Christ "insofar as he temporally became man."[1]

This paper examines one of the exemplary exceptions to this trend, namely, Thomas de Vio Cajetan, and offers a Thomist critique of his position that there is

[*] *Eric Mabry* is assistant professor of systematic theology and philosophy at St. Mary's Seminary and University in Baltimore.

[1] Thomas Aquinas, *QD de Unione Verbi Incarnati*, a. 4: "Et ideo, sicut Christus est unum simpliciter propter unitatem suppositi et duo secundum quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi; est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non inquantum est aeternum, sed inquantum est temporaliter homo factum. Quod est, si non sit esse accidentale quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra habitum est, non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium" (ed. Obenauer, 86). See Capreolus, *Defensiones* 3, d. 6, q. 1 (Tours, 1904, 5:111-24), Banez, *Comm. in ST IIIa*, q. 17, a. 2 (Matriti, 1951, 1:254-57), and John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus in ST IIIa*, q. 17, a. 2 (Cologne, 1711, 7:278).

only a single substantial and uncreated *esse* in Christ. I argue that this Christological position ultimately undermines an explanatory, metaphysical account for why the human nature of Christ is created because if there is no created *esse* in Christ (but only the divine), then his human nature is not related to the Trinity as to an efficient cause and consequently cannot be affirmed to be truly created.

I also suggest that the single-*esse* view results, at least in part, from a failure to sufficiently apply the principle that essence limits what it receives. Because objections based on the principle of limited reception are well known to Cajetan and the wider Thomistic commentary tradition, I select a particular response to this challenge, which hinges on an analogical appeal to the beatific vision, and present a sharpened formulation of it in Reginald Garrigou-Langrange, who also advocates a single *esse* in Christ. I demonstrate how this analogical appeal fails, because it conflates the *ordo essendi* with the *ordo cognoscendi* and thereby fails to recognize the different modes of reception proper to each order.

Cajetan's Interpretation of the Teaching of St. Thomas

In his commentary on article 2, question 17 of the *tertia pars*, Cajetan has two principal questions in focus. He refers to the first as a "domestic" question, insofar as it asks what is the "intention and meaning" of St. Thomas? Does St. Thomas intend to teach that in Christ there is no *esse actualis existentiae* in the genus of created substance, but only an uncreated existence? The second is whether it is actually the case "that in Christ there is no substantial existence except the divine."[1] Although the answers to these questions mutually determine one another, I will focus on the first insofar as Cajetan has the interpretation of the texts of St. Thomas clearly delineated, before turning to some of the reasons for Cajetan's own position about this matter.[2]

Shawn Colberg has produced a distillation of Cardinal Cajetan's commentary on this portion of the *Summa* and provided an adroit sampling of the various arguments Cajetan engages.[3] He has also helpfully situated Cajetan's commentary vis-à-vis one of Cajetan's unedited sermons, illuminating subtle features (and

[1] Cajetan, *Comm. in ST IIIa*, q. 17, a. 2, n. 4: "Haec sunt in corpore articuli. In quibus multae sunt quaestiones Prima domestica est, de intentione et sensu Auctoris: an scilicet Auctor intendat docere quod in Christo nullum est esse actualis existentiae de genere substantiae creatum, sed sola existential increata. Secunda quaestio: an ita sit in veritate, quod in Christo nulla existential substantialis sit nisi divina" (ed. Leonina, 11:223b).

[2] Perhaps the most comprehensive study of Cajetan's Christology in recent decades has been Marcel Nieden's *Organum Deitatis: Die Christologie des Thomas de vio Cajetan* (Leiden: Brill, 1997).

[3] See Shawn Colberg, "Accrued Eyes and Sixth Digits: Thomas Aquinas and Cardinal Cajetan on Christ's Single *Esse* and the Union of Natures," *Nova et Vetera* (English Edition) 8, no. 1 (2010): 55-87.

pastoral applications) of Cajetan's position regarding the single existence of Christ. For these reasons, I will be relatively brief in my exploration of many aspects of Cajetan's commentary, but judicious and focused with respect to those areas that are apropos to the question of the meaning of *esse secundarium* and especially Cajetan's reading of the *QD de Unione*, for on these matters my reading of Cajetan diverges from Colberg's.[1]

Cajetan stages a kind-of disputed question with respect to the "meaning and intention" of Thomas as to whether he "intends to teach that in Christ there is no *esse actualis existentiae* in the genus of created substance, but only an uncreated existence."[2] Consequently, Cajetan offers four arguments that oppose this reading. The latter three are based on variant readings of the corpus, ad 1, and ad 3 of article 2 of question 17 in the *tertia pars*, but the first objection provided by Cajetan centers on the *QD de Unione*: "For in the Disputed Questions, *On the Union of the Word Incarnate*, the Author clearly says that in Christ there are found two existences (*duo esse*): one eternal, which is the principal existence of the supposit; and one temporal, inasmuch as the Word became man, and this

[1] Colberg reads Cajetan as illustrating "that the admission of an *aliud esse* could be regarded either as an insight or a mistake" (81). Colberg, therefore, believes that Cajetan "regards the opinion [expressed in the *QD de Unione*] as potentially consonant with the rest of Thomas's writings if one but grasp the *quo est* versus *quod est* distinction" (82). This seems an imprecise reading of Cajetan. Cajetan has actually set up a kind of disputed question regarding "the intention and meaning of" St. Thomas. Consequently, what Colberg regards as an argument for *aliud esse* as an insight is simply Cajetan using III, q. 17, a. 1, ad 1 as his third objection out of a total of four, prior to a line that reads just like a *sed contra*: "in oppositum autem est processus articuli secundum planum illius sensum," which is in turn followed by a quasi *respondeo*: "ad hoc dicitur quod procul dubio sensus litterae huius, et doctrina Auctoris est in Christo non inveniri aliquod esse actualis existentiae substantiale nisi esse existentiae divinum" (see 11:224a n. 4). Cajetan, then, replies to each of the four objections and concludes definitively: "est igitur indubie tenendum, secundum Auctoris doctrinam, in Christo nullum esse actualis existentiae substantialis inveniri nisi esse actualis existentiae Filii Dei, quod est aeternum, et ipse Deus." Only the first objection addresses the *De Unione*; the remaining three are based on the corpus, ad 1, and ad 3 of article 2, question 17 in the *tertia pars*. It is therefore a misinterpretation for Colberg to read Cajetan as though the Cardinal presents an explicitly positive reading of the *QD de Unione*. Cajetan only expresses one opinion about the *De Unione*: "ut retracta censenda est" (n. 6), which is cited by Colberg (82). To be sure, one can take some of Cajetan's arguments and *apply* them to the *De Unione*, but this is not the same as arguing that Cajetan himself does so.

[2] Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 4: "Haec sunt in corpore articuli. In quibus multae sunt quaestiones. Prima domestica est, de intentione et sensu Auctoris: an scilicet Auctor intendat docere quod in Christo nullum est esse actualis existentiae de genere substantiae creatum, sed sola existentia increata" (ed. Leonina, 11:223b).

existence is the secondary existence of the supposit."[1]

In his reply, Cajetan says that the opinion posited in the *De Unione* is to be judged as retracted, unless someone is so senseless as to reduce the teaching expressed in the *Summa*, the *Scriptum*, and the *Quodlibetal Questions* to a tiny question "hardly known among the works of the Author" and written long beforehand. Cajetan regards Thomas's treatment in the *De Unione* as "most incomplete" and dissonant with his treatment of the same subject in other disputed questions.[2]

Before looking to Cajetan's own determination of whether there is in Christ no substantial existence except the divine, it will be helpful to assess how his metaphysical commitments play out in his reading of St. Thomas. Ultimately, Cajetan finds the position expressed in the *tertia pars* to be beyond doubt. To him, the teaching of St. Thomas is that in Christ there is no substantial *esse* of actual existence except the divine *esse existentiae*.[3] Cajetan believes that the argumentation of the article itself rests upon several principles: (1) Whatever looks to or regards the personality (whether form, matter, part, or nature), such metaphysical elements do not bear their own *esse*.[4] This presupposes (2) the distinction between those "forms" that pertain to the personality and those that do not. Cajetan adds that (3) in contrast to "personal forms," "non-personal forms" each have their own

[1] Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 4: "Nam in Quaestionibus Disputatis, *de Unione Verbi Incarnati*, Auctor clare dicit in Christo inveniri duo esse: unum aeternum, quod est esse principale suppositi; et unum temporale, inquantum Verbum est factum homo, et hoc esse est esse secundarium illius suppositi" (ed. Leonina, 11:223b).

[2] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 6: "Ad obiecta autem in oppositum respondendo, ad primum dicitur quod opinio illa, posita in Quaestione illa *de Unione Verbi*, ut retractata censenda est: nisi quis adeo desipiat ut putet doctrinam in hoc ultimo libro traditam, et in authenticis libris etiam prius probatam, scilicet in III *Sent.*, dist. VI, qu. II, et in Quolib. IX, qu. II, reducendam esse ad quaestiunculam vix cognitam inter opera Auctoris, et longe ante factam. Quae rationabilius creditur colligendo condita inter schedulas disputationum inventa, quam unquam edita a divo Thoma. Constat enim quaestionem illam de tanta re, hoc est de unione Verbi incarnati, imperfectissime materiam unionis tractrae, et per hoc dissonare ab aliis Quaestionibus Disputatis eiusdem; et rationibus multum debilibus uti, ut patet conferenti illos articulos similibus in hoc opere; et quinque tantum articulis rem tantam absolvere. Prae se ferunt siquidem haec quod diximus" (ed. Leonina, 11:224a).

[3] Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: "Ad hoc dicitur quod procul dubio sensus litterae huius, et doctrina Auctoris est in Christo non inveniri aliquod esse actualis existentiae substantiale nisi esse existentiae divinum" (ed. Leonina, 11:224a).

[4] Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: "Fundatur enim vis rationis litterae super hoc quod, sive forma sive material sive pars sive natura quaecumque sit spectans ad personalitatem alicuius, non affert suum esse" (ed. Leonina, 11:224a).

individual and distinct *esse*.[1] Thus, accidents (*non personalia*) have their own *esse*, but *personalia* are bereft of their own *esse*.

Cajetan, therefore, sets out two alternatives: Either (1) the human nature does not fall under the ambit of the personality of Christ, or (2) the human nature does not bring to Christ the *esse* it would have given to the human person that it would have constituted if it had not been assumed.[2] So if we take nature as a *res personalis* (that is, as pertaining to or dependent upon personality), then the human nature is bereft of its own *esse* even as a *principium quo*.[3] Even though Cajetan understands St. Thomas to locate the humanity of Christ among those metaphysical elements that are related to the personality, and for this reason accepts the consequences of the second option, he nevertheless makes a telling observation about the first alternative. It would be the same to say that the humanity in Christ has its own existence but that it is not the absolute (*simpliciter*) or principal existence of Christ but, rather, the secondary or relative (*secundum quid*) existence (in as much as he is man) as it would be to place the humanity among those metaphysical constituents that do not pertain to the personality.[4]

By invoking the language of the *QD de Unione*, Cajetan highlights what he finds so fundamentally flawed about the position presented therein, for it amounts to saying that the human nature could have an *esse* that does not pertain to the personality. In contrast, Cajetan argues that the humanity is among those elements that relate directly to the personality. Consequently, the humanity cannot bear its own *esse*, for it if had its own *esse*, then in one and the same person there would

---

[1] Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: "Ad hoc namque fundavit se Auctor super pertinentia vel impertinentia formae ad personalitatem alicuius, ut pertinentia ad personalitatem alicuius privata fore singulis propriis esse, ex hoc ipso quod ad alterius personalitatem spectant, monstraret. Quoniam in hoc differunt personales a non personalibus formis, quod non perosnales habent singulae singula propria esse, ut patet de albedine, dulcedine, quantitate, etc.; personalia autem carent singulis esse" (ed. Leonina, 11:224a).

[2] Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: "Et propterea oportet alterum duorum dicere: aut quod natura humana non spectet ad personalitatem Christi; aut quod non attulerit Christo esse quod dedisset personae humane quam constituisset si non fuisset assumpta" (ed. Leonina, 11:224a).

[3] Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: "Et propterea si, pro *qui*, humanitas in Christo personalis res est, oportet quod careat suo proprio esse, quod constat vocari esse actualis existentiae, natum prncipiari ab humanitate, seu natum esse humanitatis ut principii quo" (ed. Leonina, 11:224a).

[4] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: "Unde perinde esset dicere humanitatem in Christo habere propriam existentiam, sed illam non esse simpliciter aut principalem existentiam Christi, sed secundariam aut secundum quid, puta inquantum est homo; et collocare humanitatem Christi in ordine formarum seu naturarum non pertinentium ad personalitatem, quibus convenit aferre secum sua singual esse, et propterea multiplicare illa in una et adem persona" (ed. Leonina, 11:224a).

be multiplied the *esse personale*, which cannot be the case, since the *esse* proper to a human nature is the *esse personale*, for it is the *esse* of Socrates or Plato.[1] Not surprisingly, therefore, Cajetan argues that, although there is a real distinction between nature and person, there is not a real distinction between the *esse* of nature and the *esse* of person, for it is one and the same *esse*, although it belongs to the person in a primary way and to nature in a derivative way.[2]

Cajetan's Personal Determination of the Question

As to how the matter stands "in truth," Cajetan believes that the conclusion: *There is no substantial existence in Christ except the divine* finds ample and sufficient foundations for its demonstration in the text of St. Thomas. Nevertheless, he offers his own distillation of principles (6) before addressing a host of objections. Cajetan initiates his determination of the question by acknowledging that when we prescind from the (real) distinction between nature and person, we say that *esse* is the actuality of each created nature. But when we advert to the distinction, we will also distinguish between the different ways in which nature and person are related to the very same *esse*, for (1) "*esse* is the act of a nature as a principle by which," but *esse* is the act of a person "as of a subject or that which has *esse*."[3]

This means that "the nature is the immediate principle by which of its *esse*, but it is not the immediate receptacle of its *esse*, but only by the mediating person."[4] Consequently, Cajetan adds that (2) a nature is never a *quod est* but is always a *quo est*. Nature, therefore, is an existent, though not as *what exists* but

[1] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 5: "in littera clarum sit humanitatem Christi locatam esse inter spectantia ad personalitatem, ed ideo non afferre proprium esse; quia, si afferret illud, multiplicaretur in una et eadem persona esse personale, quoniam esse proprium naturae humanae est esse personale est enim esse Socratis aut Platonis, etc." (ed. Leonina, 11:224a).

[2] See Cajetan, Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 7: "In iis enim in quibus persona et natura secundum rem differunt, sicut persona est aliud a natura, ita esse personae debitum est aliud ab esse naturae. Aliud autem, non per positionem duorum esse quorum unum sit aliud ab alio, sed per alietatem, ut ita dixerim, *naturalem*: quia alterius naturae est esse quod non debetur naturae nisi per personam, cui primo convenit; et alterius naturae esset esse quod convenit naturae absque expecatione a persona, quod in solo Deo invenitur" (ed. Leonina, 11:224b).

[3] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: "Quamvis enim, dum non curamus de distinctione inter personam et naturam, dicamus esse actualis existentiae, de quo est sermo, esse actualitatem naturae cuiusque creatae: cum tamen exacte discernitur persona a natura, dicimus, ut in hac littera habetur, quod esse est actus naturae ut principii quo, personae autem ut subiecti, seu quod habet ipsum esse" (ed. Leonina, 11:226a).

[4] Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: "Ita quod natura est principium quo immediatum ipsius esse: sed non est receptivum immediatum ipsius esse, sed mediante persona" (ed. Leonina, 11:226a).

as that *by which someone exists*.[1] These first two principles lead him to two subsequent corollaries. The first is (3) that for a nature to exist it is not required that it be actuated by existence in the way that a subject is actuated by a form; it suffices simply for the nature to be that *by which* someone exists. Cajetan goes on to observe that "there are many modes of being," and consequently it just so happens that the mode of being consonant with natures and forms is that they exist as *quo est* not as *quod est*, "nothing more is owed to them."[2]

The second is that (4) person is more intimate to nature than existence, which is to say that a nature is "impersoned" prior to its constituting its own existence.[3] This principle echoes Cajetan's earlier observation that the unity of *esse* follows upon the unity of person, that is, the unity of *esse* is an effect of the unity of person.[4] It also reiterates the fact that although nature is a *principium quo* of existence, it actually originates existence only as really joined to a supposit or person. Being joined to a supposit, therefore, is the precondition for a nature fulfilling its own proper mode of being as an *id quo*, not through any deficit on the originating natures' part, but because a nature is not the primary receiver (*susceptivum primum*) of its *esse*. (5) Hence, if a nature were drawn into the personhood of another (as happens in the incarnation), how much more so would it be drawn into the existence of another, since the production of existence follows upon the constitution of personhood.[5] Cajetan, therefore, insists that the first substantial subject of existence is the person.[6]

---

[1] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: "natura nunquam est quod est, sed semper est quo est: invenitur siquidem natura existens non ut quae existit, sed ut qua aliquis existit" (ed. Leonina, 11:226a).

[2] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: "quod ad hoc quod natura existat, non exigitur quod ipsa actuetur per existentiam ut subiectum actuatur per formam in eo; sed sufficit quod ipsa sit qua aliquis existit. Nec mirum est scientibus quod non omnia uno eodemque modo sunt, sed sat est unicuique entium esse modo sibi convenienti. Sunt enim multi essendi modi. Et naturis quidem ac formis consonus essendi modus est, non ut sint tanquam quod est, sed ut sint tanquam quo est: nec plus eis debetur" (ed. Leonina, 11:226a).

[3] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: "Aliud est quod, quia prius natura personatur quam existentiam propriam constituat, intimior est persona naturae quam existentia" (ed. Leonina, 11:226a).

[4] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 6: "Unitas enim personae et dualitas naturae sunt causae: unitas vel dualitas esse est effectus" (ed. Leonina, 11:224b).

[5] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 13: "natura carens propria personalitate quia praevenitur ab aliena, oportet consequenter quod careat propria existential. Si enim existential propria non provenit ab ipsa actualiter nisi in propria persona, ex hoc ipso quod ad alienam trahitur personam, sequitur quod ad alienam trahitur existentiam, illius scilicet personae praevenientis ipsam" (ed. Leonina, 11:226a).

[6] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 14: "Primum enim substantialis existentiae subiectum est persona" (ed. Leonina, 11:226a).

Cajetan commences the enumeration of his final argument with an observation about why there is only one real relation of filiation, namely, because there is only one real subject of filiation, the (uncreated) person of the Word. This carries over in the case of the question of existence, because as Cajetan has emphasized continually, a nature is related to existence only as an *id quo*, whereas the person is related as the proper and primary subject of existence. Consequently, if there is only one person, then there is only one foundation or subject for an act of existence. But since (6) a created existence would be repugnant to the divine person both because (6a) a divine person cannot receive something created in himself and (6b) because to one person there only belongs one substantial *esse*, therefore the humanity of Jesus is assumed to the personality of the Word and thereby made to share in the divine *esse* of the Word. This sharing, however, although it abrogates the need for a created *esse*, does not eradicate the mode of being (*essendi modum*) proper to a nature, for the humanity of Christ exists as a *by which*.[1]

Clarifications

Cajetan exemplifies his typical familiarity with rival scholastic positions regarding the question of *esse* in Christ, and while it is not possible to explore all of the many objections he entertains, I do want to single out those replies that amplify Cajetan's personal position about this matter, constitute points of departure for later scholastic development, and illustrate certain *lacunae* in argumentation. Cajetan organizes the many "doubts" regarding whether "in Christ, there is no substantial existence except the divine" under four major headings: (1) doubts about the premises, (2) a challenge to the textual thesis that only a new relation accrues to the Word according to the human nature (not a new *esse*), (3) arguments against the conclusion (that the incarnate Christ only has a divine *esse*), and (4) arguments for the contradictory of the conclusion.[2]

---

[1] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 14: "Repugnat autem divinae personae existentia creata, duplici ratione. Prima est ex divinitate: quia divina persona non potest recipere in se creatum aliquid. Secunda est ex communi ratione personae: quia personae unius non est nisi unum esse substantiale. Et haec ratio in littera ponitur. Quocirca, quia humanitas Christi praeventa est in mysterio incarnationis ut propriam non sortiretur personalitatem, sed ad personalitatem Verbi assumpta est; ideo quasi impedita est a proprio esse, et est sortita esse personae divinae, ex hoc ipso quod est divinae personae natura, dicta de illa *in quid* Habet enim ex hoc suum essendi modum, scilicet esse ut quo. Natura enim personae est ut quo: nec plus sibi debetur" (ed. Leonina, 11:226).

[2] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 8: "Circa secundam autem quaestionem multiplex dubium occurrit. Nam primo, dubitatur de praemissis; deinde de modo quo ponitur Christus existentiam humanam habere; tertio, de ipsa conclusione; quarto, de sua contradictoria" (ed. Leonina, 11:225a).

In Cajetan's first set of responses to Scotus, we can again see the emphasis on the diversity of modes according to which the very same *esse* is of a nature as a *by which* and of a person as a *that which*.[1] His engagement with Scotus, however, leads him to clarify his mereology, for the second premise under attack is that the *esse* of a part and the *esse* of the person are the same. Cajetan rejects the inference drawn by Scotus that a part is contained by the *esse* of the whole because it is perfected by the form of the whole and instead says that a part is contained by the *esse* of the whole because it pertains to the integrity of the whole.[2]

This clarification yields for Cajetan yet another way to emphasize the different way nature is related to *esse* compared with how person is related to *esse*. For an essential part (or *personalia*) like nature is not informed by the *esse* of its whole the way a subject would be; rather, the nature is integral to the *esse* of the whole or supposit. It is helpful here to recall St. Thomas's own observation about the two aspects of a whole: (1) that "the *esse* of a composite whole belongs to all its parts, since the parts do not have their own *esse* but exist through the *esse* of the whole," and (2) that the parts that compose the whole "cause the *esse* of the whole."[3]

Now, Cajetan clearly understands that only one of these existential lines (the first) is operative in the *sui generis* case of the incarnation (for the human nature supplies no lack in Christ), but Cajetan also maintains that, although the human nature does not cause the *esse* of the Word, simply speaking, the humanity still retains in some way its proper mode of being insofar as it is the nature of Christ,

---

[1] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 15: "Ad primo ergo obiecta contra fundamentum processus, quia idem est esse naturae et personae, respondetur: praemittendo tamen quod fundamentum Auctoris est quidem identitas ipsius esse respectu naturae et personae, sed non sola identitas; sed, adiuncta modi diversitate respectu utriusque, quia scilicet illud idem esse est naturae ut quo, personae ut quod. Ex identitate enim esse cum hac modi diversitate, procedit littera, ut patet. Sed Scotus, contra, solam identitatem affert pro causa" (ed. Leonina, 11:226b).

[2] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 15: "Ad obiecta vero eiusdem contra unum esse parties et personae, respondetur quod, si vis fiat in verbis, assumitur non-causa ut causa. Non enim ideo pars est contenta ipso esse totius quia perficitur per formam totius; sed quia spectat ad integritatem totius. Ex hoc enim fit ut sit contenta modo essendi congruo ac debito integrantibus personam: scilicet, ut existant per existere totius, ex hoc ipso quod totius integrativa sunt" (ed. Leonina, 11:226b).

[3] See Thomas, *in 3 Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 3c: "ad rationem totius duo pertinent. Unum scilicet quod esse totius compositi pertinet ad omnes partes; quia partes non habent proprium esse, sed sunt per esse totius, ut dictum est. Aliud est quod partes components causant esse totius." See also, *ST* IIIa, q. q, a. 2c: "Unde suppositum significatur ut totum, habens naturam sicut partem formalem et perfectivam sui. Et propter hoc in compositis ex materia et forma natura non predicatur de supposito, non enim dicimus quod hic homo sit sua humanitas" (ed. Leonina, 11:25a).

which is to say that only *this* composite of body and soul is joined to the Word and is the Word's own humanity.[1]

In his reply to the fourth set of arguments (again having their origin in Scotus), Cajetan continues to affirm that the humanity of Christ is "as though a certain part of the person of the Word," but presses further to argue that the *esse* of the Word is sufficient to constitute the humanity as existing "outside its causes," (a) without the humanity's own (created) existence and (b) without the humanity being actuated by the existence of the Word according to an "informing which inheres" in the subject informed, for such an actuation is not owed to a humanity except through the person to whom it belongs, and in the unique case of the incarnation, this person is the eternal and uncreated person of the Word.[2]

So while the rejection of the humanity as a subject for or receiver of existence persists throughout his replies to the objections, this is not the case when considering operations, for the humanity of Christ (as distinguished against the supposit) is the proper subject of operation, and for this reason the human nature originates its own operations.[3] This is why in the life of Christ we can always discern a twofold operation, but this does not apply to *esse* because the humanity of Christ does not originate the *esse* of Christ.

Problems

Cajetan sets aside a separate reply for the Scotist challenge to the textual thesis that there is only a new relation of the Word to the humanity not a new *esse*.

---

[1] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 15: "Et proportionaliter in proposito dicitur quod, quia humanitas Christi pertinet ad personalitatem Christi quia est assumpta quasi ad integritatem personae Christi; non quasi suppleat defectum aliquem in persona Christi, sed ut sit persona Christi persona illius humanitatis: ideo humanitas Christi non dat novum esse Christo, sed contenta est consono sibi essendi modo, ut scilicet existat ex hoc ipso quod est natura Christi" (ed. Leonina, 11:226b); cf. Thomas, *in 3 Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2: "persona non dicitur composita quasi esse suum sit ex multis constitutum – hoc enim est contra rationem aeterni – sed quia ad multa se extendit quae assumuntur in illud esse."

[2] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 19: "ideo humanitas Christi, quae quasi pars quaedam est personae Verbi, quia ad personalitatem propriam Verbi assumpta est, invenitur sufficienter posita extra causam suam existens absque propria existentia, et absque hoc quod actuetur per informationem inhaesivam ab existentia Verbi: sibi enim non debetur existentia nisi per personam cuius est" (ed. Leonina, 11:228b).

[3] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 21: "Quia natura, ut distinguitur contra suppositum, est non solum principium, se etiam susceptivum proximum operandi: sed existentiae est solum principium, et non est susceptivum proprium. Natura enim humana est principium existendi personae propriae ut proprio subiecto: quae in Christo non est. Et ideo non principiat existentiam in Christo. Sed operandi est principium sibi ipsi ut proprio subiecto, distinguendo naturam contra suppositum, ut dictum est. Et ideo in Christo principiat proprium operari. Et propterea operari multiplicatur secundum naturas: esse autem non" (ed. Leonina, 11:228b).

The argument of Scotus (as rehearsed by Cajetan) shows familiarity with the framework laid out in question 2, article 7 of the *tertia pars* that is but a particular application of the general rule for predications involving creatures and the creator, namely, that relations between creature and creator denote a real relation inhering in the creature but only a relation of reason in God.[1] From this very Thomist position, Scotus argues that if there is only a relation of reason from the Word to the humanity, then it is not possible for the human nature to be something (*aliquid*) formally, for a relation of reason alone cannot constitute a subject formally as something, and consequently it cannot be said that the Word insofar as he is man is formally something, which is contrary to the papal decrees of Alexander III (which were understood to be directed against the so-called *habitus* theory),[2] and therefore is heretical.[3]

The human nature of Christ is an individual in the genus of substance; a relation of reason alone cannot constitute the humanity of Jesus as a substance existing in reality. Only a real relation could constitute the human nature as an *aliquid* and therefore as a really existing substance or individual essence. Consequently, if a real relation is lacking, then Christ insofar as he is man is not something, because the humanity is not something formally constituted, that is, existing in reality.

Cajetan's reply is a little disappointing, and while he accuses Scotus of an impoverished understanding of the text of St. Thomas, it would seem that it is the good cardinal who has missed a few steps.[4] Cajetan receives the Scotist objection

---

[1] See Thomas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 7: "omnis relatio quae consideratur inter Deum et creaturam, realiter quidem est in creatura, per cuius mutationem talis relatio innascitur: non autem est realiter in Deo, sed secundum rationem tantum, quia non nasictur secundum mutationem Dei" (ed. Leonina, 11: 40). See also *ST* I, q. 13, a. 7; q. 28, a. 1, ad 3; q. 45, a. 3, ad 1.

[2] See Denzinger-Hünermann, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 749-50.

[3] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 9: "Contra modum quo ponitur Christus habere esse secundum naturam humanam, scilicet quod Verbum novo modo relative se habet secundum illam, arguit: 'Si Verbum tantum habeat respectum novum ad naturam illam, et ille est respectus rationis tantum; cum per respectum rationis non dicatur subiectum formaliter esse aliquid, ergo Verbum, inquantum homo, non erit formaliter aliquid. Consequens est contra illud, Extra, *de Haeret., Cum Christus.* Ergo', etc." (ed. Leonina, 11:225a).

[4] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 16: "Ad obiecta deinde eiusdem Scoti contra modum respondetur quod ex malo intellectu litterae procedit. Interpretatur siquidem arguens Auctorem dicere inter Verbum et naturam humanam non ese coniunctionem nisi relativam relatione rationis ex parte Verbi: et ideo arguit, *Si tantum habet relationem*, etc. Hic autem sensus longe est a nobis plus quam terra a caelo. Quoniam secundum | doctrinam Auctoris, saepe repetitam, inter Verbum et humanitatem assumptam est coniunctio substantialis, quam comitatur unio relativa. Sed quia coniunctio ista substantialis non est secundum novum esse ipsius humanitatis, sed secundum aeternum esse ipsius Verbi, ideo

as though Scotus has overlooked the substantiality of the hypostatic union and mistakenly understood St. Thomas to have advocated only a relative (that is, accidental) relation of reason between the Word and his humanity. But the problem of substantiality is not so much a premise in Scotus's argument as the conclusion, and what the objection has clearly in focus is the problem of the constitution or foundation of substantiality, namely, a real relation. Cajetan does not address this problem in his reply and simply repeats precisely what is in dispute. But how can a relation of reason be the (causal) ground for the substantiality of a created *individuum* in the genus of substance?

If it is according to the person of the Word that we say that the relation (of hypostatic union) is substantial, but that relation on the side of the Word is only a relation of reason, then how can it be said (truly) *in re* that the humanity is substantial? To be sure, Cajetan's response is that the *esse* of the person of the Word is sufficient cause and the Person of the Word himself is sufficient ground or foundation for the substantiality of the humanity, but this still fails to address the question. So to clarify this issue, let us look at Cajetan's own assessment of St. Thomas on the created character of the hypostatic union.

With alarming regularity, Cajetan systematically qualifies (almost to the point of resistance) the conclusions drawn by St. Thomas in question 2, article 7 of the *tertia pars*. For Cajetan, there is a fundamental divide between the meaning of the union taken as a relation in the genus of relation (and therefore as an accident) and the union as signifying the conjunction of the human nature with the person of the Word. Understood as a relation, the union is a "real, created being." But understood as the unity constituted between the human nature and the person of the Son, "it is in the genus or order of substance: and is not something created, but the Creator."[1]

This distinction in meanings is absent from the text of article 7. There is no indication that Thomas intends for us to understand the hypostatic union as an

---

Auctor, ad excludendam acquisitionem novi esse, dicit quod solum advenit sibi nova relatio : et non dixit hoc ad excludendam coniunctionem substantialem secundum personalitatem et illius esse, ut clare patet in littera. Quin potius, cum dictio exclusiva non excludat a concomitantibus, nec fundamentum a relatione, ponendo solum novam relationem acquiri, intelligitur praeacquiri fundamentum illius, quod est personalis coniunctio, super qua fundatur relatio nova personae ad naturam. Unde patet argumentum totaliter ruere" (ed. Leonina, 11:226-27).

[1] See Cajetan, *in ST IIIa,* q. 2, a. 7, n. 3: "In hoc articulo cautissime adverte distinctionem praedictam de unione: vel quantum ad relationem, quam significant; vel quantum ad coniunctionem in persona, ad quam consequitur. Quoniam plus differunt haec duo quam caelum et terra. Unio enim pro relatione est in genere relationis, et est ens reale creatum, ut in littera dicitur. Unio autem pro coniunctione naturae humanae in persona divina, cum consistat in unitate quae est inter naturam humanam et personam Filii Dei, est in genere seu ordine substantiae: et non est aliquid creatum, sed Creator" (ed. Leonina, 11:41a).

accident in the genus of relation when he says that it is something created,[1] and as he insists in the reply to the third objection, the hypostatic union is not the Creator or God.[2] The Angelic Doctor expends a great deal of energy in the previous article (a. 6) to establish that the union between humanity and divinity is not an accidental union, because humanity is not predicated of the Word accidentally but substantially. To be clear, this is not the same as determining whether the union is an accident (or in a genus of accident), but the union is obviously not a substance. Article six, however, does open a trajectory for asking whether the union is substantial and that question is answered in the affirmative, so it should at least produce caution about too readily placing it within the accidental genus of relation.

Consequences

What has happened here is an unwarranted reduction of an accident to a categorical or predicamental sense without sufficient exploration of other possible meanings of accident. In the unique case of the hypostatic union, we have something like a (quasi) predicable meaning of accident, insofar as it does not flow directly from the essence of its subject.[3] Yet while pertaining to its subject substantially,[4] the hypostatic union is not causally dependent on the humanity in a formal or an efficient way. The hypostatic union is substantial, and as substantial it cannot be placed within the accidental category of relation simply speaking.

---

[1] See Thomas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 7, s.c.: "Quod incipit esse ex tempore, est creatum. Sed unio ill anon fuit ab aeterno, sed incoepit esse ex tempore. Ergo unio est aliquid creatum" (ed. Leonina, 11:40a).

[2] See Thomas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 7, ad 3: "homo dicitu ret est Deus propter unionem inquantum terminatur ad hypostasim divinam. Non tamen sequitur quod ipsa unio sit Creator vel Deus: quia quod aliquid dicatur creatum, hoc magis respicit esse ipsius quam relationem" (ed. Leonina, 11:40b).

[3] See Thomas, *Quodl*. 12, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1: "Et ad id quod Hylarius dicit, dico quod accidens dicitur large omne quod non est pars essencie, et sic est esse in rebus creatis, quia in solo Deo esse est eius essencia" (ed. Leonina, 25.2: 404). See also, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 12: "Gratia igitur Christi, sive unionis sive habitualis, non potest dici naturalis quasi causata ex principiis naturae humanae in ipso: quamvis possit dici naturalis quasi proveniens in naturam humanam Christi causante divina natura ipsius. Dicitur autem naturalis utraque gratia in Christo inquantum eam a nativitate habuit: quia ab initio conceptionis fuit natura humana divinae personae unita, et anima eius fuit munere gratiae repleta" (ed. Leonina, 11:51b); cf. *QD de Unione*, a. 3, ad 14 (ed. Obenauer, 82).

[4] Given Cajetan's own example of the relation between soul and body, it is good to recall that St. Thomas regards this relation as a substantial perfection (not an accidental perfection), see *ST* III, q. 6, a. 6, ad 2: "anima est perfectio substantialis corporis: gratia vero est perfectio animae accidentalis. Et ideo gratia non potest ordinare animam ad unionem personalem, quae non est accidentalis, sicut anima corpus" (ed. Leonina, 11:104b).

Cajetan's strategy of making the union into something in the "genus or order" of substance and then identifying it with the Creator himself is equally problematic. For on the divine side, the only distinction is of person, and whether we consider the divine according to person or nature neither is to be properly understood *within* the genus or order of substance: God is not in a genus. I am not trying to insinuate that Cajetan is unaware of the uncategorical character of God, but I am trying to indicate that a failure to adhere to the sense of St. Thomas in this text produces severe and grave ambiguities in his language and implementation of otherwise sound philosophical and theological principles.

When it comes to the question of *esse*, Cajetan again relativizes the basic thrust of the text. Thomas explains that while the intelligibility of a relation depends upon its end or term, a relation's *esse* depends on its subject. Consequently, he concludes that the hypostatic union has an *esse creatum*, because its (real) subject is a created human nature.[1] But once again Cajetan injects his distinction of relative and substantial so that he can redirect the emphasis back to the term of the relation and therefore assert that the *esse* is really the divine *esse*.[2] This fundamentally undermines the rationale presented by Thomas, however, which is that to determine the *esse* of a relation, one must look not to the end or term but to the (real) subject of the relation. Cajetan would have the reader look in the wrong place!

Ultimately, Cajetan concludes that there is "nothing created" intervening between the human nature and the Word "except a passion by which the human nature is drawn to the *esse* of the Word."[3] It is good to recall Thomas's own remark that the hypostatic union does not take place as through a medium, whether on the divine side or the created side,[4] and if this were the only implication of "intervene," Cajetan's comment could be conceded without qualification. But to say that "there is nothing created"? This is the most disconcerting of Cajetan's interpretations, for it deprives the human nature of its created status before the divine essence, which is to say, if Cajetan is correct in his reading, then the human nature of Christ is not related to the divine essence as

---

[1] See Thomas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 7, ad 2: "ratio relationis, sicut et motus, dependet ex fine vel termino: sed esse eius dependet ex subiecto. Et quia unio talis non habet esse reale nisi in natura creata, ut dictum est, consequens est quod habeat esse creatum" (ed. Leonina, 11:40b).

[2] See Cajetan, *in ST IIIa*, q. 2, a. 7, n. 6: "Et quamvis esse aliquid, in communi loquendo , propter terminum relationis praecise, sit esse relativum; esse tamen aliquid ratione talis termini, scilicet personae divinae unius personaliter cum natura humana, non est esse relativum, sed esse divinum" (ed. Leonina, 11:42b).

[3] Cajetan, *In ST IIIa*, q. 2, a. 7, n. 3: "Ubi patet nihil creatum intervenire nisi passionem qua natura humana trahitur ad esse Verbi" (ed. Leonina, 11:41a).

[4] See *ST* III, q. 6, a. 6c et ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 11:104b).

to an efficient cause; this would mean that it is not created, which is not only absurd but heretical.[1]

If this seems like a leap in argumentation, it will be helpful to address another one of Cajetan's replies to Scotus in order to verify the implication I have drawn. The objection addressed is the fourth in the third series, which pertains to the conclusion excluding any created *esse* from the humanity of Christ. The Scotist objection begins with the claim that the humanity of Christ is produced and conserved by the whole Trinity. Its conclusion is that the humanity must therefore have a created *esse*, for it could not have the divine *esse*, since nothing produces itself.[2]

Cajetan seems remarkably untroubled by this objection and concedes the premise, "the humanity of Christ is effectively conserved and made by the whole Trinity," but adds the qualification, "according to the uncreated *esse existentiae* communicated to it." He then attacks the implication that God would cause himself: "It does not follow, therefore, that God produces himself or his own *esse*, but that he produces and conserves himself and his own *esse* as communicated to the human nature personally."[3]

---

[1] There is a further argument to be made here against Cajetan, insofar as this position insinuates that the only created intelligibility is a *passio*. A passion cannot be ongoing, which is one of the reasons why Thomas on the one hand thinks that prophecy is a passion (not a habit, see *ST* II-II, q. 171, a. 2), and on the other thinks that the *lumen gloriae* must be a habit (see *ST* I, q. 12, a. 5, ad 1). A passion has an insufficient metaphysical longevity to be an adequate explanatory term (however analogical) for the hypostatic union. If the counterargument is made that Cajetan is not identifying this *passio* with the hypostatic union but rather with some sort of *habilitas* in the human nature that disposes it for union. This counterargument has two problems: (1) Thomas rejects any requirement for an intervening habit between the human nature and the Person of the Word (see *ST* III, q. 2, a. 10; q. 6, a. 6). From this, it does not seem that any dispository mediation is required whatsoever. (2) In the *Scriptum*, Thomas identifies multiple meanings for *gratia unionis* (*Scriptum in 3 Sent*., d. 13, q. 3, a. 1). One of them is some sort of disposition in the human nature for its union to the person of the Word. In the *tertia pars*, however, not only is this meaning never invoked or mentioned, but the hypostatic union is identified explicitly with the *gratia unionis* (see *ST* III, q. 2, a. 10; q. 6, a. 6c; q. 7, a. 13). Consequently, even if it is argued that Cajetan doesn't actually say there is nothing created *simpliciter* but posits a passion, this argument cannot stand for the reasons advanced above and consequently his position must be reduced to *nihil*. The argument on behalf of a *passio* fails both textually and metaphysically.

[2] See Cajetan, *in ST IIIa*, q. 17, a. 2, n. 10: "Humanitas Christi est effecta et conservata a tota Trinitate. Ergo secundum existere creatum. Probatur consequentia. Quia non secundum existere increatum. Probatur: quia nihil efficit se" (ed. Leonina, 11:225a).

[3] See Cajetan, *in ST IIIa*, q. 17, a. 2, n. 17: "ad quartum dicitur quod humanitas Christi effective conservatur et facta est a tota Trinitate, secundum esse existentiae increatum communicatum sibi. Nec sequitur quod Deus efficiat ideo se, aut suum esse: sed quod effecerit et conservet se et suum esse communicatum humanae naturae personaliter" (ed.

But this does not sufficiently address the main thrust of the objection, which is the claim about production entailing a created (not uncreated) *esse*. If created, then the human nature must be related to God as to an efficient cause. Such a relation, the objection contends, consists in an *esse creatum*. What is produced is not the person of the Son even as incarnate (this would be to speak most imprecisely); rather, the human nature is produced insofar as at the moment of conception it is simultaneously joined to the Word.[1] It is possible, therefore, to also affirm that the union too is in some sense created and conserved, and this is just what St. Thomas says: "the union is produced through grace, not as through a medium, but as through an efficient cause,"[2] for it is the whole Trinity that unites the human nature to the Word, but only the Word may be truly said to have been united to the humanity.[3]

And if the principles of Thomas are adhered to, then one must discern the character of this substantial relation insofar as it regards its production and conservation according to its subject, which is the human nature. Hence (in this theologically exceptional case), it is more precise to say that the nature is produced and conserved by the whole Trinity, even though a nature is normally only the formal term of generation not the material term (that is, that which is received in generation not that which is produced by generation).[4] It remains misleading, however, to say that the Word produces or preserves himself, even if the qualifiers "as incarnate" or "as communicating himself and his *esse* to the human nature" are added. Indeed, precisely because in the natural order of things the material term of creation or generation is the supposit,[5] in the supernatural

---

Leonina, 11:227a).

[1] See Thomas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 12: "ab initio conceptionis fuit natura humana divinae personae unita" (ed. Leonina, 11:51b).

[2] See Thomas, *ST* III, q. 6, a. 6: "Si vero intelligatur gratia ipsa voluntas Dei aliquid gratis faciens vel donans, sic unio facta est per gratiam, non sicut per medium, sed sicut per causam efficientem" (ed. Leonina, 11:104b); cf. III, q. 2, a. 12, ad 3: "gratia unionis non est naturalis Christo secundum humanam naturam, quasi ex principiis humanae naturae causata. Et ideo non oportet quod conveniat omnibus hominibus. Est tamen naturalis ei secundum humanam naturam, propter proprietatem nativitatis ipsius: prout sic conceptus est ex Spiritu Sancto ut esset idem naturalis Filius Dei et hominis. Secundum vero divinam naturam est ei naturalis, inquantum divina natura est principium activum huius gratiae. Et hoc convenit toti Trinitati: scilicet huius gratiae esse activum principium" (ed. Leonina, 11:52).

[3] See Thomas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 8, ad 2: "Nam persona Patris univit naturam humanam Filio, non autem sibi" (ed. Leonina, 11:43).

[4] See Thomas, *QD de Unione*, a. 2, ad 16: "generatio terminatur ad suppositum quidem sicut quod generatur, ad naturam autem sicut ad id, quod per generationem accipitur" (ed. Obenauer, 62).

[5] See Thomas, *ST* I, q. 45, a. 4 (ed. Leonina, 4:468).

case of the incarnation (where a supposit is not generated or created) such language ought to be avoided.[1]

Consequently, the real trouble with Cajetan's solution is that there is no longer any metaphysical reason for him to say that the human nature of Christ is created. Saying that the humanity exists by the uncreated existence of the Word is to say that it is not related to the Trinity as to an efficient cause, but every created reality is related to God as to an efficient cause,[2] for everything that exists in any way exists by God,[3] according to a limited or participated *esse*,[4] for a created *esse* is the proper effect of God as *ipsum esse*.[5] And whereas normally the proper subject of creation or generation would be the supposit, in the unparalleled case of the incarnation, the human nature is a created individual before God, not existing per se but in another, because it is really joined to and assumed by the person of the Son.[6]

Yet some account of the humanity's creatureliness needs to be extrapolated, for it is not as though the human nature can be exempted from creaturehood. Yet if no explanation of how it can be related to God as to an efficient cause can be offered, because there is "nothing created" intervening between it and any of the persons of the Trinity, then it is difficult to understand how one can maintain both Cajetan's conclusion excluding any created *esse* whatsoever and hold (on metaphysical grounds) that the humanity of Jesus is created. In order for it to be true that the humanity of Jesus is created, there must be a real relation of *creari* that has as its real, ontological subject the humanity of Jesus.

The final reply to an objection I want to note is the tenth in the third series of objections surrounding Cajetan's conclusion excluding a created, substantial *esse* from Christ's humanity. This objection is associated with Peter Aureol and

---

[1] See Thomas, *ST* III, q. 16, a. 10, corpus and ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 11:215).

[2] See Thomas, *ST* I, q. 8, a. 3, corpus and ad 1 (ed. Leonina, 4:87).

[3] See Thomas, *ST* I, q. 44, a. 1: "necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse" (ed. Leonina, 4:455a).

[4] See Thomas, *QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 1: "Omne igitur quod est post primum ens, cum non sit suum esse, habet esse in aliquo receptum, per quod ipsum esse contrahitur: et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei que participat esse et aliud ipsum esse participatum. Et cum quelibet res participet per assimilationem primum actum | in quantum habet esse, necesse est quod esse participatum in unoquoque comparetur ad naturam participantem ipsum sicut actus ad potentiam" (ed. Leonina, 24.2:13b-14a).

[5] See Thomas, *ST* I, q. 8, a. 1 (ed. Leonina, 4:82a).

[6] See Thomas, *QD de Unione*, a. 2: "Sic igitur, quia natura humana in Christo non per se separatim subsistit, sed existit in alio, id est in hypostasi Verbi Dei, non quidem sicut accidens in subiecto neque proprie sicut pars in toto, sed per ineffabilem assumptionem, ideo humana natura in Christo potest quidem dici individuum aliquod vel particulare vel singulare, non tamen potest dici vel hypostasis vel suppositum, sicut nec persona" (ed. Obenauer, 56

John of Naples, the foundation of which is that the divine *esse* does not actuate a human essence, because the divine *esse* does not take the place of a formal, inhering cause. Consequently, this leaves only two possibilities in the case of the incarnation: (1) either the humanity of Christ is actuated by its own *esse*, or (2) the natural potency the humanity has toward being actuated by its own (created) *esse* is retained.[1]

In reply, Cajetan distinguishes between two ways of taking "actuate." According to a strict meaning, actuation takes place according to the mode of inherence. Implementing the principles he has already enumerated, Cajetan argues that existence does not actuate an essence except as having reached its term, that is, as having been supplied with a person,[2] for a nature is not properly speaking the subject of existence, only the supposit. Consequently, existence does not ever inhere in a nature as in a subject but only in the supposit.

Cajetan, however, is open to a wider meaning of actuate and offers an example. In the case of the beatific vision, the divine essence actuates the created intellect that sees it. In this way, the divine essence could be said to actuate a created essence. By extension, in the incarnation the human nature in Christ could be said to be actuated in some way through the personality and *esse* of the Word,[3] not as inhering in the human nature but as drawing the human nature into the divine perfection and completing it.

The cardinal doesn't extrapolate on the character of this second kind of actuation, other than to offer the example of beatific vision. But I think this warrants the question: Is the analogy drawn from the beatific vision based on a sufficient likeness? The constitution of the possible intellect is unique insofar as "in a certain way it becomes all things,"[4] and for this reason it does not limit the

[1] See Cajetan, *in ST IIIa*, q. 17, a. 2, n. 10: "Aureolus etiam, et Ioannes de Neapoli, apud Capreolum, in VI dist. III *Sent.*, arguunt: ille quidem, quia esse existentiae est actus quo formaliter essentia est. Esse divinum non actuat essentiam humanam. Ergo humanitas Christi vel est actuata suo esse, vel adhuc perseverat potentialis ad esse: nam esse divinum non supplet vicem causae formalis inhaerentis" (ed. Leonina, 11:225b).

[2] See Cajetan, *in ST IIIa*, q. 17, a. 2, n. 18: "Ad aureolum dicitur quod esse existentiae non actuat essentiam nisi terminatam, hoc est personatam, seu per se subsistentem. Et quia humanitas Christi non est terminata propria personalitate, sed personalitate Verbi, ideo non convenit sibi actuary per existentiam. Et haec intellige, loquendo de actuare et actuary per modum inhaesionis" (ed. Leonina, 11:228a).

[3] See Cajetan, *in ST IIIa*, q. 17, a. 2, n. 18: "Nam si de actuare et actuary infra totam latitudinem suorum modorum sermo sit, non est remotum a philosophia divina Deum posse actuare rem creatam. In cuius signum, divinam essentiam esse actum cuiusque intellectus videntis ipsam, et theology et philosophi fatentur. Cum ergo naturam humanam in Christo ex divina personalitate et esse divino perfici fateamur, non est absonum fateri etiam quod actuatur aliquo etiam modo per personalitatem et esse divinum" (ed. Leonina, 11:228a).

[4] See Thomas, *ST* I, q. 79, aa. 2-3; cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.5.430a10.

actuation it receives through the intelligible species that inform it. Yet in the order of being(s), even if one accepts Cajetan's claim that *esse* is only received by the supposit, this does not change the fact that *esse* is also always contracted and limited through a nature or species, even if its proper subject is the supposit.[1]

As regards the reception of an actuation, the two orders of being and knowing are not the same, for in the order of knowing there is reception without limitation, but in the order of being there is never reception without limitation. This difference between the two orders, consequently, calls into question the appeal to the order of knowing in order to justify a claim about the order of being. In the case of reception, therefore, there is an insufficient likeness between the two orders to substantiate the argument.

Deepening the Appeal to Beatific Vision: Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.

Since John Froula has produced a fine analysis of Garrigou's interpretation of *esse secundarium*,[2] I will focus only on Garrigou's response to this objection about limitation. Garrigou frames the objection in the following way: "No divine perfection is able to actuate a created nature, for in this very act it would be limited, for it would be received in a created nature, and with it would constitute a composite more perfect than its parts."[3]

To field this objection, Garrigou introduces a distinction, genetically related to the ones illustrated in Cajetan and the Carmelites, distinguishing between an actuation by way of "a form informing intrinsically" and "a term terminating intrinsically."[4] If the objection is appealing to the first mode, then Garrigou concedes that God cannot actuate a created nature in this way, for this would entail God's entering into composition with a creature. Were this to be affirmed in the case of Christ, this would result in the heresy of monophysitism.

Again in genetic relation to the texts explored above, Garrigou presents an example of the second mode of actuation according to a term that terminates

[1] See Thomas, *QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 1: "Manifestum est enim quod primum ens, quod Deus est, est actus infinitus utpote habens in se totam essendi plenitudinem, non contractam ad aliquam naturam generis uel specei; unde oportet quod ipsum esse eius non sit esse quasi inditum alicui nature que non sit suum esse, quia sic finiretur ad illam naturam : unde dicimus quod Deus est ipsum suum esse" (ed. Leonina, 24.2:13b).

[2] See John Froula, "Esse Secundarium: An Analogical Term meaning that by which Christ is Human," *The Thomist* 78 (2014): 562-64.

[3] Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Christo Salvatore*, 302: "Nulla perfectio divina potest *actuare* naturam creatam, eo ipso *limitaretur*, nam reciperetur in natura creata, et cum ea constitueret compositum magis perfectum quam partes ejus."

[4] Ibid.: "Nulla perfectio divina potest actuare naturam creatam per modum *formae intrinsece informantis*, concedo; per modum *termini intrinsece terminantis*, nego."

intrinsically: "thus, the essence of God when it is seen clearly terminates the act of beatific vision." He immediately applies this analogically to the incarnation, "so the eternal existence of the Word is the ultimate act terminating the humanity of Christ." He subsequently makes a further parallel, approving of those who say that "in Christ there is not only an ecstasy of contemplation and love, but an ecstasy of existence, as the humanity of Christ exists through the eternal existence of the Word, as though raptured to it, as an ardent lover to the object loved."[1]

First, it should be pointed out that a form that informs intrinsically wouldn't actually apply in the case of existence even if we were talking about a created existence. Neither essence nor existence is a form that informs intrinsically. Existence is not a form (in the strict sense),[2] for even form is in potency to existence.[3] And while essence can be considered as a form, Thomas regards it not as a form of a part (like the soul) but a form of the whole, and consequently it does not inform its supposit the way the soul informs a body but is that in which the supposit subsists.[4] It is for this reason that Thomas can affirm that there is a union between the person of the Word and the human nature, because a human nature does not, strictly speaking, inform its supposit, although it remains causally

[1] Ibid.: "Sic essentia Dei clare visa terminat actum visionis beatificae. Ita existentia aeterna Verbi est actus ultimus terminans humanitatem Christi, ut culmen pyramidis terminat novas lineas quae tendunt ad ipsum. Unde quidam merito dixerunt: in Christo est non solum extasis contemplationis et amoris, sed *extasis ipsius esse*, prout humanitas Christi existit per esse aeternum Verbi, quasi rapitur ad illud, sicut ardens amor ad objectum amatum."

[2] I am aware that St. Thomas sometimes refers to *esse* as an *id quo* (see *SCG* 2.52) and even obliquely as a form (see *in 1 Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, a. 1c); and that he speaks of it as formally related to other metaphysical elements (see, *in 1 Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2).

[3] See Thomas, *Quodl*. 12, q. 4, a. 1c: "Sciendum ergo, quod unumquodque quod est in potentia et in actu, fit actu per hoc quod participat actum superiorem. Per hoc autem aliquid maxime fit actu quod participat per similitudinem primum et purum actum. Primus autem actus est esse subsistens per se; unde completionem unumquodque recipit per hoc quod participat esse; unde esse est complementum omnis formae, quia per hoc completur quod habet esse, et habet esse cum est actu: et sic nulla forma est nisi per esse. Et sic dico quod esse substantiale rei non est accidens, sed actualitas cuiuslibet formae existentis, sive sine materia sive cum materia" (ed. Leonina, 25.2:404a). See also, *QD de Anima*, q. 6, ad 2: "ipsum esse est actus ultimus qui participabilis est ab omnibus; ipsum autem nichil participat. Vnde si sit aliquid quod sit ipsum esse subsistens, sicut de Deo dicimus, nichil participare dicimus. Non est autem similis ratio de aliis formis subsistentibus, quas necesse est participare ipsum esse et comparari ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum. Et ita, cum sint quodammodo in potentia, possunt aliquid aliud participare" (ed. Leonina, 24.1:51b.268-77).

[4] See Thomas, *Quodl.* 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4: "humanitas non est forma parties que dicatur forma quia informet aliquam materiam uel subiectum, set dicitur forma totius, in qua suppositum nature subsistit; unde non portet ponere quod ypostasis increata informetur humanitate, set quod subsistat in ea" (ed. Leonina, 25.1:93b).

related to its supposit in important ways (some of which apply to us and Christ, and others that apply only to us). So it is not especially helpful to make this concession, for it only excludes the informing relationship that obtains between matter and form, which all (scholastic) parties, whether Scotist, Suarezian, or Thomist, believe to be impossible for God, because he is not the form of any matter,[1] which is to say that no creature is related to him as matter to form.

Second, as the Carmelites of Salamanca note, even if we are not talking about the inherence of a form in the proper sense but a term reaching its completion, such termination still implies limitation.[2] Thomas refers to the reception and limitation of *esse* as a termination, explicitly citing the reception of existence in a supposit as the primary example.[3] Consequently, there is still a problem even in the case of a "term terminating intrinsically," for no supposit exists apart from a nature,[4] and thus any existence received in a supposit is received concomitantly through a determinate nature or a species and in this way is limited or contracted.[5] Whenever a creature is distinct from its existence, there is contraction and limitation.[6]

Third, for Thomas, a created *individuum* is related in the natural order to God in two ways: (1) according to efficient causality and (2) according to exemplar

---

[1] See Thomas, *ST* I, q. 3, a. 8: "neque est possibile Deum aliquo modo in compositionem alicuius venire, nec sicut principium formale, nec sicut principium materiale" (ed. Leonina, 4:48a).

[2] See *Cursus Theologicus*, tr. 21, pars 2, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 2, n. 80: "nam si loquamur de subsistentia; et existentia creatis; neutra unitur naturae absque sui in eadem natura receptione, et limitatione" (Paris, 1879, 14:62a).

[3] See Thomas, *in 1 Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, a. 1: "Respondeo dicendum, quod aeternitas dicitur quasi ens extra terminos. Esse autem aliquod potest dici terminatum tripliciter: vel secundum durationem totam, et hoc modo dicitur terminatum quod habet principium et finem; vel ratione partium durationis, et hoc modo dicitur terminatum illud cujus quaelibet pars accepta terminata est ad praecedens et sequens; sicut est accipere in motu; vel ratione suppositi in quo esse recipitur: esse enim recipitur in aliquo secundum modum ipsius, et ideo terminatur, sicut et quaelibet alia forma, quae de se communis est, et secundum quod recipitur in aliquo, terminatur ad illud; et hoc modo solum divinum esse non est terminatum, quia non est receptum in aliquo, quod sit diversum ab eo" (ed. Mandonnet, 202).

[4] See Thomas, *Quodl*. 9, q. 1, a. 1c: "Non enim potest esse actu in rerum natura aliquid non specificatum, ad diuersas species indifferenter se habens" (ed. Leonina, 25.1:89).

[5] See Thomas, *QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 1 (ed. Leonina, 24.2:13b).

[6] See Thomas, *ST* I, q. 7, a. 2: "Si autem sint aliquae formae creatae non receptae in materia, sed per se subsistentes, ut quidam de angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae secundum quid, inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque contrahunter per aliquam materiam: sed quia forma creata sic subsistens habet esse, et non est suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit receptum et contractum ad determinatam naturam. Unde non potest esse infinitum simpliciter" (ed. Leonina, 4:74b).

causality.[1] These two causal relations indicate the two ways in which all creatures fall short of the Creator, for they equal the divine essence neither in species or genus nor in purity of act. In all created beings, therefore, there is a twofold limitation or imperfection: (1) according to nature or species[2] and (2) according to its mode of having existence.[3]

Fourth, Garrigou's example of a "term that terminates intrinsically" is the essence of God as attained in the beatific vision. But this analogical appeal seems to give insufficient attention to the difference between knowing and being.[4] For in knowing, the intellect does not limit the act of understanding that it undergoes (*pati*) and this is why the intellect in a certain way becomes all things and why in the beatific vision we can be said to understand God perfectly (but not comprehensively, since comprehension is on the side of conception not understanding).[5] But in the *ordo essendi* essence always limits the act of existence

[1] See Thomas, *in 1 Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2c: "Unde patet quod divinum esse producit esse creaturae in similitudine sui imperfecta: et ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, a quo omne esse creatum effective et exemplariter manat" (ed. Mandonnet, 1:198). See also, *ST* I, q. 3, a. 8, ad 1: "deitas dicitur *esse* omnium effective et exemplariter: non autem per essentiam" (ed. Leonina, 4:48b), and I, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3: "Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium rerum. Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia" (ed. Leonina, 4:199b).

[2] See Thomas, *ST* I, q. 3, a. 8: "Forma autem quae est pars compositi, est forma participata: sicut autem participans est posterius eo quod est per essentiam, ita et ipsum participatum; sicut ignis in ignitis est posterior eo quod est per essentiam" (ed. Leonina, 4:48b). See also, *ST* I, q. 15, a. 2: "Unaquaeque autem creatura habet propriam speciem, secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinae essentiae similitudinem" (ed. Leonina, 4:202a).

[3] See Thomas, *in 1 Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, a. 1, ad 5: "Est etiam quaedam imperfectio quantum ad modum habendi, sicut omnis creatura habet imperfectum esse" (ed. Mandonnet, 1:203). See also, *Exp. in Lib. de Causis*, prop. 4, lect. 4, n. 109: "Si autem aliquid sic haberet infinitam virtutem essendi quod non participaret esse ab alio, tunc esset solum infinitum et tale est Deus, ut dicitur infra XVI propositione. Sed si sit aliquid quod habeat infinitam virtutem ad essendum secundum esse participatum ab alio, secundum hoc quod esse participat, est finitum: quia quod participatur non recipitur in participante secundum totam suam infinitatem, sed particulariter. Intantum igitur Intelligentia est composita in suo esse ex finito et infinito, inquantum natura Intelligentiae, infinita dicitur secundum potentiam essendi et ipsum esse quod recipit est finitum. Et ex hoc sequitur quod esse Intelligentiae multiplicari possit, inquantum est esse participatum: hoc enim significat compositio ex finito et infinito" (ed. Pera, 29).

[4] See Thomas, *ST* I, q. 44, a. 3, ad 3: "licet quaelibet scientia et dfinitio sit solum entium, non tamen oportet quod res eundem modum habeant in essendo, quem intellectus habet in intelligendo. Nos enim, per virtutem intellectus agentis, abstrahimus species universals a particularibus conditionibus: non tamen oportet quod universalia praeter particularia subsistant, ut particularium exemplaria" (ed. Leonina, 4:460b).

[5] See Thomas, *ST* I, q. 12, a. 7 (ed. Leonina, 4:127b). See also *Compendium Theologiae*, 1.106 (ed. Leonina, 42:121).

that it receives. Hence, this analogy to beatific vision fails because essence is related to existence differently than the intellect to understanding, even though both relationships are instances of potency/act.[1] In the case of beatific vision (and understanding more generally), the reception (in the possible intellect) is the act (of *intelligere*) and consequently the act is not limited by reception because they are one and the same; the union of an intelligible species with the possible intellect is *intelligere* as *pati*; the possible intellect undergoes reception. But in the case of existence, reception in an essence/supposit is to be limited by that essence/supposit, whereas the possible intellect does not limit the intelligible species it receives.

Lastly, if Garrigou's argument is conceded, what would be the character of the ontological *extasis* to which he refers? Would it be created or uncreated? Garrigou says that the ecstasy would be of the existence, which on his reading would be the divine existence. But *esse* is not a subject, so he must mean (given the immediately following *prout humanitas*) the *ecstasy of the humanity*. But surely this ecstasy must be created; it cannot be the divine ecstasy itself, for even in beatific vision, although the divine essence acts as an uncreated intelligible species, the act of receiving the divine essence in the possible intellect (which is the very act of *intelligere* whereby the intellect attains blessedness) is created.[2] On Garrigou's analogy, therefore, how much more so would the ontological ecstasy (whether of existence or the human nature) also be created? What is this ontological, created ecstasy?

Conclusion

In closing, it is perhaps helpful to heed Cajetan's own warning to novices regarding this topic. He says, "Attend diligently and be careful, Novices, because this decision depends on two common questions. One is whether existence and essence are really distinguished. The other is whether substantial existence is of

[1] There is a legitimate analogy to be made between these orders (see Thomas, *SCG* 1.45), but it is improperly applied in this context.

[2] See Thomas, *ST* I, q. 12, a. 7: "Cum igitur lumen gloriae creatum, in quocumque intellectu creato receptum, non possit esse infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum infinite cognoscat. Unde impossibile est quod Deum comprehendat" (ed. Leonina, 4:127b). See also, *Compendium Theologiae*, 1.106 (ed. Leonina, 42:121); *ST* I-II, q. 1, a. 8 (ed. Leonina, 6:16b); I-II, q. 3, a. 1: "ultimus finis hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens, quod nihil est aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi" (ed. Leonina, 6:26b); q. 3, a. 4: "Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit: sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio beatitudinem consequens" (ed. Leonina, 6:29b); q. 3, a. 8, ad 2 (ed. Leonina, 6:36b).

the person as of a proper subject, or whether it is of person or nature mutually."[1] The cardinal goes onto explain that the doctrine of a single uncreated existence in Christ presupposes that existence is really something other than essence and that existence is owed to the person as to a proper subject. But he adds that "there are various opinions about these questions," and they are not to be understood as though they are of the faith, so he exhorts the novices not to be obstinate in the theological conclusion drawn from the answers, unless they have carefully weighed the evidence.[2]

I want to stress that I maintain both the real distinction between essence and existence and that the supposit is the primary or proper subject of existence. It is out of fidelity to both of these principles that I develop (elsewhere) my own interpretation of *esse secundarium* (although it differs with Cajetan's).[3] I remain convinced, however, that the question posed to the standard Thomist interpretation of the *esse* of Christ is sound: How can the divine *esse* be the actuation of a finite, created individual? As demonstrated in the exploration of Cajetan's text above, this is not a new question, and in the twentieth century, Garrigou-Lagrange offers an expert but still mostly preestablished answer.

In exploring some of the textual receivers of the *QD de Unione*, I have sought to illustrate some of the shortcomings in the Thomist commentary tradition's response to this question of actuation. An appeal to the analogy of beatific vision fails because an actuation of the intellect in the cognitive order is not the same as an actuation of an individual substance in the order of being. Furthermore, it does not seem that a position maintaining that the divine *esse* is the *esse* of the human nature can still say that the human nature is related to the divine essence as to an efficient cause, and consequently lacks sufficient metaphysical wherewithal to explicate how the humanity of Jesus is truly and really created.

There is, however, another extreme to be avoided, for whatever the character of the created *esse* of Christ's humanity, it cannot be natural and proper to the humanity nor can the hypostatic union said to be dependent on it, except as

---

[1] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 22: "Attende diligenter et caute, Novitie, quod ista decisio pendet ex duabus quaestionibus communibus. Altera est: An existentia et essentia distinguantur realiter. Altera: An existentia substantialis sit personae ut proprii susceptivi, an communiter sit personae vel naturae" (ed. Leonina, 11:229a).

[2] See Cajetan, *in ST* IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, n. 22: "Praesupponit enim doctrina ista et esse aliam rem esse ab essentia: et esse deberi personae ut proprio subiecto. Et quoniam variae sunt opiniones circa haec, cum de Christi existentia humana quaestio est, noli haec intelligere quasi sint fidei; noli pertinax esse in conclusione, nisi evidentiam prius habeas de communibus quaestionibus; sed ut rationabilia ac consona haec amplectere" (ed. Leonina, 11:229a).

[3] See Eric A. Mabry, "*In Illo Tempore*: Being and Becoming in the Historical Life of Jesus Christ," *The Heythrop Journal* 58, no. 1 (2017): 17-36.

presupposing it *in ratione*.[1] Rather, the created *esse* must be understood as the contingent result of the Trinity's uniting of the human nature to the Word. This means that the *esse secundarium* is a dependent *esse* because it is a contingent *esse*. Understood as a grace (that is, *gratia unionis*) it is absolutely supernatural, for not only is there no preceding merit, but it is also absolutely beyond the natural proportion of a created nature to be the nature of the Son of God. A human nature does not possess a natural potency for a substantial union with a divine person. Consequently, the actuation of a human nature that results from the divine uniting is the actuation of a substantial, obediential potency.[2] Thomas's *esse secundarium*, therefore, must be a substantial, created, but absolutely supernatural participation of Christ's human nature in the divine *esse* of the Word. To establish this interpretation textually requires a separate treatment,[3] but this paper has illustrated shortcomings in the Thomist commentary tradition's attempt to establish an exclusively single-*esse* view.

[1] See Francisco Suarez, *Comm. ac Disp. in IIIa,* q. 17, a. 2, disp. 36, sect. 2, n. 6: "Ex his principiis metaphysicis demonstratur Theologica conclusio a nobis posita, quia humanitas Christi, ut condistincta a Verbo, intelligitur esse quaedam actualis entitas, quam ipsa secum affert, et illam a Verbo formaliter non recipit; ergo intelligitur esse existens per existentiam propriam et creatam, omnino a Verbo distinctam" (ed. Berton, 18:262b).

[2] See Bernard Lonergan, *Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, vol. 7 of the *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 112; cf. *The Incarnate Word*, vol. 8 of the *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, trans. Charles Hefling, ed. Robert Doran and Jeremy Wilkins (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), assertio 9, 458.

[3] See Eric A. Mabry, "*Inquantum est Temporaliter Homo Factum*: Thomas Aquinas on the Contingent Being of Jesus Christ," *Lonergan Review* (forthcoming).

Neither Substantial nor Accidental: A Reply to Eric Mabry on the *Esse secundarium* of Christ

R. J. Matava[*]

ABSTRACT: In this article, I respond to Eric Mabry's fine article, "*Nihil Creatum:* Some Thomistic Concerns about the *Consensus Thomistarum* Regarding the *Esse* of Christ." While suggesting a few lines of further refinement for Mabry's view, I agree with Mabry that an unqualified single-*esse* view of the Incarnation is inadequate because the subordinate, secondary *esse* of Christ (which Aquinas affirms in *QDVI* 4) makes the distinct reality of Christ's human nature intelligible.

ST. THOMAS'S TEACHING on the unity of Christ's existence is a matter over which much ink has deservedly been spilled, especially in the last decade. Eric Mabry's essay, "*Nihil Creatum*: Some Thomistic Concerns About the *Consensus Thomistarum* Regarding the *Esse* of Christ," is one of the latest contributions to the ongoing conversation, and his contribution is worthy of serious consideration.

While some, including Coleman O'Neill, whose work I admire, characterize the debate over the alleged tension in St. Thomas's works on the unity of Christ's existence as theologically marginal, only tangential to biblical revelation and Christian life, it seems to me that the stakes in this controversy are high, for it concerns the very identity of Christ. What we see in the fourth article of Thomas's *Disputed Question on the Union of the Incarnate Word* is an astute attempt to thread the needle between the two opposite heresies of Nestorianism, condemned at the Council of Ephesus in 431, and Monophysitism, condemned at the Council of Chalcedon twenty years later. Moreover, how one answers the question of Christ's constitution – particularly the ontological status of his human nature – has great ramifications for how one thinks about salvation, insofar as salvation is accomplished through the instrumental causality of Christ's humanity.

The alleged tension in St. Thomas's treatment of the unity of Christ's existence cannot be dismissed, as it sometimes was in the past, on the basis that the *Disputed Question on the Union of the Incarnate Word* was an early work, reflecting an immature stage of St. Thomas's intellectual development. For we now know that the *Disputed Question on the Union of the Incarnate Word* was a

[*] *R. J. Matava* is associate professor and dean of the Notre Dame Graduate School of Christendom College.

late mature work, dating from around the time of the *tertia pars*. Moreover, it is implausible to suggest that St. Thomas abandoned his view on the unity of Christ's supposital *esse* to espouse the new and allegedly incompatible view of the *Disputed Question*, for even there Thomas maintains his consistent view that Christ has only one supposital *esse*.

According to the predominant Thomist interpretation of *QDVI* 4, represented by such thinkers as Cajetan, Christ had only a single supposital *esse*. The human nature of Christ does not exist by a distinct, finite, creaturely *esse* but, rather, by the uncreated *esse* of the Word.

The reason for the predominant view – that Christ's human nature must exist by the uncreated *esse* of the Word and not its own distinct, finite *esse* – can be appreciated by considering that only an independently existing thing – a first substance – can be the subject of an act, including existence itself (the "act of all acts"). *Personalia* – constitutive aspects of the person – do not exist by their own *esse* but, rather, by the *esse* of the person of whom they are constitutive aspects. On the other hand, accidents – which are *non personalia* – exist by their own act of being, but this is not an independent, substantial act of being. Rather, *non personalia* have their being in another (namely, in their respective subject).

A nature is a *personalium* – a constitutive aspect of the person. But as such it is not the nature that is the subject of existence. The *suppositum* is. Thus, to ascribe any existence to the nature other than the existence of the *suppositum* would seem to entail either that the human nature of Christ is in fact a distinct *suppositum* – not merely an *id quo*, but a *quod est* – a second individual substance, or that the human nature is not a second individual substance but is merely an accident of the Word. Both of these are unacceptable conclusions for anyone committed to Christological orthodoxy. Again: what makes a thing *one* is its supposital *being*. If a putative *suppositum* has more than one act of being, it seems impossible to demonstrate how in fact it could be a unitary substance. The problem, in Christological terms, is Nestorianism.

Therefore, from this concern to avoid positing a distinct supposital *esse* proper to the human nature of Christ, Cajetan maintains that "*nihil creatum*" goes between the human nature and the Word except for a passion by which the human nature is drawn to the Word.

In Mabry's estimation, this is "the most disconcerting of Cajetan's interpretations, for it deprives the human nature of its created status." Indeed, for Mabry, Cajetan's view implies that "the human nature of Christ is not related to the divine essence as to an efficient cause." This, if true, would undermine the creaturely status of Christ's human nature.

Now, it seems to me that something relevant, though beyond the scope of Mabry's paper, that needs to be sorted out is the distinction between (1) the

relation to the Trinity that the human nature as a created reality has as to its causal principle, and (2) the unique relation that the human nature has to the Word as hypostatically united with it. In both cases, divine simplicity entails that the relationship in question is unilaterally real in what is created and (merely) conceptual on God's side. However, that both cases involve mixed relations should not lead us to reduce the hypostatic union to the human nature's existential dependence on the Triune Creator (and not only on the Word). It seems to me that these are two distinct instances of a mixed relation.

Setting aside for the moment the question about the distinction of the human nature's dependence on the Trinity from the human nature's union with the Word, Cajetan surely does not mean to deny the creaturely status of Christ's human nature. And he says not that *nothing* created goes between Christ's human nature and the Word but, rather, that nothing created goes between the human nature and the Word *except a passion by which the human nature is drawn to the Word*. Mabry's argument can seem to elide this point, attributing to Cajetan the more pristine view that, without qualification, *nihil creatum* intervenes. According to Cajetan, the humanity of Christ is created and conserved by the whole Trinity according to God's uncreated act of being, which is communicated to Christ's human nature in the person of the Son.

But here Mabry detects a misstep in Cajetan's argument. For it is not the person of the Son who is created and conserved when the human nature is created and conserved.[1] After all, God is not a *causa sui*. Rather, it is the union which is created and conserved. Now, one might object that in leveling this critique of Cajetan's position Mabry is violating adherence to the communication of idioms, for the subject of actions and passions is not the nature but the person. Hence to deny that God the Son is created and conserved *as man* would be like denying the *Theotokos*. But Mabry's point is that, even if one were to qualify the statement by saying, "God the Son is created and conserved *as man*," what the statement picks out is the hypostatic union. What makes the Son to be created and conserved *as man* is the creaturely status of the "manhood-as-conjoined" to the person of the Son. It is not that God's own esse is, *per impossible*, created or conserved by God, even in some qualified sense such as "in the person of the Son." Such a claim would be misleading at best. In Mabry's view what is needed to save the creaturely status of the Word's humanity is a "real relation of *creari* which has as its real, ontological subject the humanity of Jesus."

Now, I think Cajetan could respond to this worry, and here's how. Recall that Cajetan does affirm a (created) passion that goes between the humanity and the Trinity. Cajetan could call upon this passion to explain the human nature's created

[1] At least not without qualification. See *ST* III, q. 16, a. 8; cf. aa. 9-10.

status. After all, if motion is subtracted from action and passion, what is left is relation.[1] And it is telling that Mabry names the relevant relation *creari* – an infinitive in the passive voice. Perhaps, then, Cajetan's exception of the "passion" supplies exactly what Mabry worries is lacking.

However, if I follow Mabry's argument, there is still a problem to which Cajetan does not have the solution. What is the subject of this relation or passion? Cajetan would apparently reply that the passion is in the human nature. But then Mabry's response would be, how can the human nature be a subject of this passion if it lacks *esse*? Cajetan would reply that the human nature does not lack *esse* but exists by the *esse* of the Word. What keeps the humanity from being *nihil creatum* and allows it to be the subject of the relevant passion is the uncreated *esse* of God. Again: What makes the humanity to be a subject of passive creation – indeed, what makes it *to be* as creaturely – is the divine, uncreated act of being.

Now, an obvious question at this point is how a finite, created nature could be actualized by infinite, uncreated *esse*. (Note: I do not mean, "How could the human nature be actualized by the divine *esse* acting as an efficient cause?" But, rather, "How could the human nature be actualized by divine *esse* as the very act whereby the created nature exists?") To answer this concern, Cajetan suggests an example that is later elaborated by Garrigou-Lagrange: In the beatific vision, a created nature is actualized by the divine essence insofar as the human intellect is actualized by the intelligible species that informs it—in this case, the uncreated essence of God.

What is to be made of Cajetan's position? First, I will address the adequacy of the beatific vision analogy, and second, I will address the underlying claim that the beatific vision analogy is deployed to defend.

In response to the beatific vision analogy, Mabry argues, plausibly I think, that the comparison fails because the order of knowing is not relevantly like the order of being. Whereas the intellect does not limit the intelligible species that informs it, but becomes, in a way, all things, the metaphysical role of essence is to delimit existence, channeling it into the being of a real thing – a determinate *this* or *that*. This argument is convincing enough, I think, to shift the burden on to one who appeals to the beatific vision analogy to show how that analogy is applicable to the matter at hand.

On the underlying claim that the uncreated *esse* of God is the act that realizes the created humanity of the Word, it is not that, on Cajetan's account, there is no subject of passive creation. Rather, it is that the subject's actuality seems incongruous with that subject's being created. Here I wish to offer an observation that I think may strengthen Mabry's argument. It seems to me that the problem

[1] See *ST* I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2; a. 3.

just described centers not on the subject of the creation relation but, rather, on its *foundation*. Given that the subject of the relation is the human nature (as all parties agree) and that its terminus is the Creator (who is the uncreated *esse* of the Word), what in Christ's human nature *founds* passive creation? For in St. Thomas's view, the foundation for passive creation in all other cases is the creature's own finite *esse*.[1] Absent a finite *esse*, what is the basis for maintaining that the humanity is something created and, by extension, that it is real? Mabry plausibly argues that to say, with Cajetan, that the infinite, uncreated *esse* of God is the *esse* of what is created seems to run afoul of some of St. Thomas's most basic and consistently held metaphysical principles, for it seems to violate the axiom that being is limited by essence, and it seems to merge God and creature, violating what Msgr. Sokolowski has called "the Christian distinction."

The only reasonable motive I can see for accepting such consequences is to avoid the even more unpalatable consequences of denying a single *esse* in Christ. Since persons are the subjects of action, it seems that to ascribe a distinct, creaturely *esse* to the humanity of the Word would be to hypostasize the human nature, resulting in a second person in Christ – a human person, separate from God the Son. Mabry does not tell us here how he avoids this unacceptable conclusion, and occasionally his modes of expression even anticipate it.[2] Instead, the primary focus of his project is limited to showing the inadmissible consequences of Cajetan's position.

Mabry hints, however, at a more adequate interpretation of St. Thomas, and what Mabry has said leads me to think that we can look forward to an account of how his position does not entail Nestorianism. Perhaps the answer is that there are not two substantial, supposital *esse* in Christ, but one substantial, supposital *esse* and a distinct *subordinate esse* – an *esse* that is not *secundum*, but *secundarium* – which is neither substantial nor accidental, at least as those terms are ordinarily understood. Such a proposal perhaps initially raises more questions than it answers, especially by not taking for granted the applicability, in this case, of the predicamental boundaries of substance and accidents. But perhaps a move that appears so philosophically unorthodox is warranted by a commitment to revealed truth and the *sui generis* character of the Incarnation.

---

[1] See Mark G. Henninger, "Aquinas on the Ontological Status of Relations," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25, no. 4 (1987): 491-515.

[2] For example, Mabry asks, "How can the divine *esse* be the actuation of *a finite created individual*?" [emphasis mine]. While the human nature of Christ is concrete and particularized, it is misleading to call it a "created individual" because this manner of speaking suggests that Christ's human nature is a created *suppositum*.

Hildebrand on the Heart of Personality

Elizabeth Shaw[*]

ABSTRACT: Dietrich von Hildebrand claims that the emotive center of man, which we may call the "heart," has been largely overlooked in the history of philosophy. Most thinkers give priority to intellect and will in their accounts of human nature, but Hildebrand argues that the heart is a third and equally important element of human nature, not reducible to intellect or will. Moreover, to ignore it is a grave error, for neither intellect nor will but rather the heart, he maintains, is the true center of the person. More than anything else, the heart is essential to our being – it accounts for both our distinctiveness as a species and the distinctiveness of each person as a unique and unrepeatable member of the species.

IN HIS SHORT VOLUME *The Heart: An Analysis of Human and Divine Affectivity* (1965), Dietrich von Hildebrand argues that the emotive or affective center of man, which we may call the "heart," has been largely overlooked in the history of philosophy, at least in the Western tradition. Most thinkers give priority to intellect and freedom of the will in their accounts of human nature, and they do so not without good reason. By one we come to know the truth of the world, and the other is crucial for our pursuit of the good and thereby our life as moral beings. Intellect and will are great gifts through which we engage in our highest activities and move toward our perfection. Even so, in Hildebrand's view, to ignore the heart is a grave error.

Hildebrand maintains that the heart is a third and equally important element of human nature. Not reducible to intellect or will, it sits alongside them and functions in its own ways. In the well-formed person all three elements are integrated and cooperative. Moreover, Hildebrand argues, neither the intellect nor the will but rather the heart is the true center of the person. More than anything else, the heart is essential to our being – it accounts for both our distinctiveness as a species and the distinctiveness of each person as a unique and unrepeatable member of the species.

The most important point from Hildebrand that I want to develop in this piece is his assertion that "the heart is the real self." This claim comes as a crescendo of sorts, something he works up to in the beginning chapters of *The Heart* and expounds fully in chapter 8. I will proceed not by summarizing the full text but by

[*] *Elizabeth Shaw* teaches in the School of Philosophy and is the assistant director for special academic programs at the Ciocca Center for Principled Entrepreneurship at the Catholic University of America.

highlighting a few key chapters, starting with the first, "The Role of the Heart." Here Hildebrand distinguishes the heart by clarifying how exactly it functions in human experience.

He begins by noting the need to distinguish subjective "feelings" from genuine affectivity. Indeed, one of the main errors with respect to the heart is its conflation with such feelings. He explains:

> One of the principal reasons for underrating the affective sphere – for denying the existence of spiritual affective acts, for refusing to grant to the heart a status analogous to that of the intellect and the will – is that one identifies affectivity with the lowest types of affective experience. The entire affective area, and even the heart, has been seen in the light of bodily feelings, emotional states, or passions in the strict sense of the term.[1]

This misunderstanding entails a failure to grasp the true, objective nature of affective experiences such as joy, love, and enthusiasm. As a corrective, Hildebrand clarifies that affectivity properly understood is precisely a response to the value (or disvalue) of some object in human experience. In other words, the activity of the heart is never a free-floating, inward feeling or a state of consciousness untethered from an object; rather, it is always bound up with some object of value that one encounters. To disassociate affective experience from the object that gives rise to it, Hildebrand explains, "results in a falsification of its nature."[2]

Affectivity also has a bad reputation in some circles because of the danger of ungenuineness that is sometimes associated with it. As Hildebrand details it, this ungenuineness comes in a variety of species, including the tendency toward introversion and egocentricity – that is, taking pleasure, as a matter of pride or of concupiscence, in one's own emotional experiences.[3] Ungenuineness is a distortion of affectivity, however, and as such does not justify disparagement of the heart.

To grasp the heart properly, Hildebrand maintains, one must appreciate "its spiritual role...[and the] place equal in rank to that of the will and the intellect" that it holds. He marshals evidence to support the claim that the most excellent human activities are matters of genuine affectivity: "To see the role and rank of

---

[1] Dietrich von Hildebrand, *The Heart: An Analysis of Human and Divine Affectivity*, ed. John Henry Crosby (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2007), 4-5. Hildebrand published the original version of this text under the title *The Sacred Heart* (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965). In 1977 Franciscan Herald Press issued a reprint with the title shortened to *The Heart*. In the 2007 edition, quoted from in this essay, the original introduction is moved to the end of the text, where it appears as an afterword.

[2] Ibid., 7.

[3] Ibid., 9-13.

the heart and of the affective sphere in its highest manifestations, we have to look at man's life, at his quest for earthly happiness, at his religious life, at the lives of the saints, at the Gospel and the liturgy."[1] In each of these areas the heart is engaged, arguably even more so than intellect or will. Indeed, the actualization of the heart, not the mind or the will, is the goal, the whole point of the noblest human things like happiness and religious experience.

Profound love and joy, for example, are the paradigmatic affective responses in the Christian context. Hildebrand writes: "Who will deny that Christian revelation has granted to love a supreme and central role, and that it has clearly expounded the nature of love in its full affectivity and as the voice of the heart? The words of St. Paul, *Gaudete in Domino semper: iterum dico, gaudete*, 'Rejoice in the Lord always, again I say rejoice' (Phil 4:4)."[2] Moreover, while intellect and will are certainly involved as preparatory for these experiences, neither love nor joy is, strictly speaking, a function of intellect or of will. In summary, Hildebrand clarifies that "in man there exists a triad of spiritual centers – intellect, will, and heart – which are ordained to cooperate and to fecundate one another."[3]

In chapter 3, "Tender Affectivity," Hildebrand expands on the nature of the heart to argue against those who would mischaracterize it as the source of nothing but unauthoritative and subjective experience. He begins here by noting, again, that while certain distortions of affectivity do exist, no one rightly appeals to these as an indictment of the heart per se. Those who would do so, he asserts, proceed on the basis of at least one flawed premise: "To see all tender affectivity [or affectivity in general] in the light of its possible perversion is in reality a manifestation of a certain anti-personalism for which everything personal is necessarily 'subjective' in the pejorative sense of this term."[4]

Those who commit this error take what is "personal" to be "egocentric" as well as "narrow and unsubstantial."[5] My personal feelings are mine, and yours are yours, and never the twain shall meet, or so the story goes. More generally they seem to take consciousness itself to be nothing more than self-consciousness, something introverted, something that turns in on and is confined to me. Hildebrand refers to this distortion, whereby a man "looks at his own feelings and is concerned only with how he reacts," as subjectivism.[6] In contrast he observes that true consciousness turns in exactly the opposite direction, namely, outward toward reality. True consciousness "implies no introversion whatever, but rather

[1] Ibid., 16.
[2] Ibid., 18.
[3] Ibid., 19.
[4] Ibid., 45.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., 47.

a fuller, more awakened experience." For example, "[t]he more conscious a joy is, the more its object is seen and understood in its full meaning, the more awakened and outspoken the response, the more the joy is lived."[1]

The keenest consciousness grasps the reality of things in the world, and when channeled as affectivity it means a response to the genuine value that is present in those things. Thus, Hildebrand argues, affectivity rightly understood is not a matter of self-enclosed or self-regarding subjectivity. Quite the contrary, affectivity is necessarily activated by the object of the heart's affection. We understand by drawing a comparison to objectivity in the realm of the intellect: "True objectivity implies . . . that an attitude conforms to the true nature, theme, and value of the object to which it refers. An act of knowledge is objective when it grasps the true nature of the object. . . . And an affective response is objective when it corresponds to the value of the object."[2]

Furthermore, a well-formed and functioning heart is not only activated by but also attentively focused on the value of its object. Hildebrand writes: "The truly affective man is preoccupied with the good which is the source and basis of his affective experience." He continues: "An affective experience which is not justified by reality has no validity for the truly affective man. As soon as such a man realizes that his joy, his happiness, his enthusiasm, or his sorrow is based on an illusion, the experience collapses."[3] The heart responds, not to its own dreams or delusions, but to those real values and disvalues that are objectively present in the world.

We may conclude that affectivity in no way detracts from but in fact is the key to genuine objectivity, and that those who would deny or otherwise suppress it commit the gravest sins against objective reality. As Hildebrand explains, "[t]he truly affective man, the man with an awakened heart, is precisely the one who grasps that what matters is the objective situation and whether there is reason to rejoice and to be happy." Furthermore, only such a person supplies the "full affective response for which the objective situation calls."[4] Anyone who fails to respond adequately to the values and disvalues that are present in the world, whether owing to a hardened heart or a commitment to sober "neutrality,"[5] suffers from some spiritual pathology or what I might call "willful disaffection" (analogous to willful ignorance) – and is clearly not at all objective.

In chapter 5, "Affective Atrophy," Hildebrand details several types of defects of the heart, among which he includes "crippled affectivity . . . due to a

[1] Ibid., 46.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., 47.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 48.

hypertrophy of the intellect." Such cases are characterized by a habitual tendency to analyze experience – measuring it against of one's preexisting conceptual apparatus, seeking an exhaustive accounting of causes and effects, trying to see patterns and establish laws in order so to predict future events, and so on. Hildebrand comments that "[i]n these people the curiosity to observe dominates to such an extent that everything immediately becomes an object of knowledge. They always remain in some way spectators."[1]

There is something ironic, and perhaps tragic, in a man who "experiences affectivity more or less only in the satisfaction he derives from the appeasement of his intellectual curiosity."[2] For notwithstanding the dominance of his intellect, "[e]specially frustrated is the possibility of any real contemplation."[3] He is incapable of actualizing the highest capacities of his intelligence.

The heart's activity is crucial for the perfection of the person insofar as it informs both the will and the intellect. Hildebrand explains: "A man must first see the splendor and glory of the cosmos, its mysteries as well as its tragic features, its character as a valley of tears. Value perception is the indispensable presupposition for the penetration of a man's soul by the ray of values and for the fecundation of his mind."[4] Both the moral life and the intellectual life depend on a person's affective acuity. Realizing one's full human potential requires an open and active heart: "A person can increase and develop all the spiritual wealth and depth to which he is called, only if he is imbued with the values he perceives, only if his heart is moved and kindled by these values and burns in responses of joy, enthusiasm, and love."[5]

Chapter 8, "The Heart as the Real Self," is the culmination of Hildebrand's argument. While intellect and will are vitally important and distinctive elements of human nature, he maintains, the heart is "the most intimate part of the person."[6] The truth of the matter is especially apparent when one examines the phenomena of human love and happiness.

In all of its forms, genuine love is constituted by an active heart. The heart of the one who loves reaches out, extends itself, and seeks union with the heart of the beloved. It is "filled to the brim with longing" and, when united with the beloved, joyful.[7] As Hildebrand describes it, "[t]he heart is here not only the true

---

[1] Ibid., 55. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche on the "weakened personality" of the modern man who in the turn to history has become a "spectator," in *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 56.

[4] Ibid., 58.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., 67.

[7] Ibid.

self because love is essentially a voice of the heart; it is also the true self insofar as love aims at the heart of the beloved in a specific way. The lover wants to pour his heart into the beloved, he wants to affect his heart, to fill it with happiness."[1]

Common sense tells us that the will alone is inadequate for love, for a person may will and act for our good and yet fail to love us. Perhaps cases of unrequited love, for example, could be described in this way. Hildebrand writes: "As long as we feel that the benefits he bestows on us, his considerations and his sacrifices, are dictated only by a good and generous will, we know that we do not really possess the beloved, because we do not possess his heart."[2]

The heart is also the key element in play in the experience of happiness, for it is obvious that we can neither will nor think our way to being happy. "If a man only wills to be happy," Hildebrand notes, "or if he realizes only with his intellect that objectively he must consider himself happy, he is not yet happy."[3] It is fair at least to say that the activities of intellect and will are a part of happiness, however, insofar as they are necessary as prerequisites – we must think and act well in order to get there. But something more is needed to close the deal.

Hildebrand affirms the significance of freedom of the will as "one of the deepest marks of the person, a feature in which man's character as an image of God manifests itself,"[4] and yet freedom is not what determines that an activity or an object is of the highest rank. Indeed, the very highest things are not what we make, but what we receive as gifts. Supernatural grace is the example par excellence; it is never something we obtain by willing it for ourselves but instead is "an absolute unmerited gift utterly inaccessible to our freedom."[5] The same is true among natural goods. Our genius, our artistic and other talents, our very existence – we do not give these things to ourselves or gain them somehow by our own free efforts. They are gifts. Highest of all, our happiness is also like this: "Happiness is a gift, pure gift. Much as we may prepare the ground for it, genuine happiness remains a gift, dropping like dew upon our heart, shining gratuitously like a sunray into our soul."[6]

An important larger point is that our affectivity is a gift, too. The values we encounter in the world are things we receive and, in turn, things to which we respond. Hildebrand gives examples and explains: "[D]eep contrition, the gift of tears, a deep and ardent love, 'being moved' on hearing sublime music or when witnessing an act of superabundant charity. These experiences exist in the higher,

---

[1] Ibid.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., 68.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 69.
[6] Ibid.

spiritual part of the affective realm and have the character of gifts from above, just as deep insight of our intellect is a gift."[1] So not the will but the heart is the proper spiritual organ for these greatest gifts, as, analogously, the speculative intellect grasps the highest objects of knowledge available to us.

In summary, Hildebrand writes, "[m]an is greater and deeper than the range of things he can control with his free will; his being reaches into the mysterious depths which go far beyond what he can engender or create."[2] The highest way to exercise freedom, moreover, is in service of the heart. True freedom is "cooperative" in the sense that it facilitates our affectivity. The will functions best when it opens a person to receive and adequately respond to values, "in sanctioning – in the 'yes' of our free spiritual center which forms from within our 'being affected' by values and, above all, our affective responses to them."[3] Primarily our will is open to respond to God and to morally relevant values, but this openness also includes our receptivity to other forms of love and aesthetic experience. The goal is simply a keen heart, fully alive and responsive to values wherever they may be encountered in the world.

Herein lies the great mystery and distinctiveness of the human person. Hildebrand writes, "It is in the affective sphere, in the heart, that the treasures of man's most individual life are stored. It is in the heart that the secret of a person is to be found; it is here that the most intimate word is spoken."[4] Irreducible to intellect and will, and more than either of these, the heart is the true center of the human person. As such, its significance is something we fail to grasp at our own peril.

[1] Ibid.
[2] Ibid., 70.
[3] Ibid., 70, 71.
[4] Ibid., 58.

Book Reviews

Aidan Nichols, O.P. *The Theologian's Enterprise: A Very Short Introduction.* San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2020. 100 pp. Paper, $14.95.

Reviewed by D. Q. McInerny, Our Lady of Guadalupe Seminary

In recent decades the term "theology," and along with it the term "theologian," became ambiguous to the point of establishing an atmosphere of destabilizing confusion. Theology as often practiced today has lost what Fr. Aidan Nichols identifies as what should be central to it – a sound philosophical foundation, systematic order, and a single formal viewpoint. Without these, what passes as theology today assumes a number of aberrant forms that are not to be mistaken for the genuine article. Accordingly, many who brashly identify themselves as theologians might rightly be suspected of being impostors. I take Fr. Nichols's *The Theologian's Enterprise* to be a response to this disordered state of affairs.

The book has five chapters. The first contains a developed response to the question, What is theology? It begins with a precise definition: "Theology is the disciplined exploration of revelation – that is, the self-disclosure of the divine" (13). This is what St. Thomas typically refers to as *sacra doctrina*. It stands in contrast to natural theology, the science that studies God and the things of God from the point of view of natural reason alone, whose sources "are essentially metaphysics" (13). The study of "natural revelation" that constitutes natural theology explores disposes us to divine revelation, which is distinguished by the particularity of its events, setting them apart from "the naturally recurring patterns of life" (15). More precisely, natural theology with its study of the preambles of faith leads us to the mysteries of faith, central to which is the mystery of Christ. Accompanying the study of the events of revelation on which the theologian concentrates is his interpretation of those events.

Theology's "two most vital ideas" are *cause* and *sign*. God is the cause of his self-manifestation, both through creation (natural revelation) and through the perfection of creation, salvation. It is through signs that God provides his creatures with an understanding of the subject matters of natural theology and sacred theology. Both have to do principally with the divine being (hence the ontological aspect), and with hermeneutics, the interpretation of signs. "Narrative theology," the substitution of narrative for ontology, is an inadequate approach to the science (19).

Extra ecclesia non est theologia. A theology that is separated from the Church is unworthy of the name, for the Church is "the accredited interpreter of the signs that [salvation history] sets up, she alone can be the proper setting for

revelation's disciplined exploration" (20). For this reason, "any theology that departs from this ecclesial norm at once degenerates into eclectic pseudo-knowledge which is alien to Gospel truth" (20). It is not for theology to attempt to "improve" on divine revelation. It is the special task of bishops and the pope faithfully to represent the rule of faith as it is found in scripture and tradition.

Chapter 2 treats of theology as science and wisdom. It is a science in that it is an organized body of knowledge founded upon first principles, manifesting a "*single formal viewpoint*" (24) that gives it unity and intellectual coherence. Theology is a "*systematically ordered*" science, and we may picture it as presenting its material arranged in a circle, in the sense that each point of the circle (representing a particular aspect of revelation) is related to every other point. Thus, "all aspects of revelation are explicitly related to each other and none can be fully understood without grasping the rest" (25). The theologian must be a "tasteful man," in the special sense that he is possessed with the kind of wisdom that allows him to enter into his subject matter mystically. Theology as no more than an academic discipline is a hollow enterprise. "*Theology and holiness* are internally connected" (26). We have an unfortunate tendency to forget that all of the great theologians were saints, people who lived their lives near "to the hallowing Source" (27). Faith-generated dispositions are necessary for the establishment of the proper theological sensibility; "all theology must be praying theology" (27). It is through contemplation that theological reflection becomes one with sanctification, but contemplation must not be divorced from liturgical prayer, the public prayer of the Church, through which the theologian comes to appreciate the bond between theology and beauty. The character of theology as wisdom is accentuated by its affinity with philosophy and its dependence upon philosophy, specifically the *philosophia perennis*, that singular body of foundational truths the roots of which are embodied within creation itself and can be understood as its explicit expression.

In chapter 3 Fr. Nichols spells out the principles and methodology of theology. As Pope Leo XIII stressed in his encyclical *Aeterni Patris*, it is imperative that theology be founded upon a sound philosophy. That philosophy must perform the negative task of excluding common errors, while positively championing the objectivity of truth. It is fortified in performing these tasks by the metaphysics upon which it is founded. While theology may benefit from consulting a wide range of philosophical sources, it has in the philosophy of St. Thomas "the ideal *philosophical principle of order in theology*" (42). The theologian prudently heeds the directive of Pope Leo: "Go to Thomas." As for the theological principle of order, here there are a number of possibilities open to the theologian, but the one recommended by Fr. Nichols and eminently worth taking to heart is "*the plenary outpouring of divine life in grace and glory,* seen as filling

up the 'receptacle' of the natural creation, above all in man." In Catholic theology there is both unity and plurality, the unity established by revelation itself, the plurality resulting from the various particular theologies. Underlying and giving stable support to all would be an essentially single "body of philosophical convictions" (45).

There are four specific methods applicable to theology: the analogy of being; the analogy of faith; totality thinking; convergence thinking. By the analogy of being we come to apprehend that being is to be understood neither univocally nor equivocally. What underlies the comprehensive "bond of being" is the fact that in being there is both sameness, the rudimentary fact of existence itself, and difference, the manner in which individual existents manifest their existence. God exists and man exists, but there is an infinite difference in the manner in which they exist. It is through the analogy of faith that we are enabled to see that the particulars of revelation "*belong together in a unitary whole*" (49). This is closely related to the theological principle of "totality thinking," whereby the theologian strives to link "*theological theses to all other knowledge*." The importance of sound philosophical and theological principles is underscored by the fact that, without them, the result can be an aberration like liberation theology. The "convergence method" of theology is ordered toward remaining focused on the center of all sacred teaching, thus the need "to return time and time again to the central mysteries of the faith" (50).

Chapter 4 deals with the sources of theology, with scripture predominant. It must be read as a whole. "*Ressourcement*, going back to sources, is useless without *recentrement*, recentering on Christ as the manifestation of the Holy Trinity in a human way" (57). The "*historical-critical* method of reading scripture...cannot as such be determinative for Catholic theology" (59). It is false to suppose that "this literature [scripture] is no more unique than any other" (59). Tradition as a source of theology is inseparably bound up with sacred scripture. We read in *Dei Verbum* that "Sacred Tradition and Sacred Scripture make up a single and sacred deposit of the Word of God" (60). The Fathers of the Church are the authoritative interpreters of sacred scripture, and it is imperative that the theologian be fully familiar with their works. The liturgy and sacred iconography represent other sources for theology, as do the creeds, the councils, the lives of the saints, the *sensus fidelium*, and the magisterium, which is "in service of the Word, to protect the primal form against distortion in one or more of its aspects" (66).

In the book's final chapter Fr. Nichols treats of the "subject matters" of theology, by which he means "the *various specializations*" to be found in theology as it is now constituted. One such specialization is "fundamental theology," whose task is to "establish the foundations for the act of faith" (71) and to specify "*the criteria theology will use when it applies itself to the disciplined explorations of*

revelation's contents" (72). Dogmatic theology takes two forms, historical or positive, and systematic or speculative. "Moral theology concerns itself with the ethical actions of Christians" (74). Spirituality is the concern of ascetical or mystical theology. Practical theology is one and the same with pastoral theology.

In the conclusion of the book Fr. Nichols emphasizes that "the theologian must have the capacity to draw conceptual distinctions" (79) so as determine whether one idea is coherent with another, or whether any given idea is internally contradictory. "The theologian must have received the gift of supernatural faith. He is not a philosopher of religion, or a practitioner of 'religious studies,' a discipline for which agnosticism or indeed atheism would not disqualify the student" (80). Foremost among the conceptual distinctions the theologian must make is that between supernatural and natural revelation. He must be able to see how all things relate "to the mystery of God and his saving design" (81). The theologian must be wise, in the judicious use that is made of philosophy, and profound, "in his penetration of his theological subject matter" (81). The theologian must be dedicated to a life of holiness, which is nourished by prayer. In treating of the mysteries of faith he must learn when it is best to speak, when it is best to remain silent. "He must develop his memory power to absorb as much of the Bible as he can" (83). He must be an avid reader. The theologian should be imaginative, in the sense that he is capable of having before him a comprehensive vision of the world.

Fr. Nichols's *The Theologian's Enterprise* is a gem of a book. It presents the essentials of the science of theology with scintillant clarity and succinctness. It should be the *vade mecum* of every Catholic theologian.

Anthony P. Coleman, ed. *Leisure and Labor: Essays on the Liberal Arts in Catholic Higher Education*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020. 153 pp.

Reviewed by Timothy Rothhaar, Marquette University

This book is recommended for all interested in Catholic higher education, leisure culture, the dignity of work, and teacher roles. Educators unfamiliar with liberal arts education will receive a solid primer in what it is, how it functions, and where opposition to it originates. The tone of the book is measured but urgent, and its target audiences are those in the thick of the liberal arts debates and controversies, namely, teachers and administrators.

Leisure and Labor is comprised of the proceedings of a 2017 conference at St. Gregory's University on the same topic, fifty years to the date from the

controversial 1967 Land O'Lakes Statement, which set a precedent in American Catholic higher education on the relationship between lay control of boards, faculty, and religious administration. The book reflects on the state of American Catholic higher education in light of what has become of American university culture, specifically as regards the emphasis on work and practical ends rather than on the light of the mind and spiritual progress. The book is implicitly a reflection on Jacques Maritain's *Education at the Crossroads*, which (without anticipating the Land O'Lakes Statement) argues for essentially the same conclusions: The number one priority of all liberal arts education is the interior freedom of the student; leisure and the education of the whole person is more important than labor (once labor establishes one's life); and there is a universally knowable right and wrong.

Leisure is divided into three parts. Part 1 details background issues embedded in the fabric of Catholic liberal arts education. Part 2 discusses the concrete problems teachers face in the classroom when teaching students the faith. Part 3 offers suggestions for the future of Catholic higher education in the current educational scene. I will offer a brief comment on each chapter.

Fr. James Schall sets the tone by summarizing the four tenets of Catholic liberal arts education. First, to be educated "means our coming to know and to affirm...reality" (4). Second, to be *liberally* educated means "to see what is there to be seen," including the knowledge we do not know with the completeness of God (5). Third, liberal arts education helps us to deal with the reality of suffering and the principle of natural law: "it is never right to do wrong" (8). Finally, human reason needs leisure, which Schall defines as "something beyond...the things of the practical intellect," in order to grasp the fullness of divine revelation (9). At heart, people need to pursue and to know things for their own sakes in order to keep society abreast of truth.

Robert Royal continues the conversation in chapter 2 with some reflections on "leisure, labor, and culture" (13). He essentially argues that "work seems not to have much more than instrumental value" (14). Work is good, but there is more to life, and students do not know it because our Catholic schools do not equip them to pursue anything but practical ends.

Michael Scaperlanda further argues in chapter 3 that "the organization, curricula, and pedagogy of a university are necessarily built upon often unstated assumptions about the nature of the human person" (26). Usually these ends are practical, but Catholic universities see things differently because Jesus is the embodiment of the ideal man. Catholic schools ought first to educate students in the Gospel in order to become saints and thereby serve all as Jesus does. Liberal arts education frees them from the fear of toiling uselessly all their lives.

Teresa Stanton Collet finishes the first part with a call to restore Catholic

education to its Western roots. She argues rationalistic thinking generates liberty in the sense of license, degrading human dignity and Christian life in the resultant judicial claims to anti-Christian positions (for example, the HHS mandate). Dignity can be restored only by Catholic higher education's positing love of truth and the discovery of Christian values by students "through the lives of its [Catholic] faculty" (41).

Wilfred McClay begins the second part on teachers and teaching, picking up where Stanton Collet leaves off, with his "three precepts on teaching" (49). Catholic teachers are embodiments of virtuous living, which happens in the following ways. First, like the prisoners freed from Plato's cave, teachers must "be liberated from the sirens of propaganda" and cultural indoctrination (55). Second, citing St. Paul's Letter to the Philippians, McClay recommends that teachers guide students by the classic trivium of the true, the good, and the beautiful in all their dealings of life. Third, one "should resolve always to do these things in such a way as to confirm the proposition that there is no substitute for the classroom teacher" (57). The number one issue in higher education is the high cost mixed with technology replacing classroom interaction. Lower costs and teachers are the answers to keep students coming to classes and schools open.

Brett Bertucio answers the question on how the liberally educated teacher originated. Teachers were not required to pass a certification in colonial times. They "were selected for their good character and for their mastery of whatever knowledge parents desired for their children," until the twentieth century when market demand created a need for formally trained teachers (60). Catholic schools preempted the law and required teacher exams out of the newly formed teacher-training departments, but at the expense of liberally educated ones who would be able to form student character. Today, "teachers in Catholic schools need something resembling a liberal education" in order to foster a feel for the transcendent (66).

Daniel Guernsey presents an essay on the necessity of Catholic educators to teach the transcendent nature of the faith. The primary mission of Catholic education is to help students get into heaven by providing them with proper theological formation and shaping them into good citizens. Guernsey points out these goals are not so troublesome as teachers' needing "permission" from their administrations to counter society. (Apparently, this issue is common enough to warrant its discussion.) Because American culture prefers "I feel" statements to absolute ones, Catholic teachers need to be ready to provide arguments against ideologies (such as relativism) inherently opposed to the Church (72). He appeals to St. John Henry Newman, who wrote that teaching the transcendent in any field will always lead to the "explicit search for purpose, meaning, harmony, and excellence" (74).

Starting the final section, Patrick Powers argues that for Catholic higher education to recover its liberal arts programs, it needs to return to the philosophy of Josef Pieper (leisure over labor) and the curriculum of Hugh of St. Victor. Pieper "is concerned that man will forget to rest by stepping outside the workaday world," a major concern of this entire volume (83). Hugh of St. Victor has a remedy for the "restoration of our nature and the removal of our deficiency" in a curriculum putting philosophy and theology at the center, a design supported also by St. John Henry Newman (86).

John Macias provides a general overview of why liberal arts education is rejected by contemporary models of education. He makes a comparison to J. R. R. Tolkien's classic *Lord of the Rings*, saying that students need to become like the virtuous Frodo, who recognizes, contra the hardened Boromir, that there are "goods higher than military victory and the preservation of the city," or success and survival (92). These goods are quite worthy, but Macias's point is that they cannot be the sole purpose of one's life.

Dignity is found in the healthy university, says Brian Jones, where students and professors are free to debate the most controversial topics without fear of reprimand. Jones argues the overarching aim of the university is to pass on an intellectual inheritance. He utilizes Wendell Berry's notion of "human culture" to describe higher education as a tree, instilling roots and teaching students that the fruit of their labor is service of God and neighbor (107).

Jason Fugikawa understands the fruit of Benedictine education as admittance "into an intellectual community" similar to a novice entering the monastery (121). He argues that liberal arts education ought to imitate Benedictine education's slow pace, ideally drawn out (up to six years) for maximum formation of students.

Angela Franks contributes the last essay, "A Body of Work: Labor and Culture in Karol Wojtyła and Karl Marx." Marx and Wojtyła have overlapping views on labor, except that for Wojtyła labor is about interiority and therefore about personhood. For Wojtyła, in labor "the body expresses visibly and materially the spiritual reality that is the person" (133). In education the whole human being is formed for labor beyond oneself and one's immediate desires.

Overall, *Leisure and Labor* is a welcome volume to liberal arts literature, as it suggests various ways of living and teaching a virtuous, scholarly life. There is much more emphasis on labor rather than leisure, but given the former's rocky relationship with higher education, that is not a surprise. Really, the volume advocates returning to a way of being that only lifelong learning can embody: patience, peace, and promise. In essence, leisure.

John Loughery and Blythe Randolph. *Dorothy Day: Dissenting Voice of the American Century.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020. 436 pp. Cloth, $30.00.

Reviewed by Thomas W. Jodziewicz, University of Dallas

Responding once to an admiring remark about her possible canonization, Dorothy Day (1897-1980) countered with a comment that the prospect of such an institutionalized and shelved plaster figure was not to her taste. She saw herself as a far more challenging reality in a twentieth-century America far too comfortable in the midst of a capitalist and materialist ethos forgetful of the poverty, socio-economic and spiritual, but visible if one would only look. Dorothy Day was, and is, a most uncomfortable witness, to herself and to her time, and this new biography is an excellent introduction to her unease and her accomplishments. She was decidedly not a plaster figure.

Day's first thirty years were marked by a tension between a deepening sense of social injustice present in a modernizing America that seemed to be too accepting of such misery, and a lingering sense of the need to worship God. Her Greenwich Village days were marked by heavy drinking, promiscuity, and an abortion. Her journalism was often radical, her politics socialist and communist. The "Hound of Heaven" was not to be denied, though, and in 1927 she was baptized, a decided shock to her friends and an occasion for her common-law husband to leave her and her infant daughter Tamar. With the appearance of the eccentric Peter Maurin in her life in 1932, and his tutelage in the Catholic social justice tradition, the two tracks of her life came together in the Catholic Worker movement. There followed a newspaper, soup kitchens, houses of hospitality, retreat centers, innumerable speaking engagements, numerous books, and hundreds of essays. In all of these Day tried to live out the two great commandments. Giving her life to the Catholic Worker provided an embrace of the Mystical Body of Christ, a commitment to personalism in a world of ever larger and more indifferent governmental and social institutions, and a commitment to living the Good Samaritan's example. Day provided an explanation in *Loaves and Fishes* (1963):

> When I think of the *kibbutzim* in Israel, and the reclaiming of the desert, and the reforestation of bare hillsides, how feeble all our efforts over these past twenty-eight years seem by comparison…. The consolation is this – and this our faith too: By our suffering and our failures, by our acceptance of the Cross, by our struggle to grow in faith, hope, and charity, we unleash forces that help to overcome the evil in the world. It is good to be able to see things in this perspective and to laugh with others who laugh at us when they see our "Brother Juniper" attempts at social reform.

The present volume offers an extensive and straightforward consideration of the

life of Dorothy Day that in the main affirms Day's own description of the Catholic Worker. The historical context provided by the authors is accessible and very helpful in understanding the circumstances that grounded Dorothy Day's own vocation to live a "holy" and "synthetic" life: "The only answer in this life, to the loneliness we are all bound to feel, is community. The living together, working together, sharing together, loving God and loving our brother, and living close to him in community so we can show our love for Him" (*The Long Loneliness* [1952]). And despite Day's early disclaimer, her cause for canonization is now underway. This introduction to her life, though, is not quite hagiographic.

In her direction of the Catholic Worker, Day could be autocratic. She had an irascible temper. Her relationship with her daughter, who felt neglected and unattended, was reconciled only just before Dorothy's death. Her strident and public pacifism, beginning with the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s and continuing through antinuclear protests in her late years proved offensive to many Catholics. Her public battles with the hierarchy over issues that included social and labor justice alienated many of her fellow believers as well as non-Catholics. Her indictments of racism were not always well received. Her own political naiveté about the realities of Fidel Castro's communist regime and the statism implicit in any "socialist" initiative could easily be off-putting to those well versed in political economy. The utter horrors that occurred in open-door Catholic Worker houses unwilling to enforce any sort of code of conduct, including personal hygiene, are noted. A full narrative of Dorothy Day's life and work, as the authors suggest, is complex. There are many books written about Day, but for someone new to the subject this volume can be a helpful introduction to Dorothy Day.

One last comment. In the spring of 1967, Day attended an anti-Vietnam War rally in New York's Central Park. She was bothered, though, by "the rage and the obscenities, the irreverence and smugness, the lack of humility. She was particularly offended by the sight of buttons blazoning the message DRAFT SPELLMAN. To her mind, it was entirely possible to be in the right politically and in the wrong spiritually, and many of the protestors exemplified for Dorothy, that dichotomy" (316). Her response to the ridicule of Cardinal Spellman of New York captures what can appear to be a source of confusion about Day's consistency and credentials as a true contemporary radical. In this telling, the Catholic Church is simply a reactionary relic of what some today might call a pre-"woke" moment. Indeed, Day

> believed without doubt in the reality of God, the divinity of Christ, the inspirational, intercessional capacity of the Virgin Mary and the saints, confession and absolution, and the apostolic Church to which she belonged. That belief was something she wished all human beings could share in some form; it was the bedrock source of any Catholic's

humanity and morality. That such a deep faith would be impossible to sustain outside an organized, hierarchical community of faith was a truth of which she was convinced. Yet none of that meant that she lived with an ahistorical mind-set or a blinkered sense of the world she lived in (316-37).

In my view, Dorothy Day's political and social activism and her devout and orthodox Catholic faith are not really such an odd pairing. Quite the contrary. Day was a true radical in both instances. Whatever one's politics, the timeless radicalism of Jesus Christ and his Church were for her the sure foundation for living a life by which to "unleash forces that help to overcome the evil in the world."

Edward Feser. *Aristotle's Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science.* Editiones Scholasticae, 2019. 515 pp. $29.90.

Reviewed by Catherine Peters, Loyola Marymount University

Edward Feser contends in *Aristotle's Revenge* that Aristotelian philosophy is "not only compatible with modern science, but is implicitly presupposed by modern science" (1). He maintains that when science attempts to supplant philosophy it does not so much debunk the philosophy of nature as substitute its own. Avenging Aristotle, therefore, is not "pitting philosophy of nature against physics" but rather "pitting one philosophy of nature against another philosophy of nature" (305). While primarily Aristotelian and scholastic, Feser's investigation of the philosophical foundation for science is enriched by phenomenology and dialogue with analytic accounts of metaphysics and the philosophy of science.

The first chapter contains an overview of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature and a presentation of its key principles and concepts. These concepts include potency and act, substantial form, prime matter, causality, and teleology. Feser treats the philosophy of nature as a subdiscipline of metaphysics and demonstrates throughout this work how these concepts underlie modern science. Importantly, he contrasts the Aristotelian view of nature with a mechanistic view, both to critique mechanism and to explain Aristotelianism through comparison. This introductory chapter is admirably clear and straightforward and serves as an excellent introduction to the elements of Aristotelian philosophy of special relevance to modern science.

The second chapter considers scientists and their method by maintaining that "the very practice of the emperiometric method itself presupposes the truth of all the fundamental claims of Aristotelian philosophy of nature" (74). Here he argues that Aristotelian philosophy is relevant not only to science but also to the

practitioners of science themselves. In other words, philosophy not only benefits scientific investigation but also illuminates the subjective precondition for science. As he states later, philosophical concepts "have an application *at least* in the analysis of the thinking, conscious, embodied subject," and "what is in question can only be the extent to which [these concepts] have application in other areas" (138).

The third chapter treats various epistemological issues related to the philosophy of nature. Feser provides a defense of scientific realism while arguing against Humean verificationism, logical positivism, and naturalistic scientism. He considers the epistemology behind science because science itself must presuppose a conscious and thinking subject. To use Feser's analogy, science "is like a painting which leaves the painter out but nevertheless could not exist unless the painter did" (139). Chapters 2 and 3 delve into more technical philosophical discussions by focusing on the epistemological and phenomenological issues of modern science. Nonetheless, these chapters should be easily followed by upper-level undergraduate and graduate students, or those already possessing general familiarity with epistemology or the philosophy of science.

Chapter 4 considers space, time, and motion, with Feser arguing in favor of a middle ground between absolute and antirealist conceptions of each. While the first three chapters serve as an introduction to Aristotelian philosophy in general, there is a shift in the fourth chapter to direct and focused treatments of modern scientific concerns in light of Aristotelian philosophy. Chapters 4 to 6 might, therefore, prove somewhat challenging to readers who lack familiarity with the issues at hand, as Feser references an almost overwhelming number of figures and positions, often in rapid succession. Nonetheless, careful reading should allow one to follow the discussions, and Feser takes care to remind his reader of the philosophical concepts under consideration.

The fifth chapter shows how an Aristotelian conception of "matter" is needed by and can contribute to the field of quantum mechanics. Feser maintains that science does not exhaust reality and that "the absence of some feature from physics' description of matter simply does not entail that the feature is absent from matter itself, since the methods of physics preclude it from providing an exhaustive description of matter in the first place" (310). In his view, both science and philosophy are concerned with matter but in different ways. As he puts it, "physics and philosophy of nature are simply concerned with different aspects of matter, just as a blueprint and a photograph of a building capture different aspects of the building" (310).

The sixth and final chapter turns from treatments of physics to biological issues. Arguing against reductionism, Feser advocates a definition of life in terms of immanent causation and teleology and maintains – in a way akin to the previous

chapter's arguments for matter – that alternative views of nature presuppose an Aristotelian conception of life. Recognizing that the kind of causality needed to defend this conception is outside science's purview, Feser reminds the reader that "the absence of some feature from physics' *representation* of nature simply does not entail that that feature is absent from nature *itself*" (376). He includes in this chapter a particularly compelling treatment of evolution and intelligent design. Drawing careful distinctions and relying on the concepts already expounded in this work, Feser shows how evolution – like many other scientific tenets discussed – relies on an Aristotelian conception of essence and teleology. This final chapter ends with a discussion of neuroscience, an issue that echoes his refrain that science cannot dispense with the practitioner of science: "we cannot coherently eliminate the subject from our conception of the world, *especially* not in the name of science" (456). In neuroscience, too, one cannot begin a scientific investigation without presupposing – in practice, if not always in theory – philosophical concepts as contained in the Aristotelian philosophy of nature.

In sum, *Aristotle's Revenge* provides a robust defense of the philosophical foundation for modern science. Throughout this work Feser reminds the reader that the perceived incompatibility between modern science and philosophy is often reducible to a mistaken view or extrapolation of scientific findings or philosophical concepts. Feser does an admirable job examining and translating Aristotelian philosophy for modern science, thereby arguing for their compatibility and revealing their mutual enrichment. Avenging Aristotle is no small task, and it must continue beyond this work – a necessity attested to by an overflowing discussion of this work at the most recent meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association – but *Aristotle's Revenge* constitutes a significant contribution to and advancement of this project.

Russell Shaw. *Eight Popes and the Crisis of Modernity*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2020. 150 pp.

Reviewed by E. Christian Brugger, St. Vincent de Paul Regional Seminary, Boynton Beach, FL

Eight Popes begins: "Somewhere amid the chaos of the twentieth century the modern age ended. In the manner typical of this era of bloodshed and turmoil, modernity did not go quietly, but unquestionably it went." The book goes on to tell the story of modernity's reluctant withdrawal from the vantage point of the century's eight popes: Pius X, Gregory XV, Pius XI, Pius XII, John XXIII, Paul VI, John Paul I, and John Paul II.

All readers of this journal will be familiar with Russell Shaw's competence as a religious commentator, with sixty years as an informed Catholic journalist and author, more than twenty published books and thousands of articles, twenty years heading the communications for the United States bishops during what many would consider that body's darkest days (1969-1987), acting as press secretary for all their delegations to Rome between 1971 and 1987, including during two papal conclaves, the one that elected John Paul I and the other John Paul II, and with multiple terms as Consultor to the Pontifical Council for Social Communications, appointed by both John Paul II and Benedict XVI. Shaw's book is short, nonpolemical, crisply focused, and written in Shaw's characteristically pleasant and lively prose. It can easily be read in a few hours.

The book is comprised of an introduction, nine chapters – eight for popes and one for Vatican II – and an afterword. Each of the chapters ends with a concise but careful selection of excerpts from ecclesial documents by the author(s) under consideration. In what follows I summarize each section, hoping to take readers inside the text enough to stimulate a desire to read the full version.

The introduction sketches a few of the century's social highlights (lowlights?) to frame some of the problems the popes will face. Shaw pauses on the legacies of Darwin, Marx, and Freud, whose ideas, he thinks, exemplify the anthropological crisis so characteristic of our time: Darwin taught us how very insignificant we are, Freud that we're controlled by subrational factors that impel us to act in ways – especially sexual – over which we have no control, and Marx to place our hopes in a godless political struggle. Beneath each can be detected a deeper problem that Shaw says became "the particular task of the Church and her leaders in the twentieth century," namely, of replying "both conceptually and in fact" to "the question of the human person."

Pius X (1903-1914) and Modernism. Born in June 1835, Piux X came to the Chair of Peter in 1903, the world having just left behind a century of revolutions and nationalist movements that reshaped the papacy's role in European affairs. Shaw focuses on two elements of Pius's pontificate, the pope's tough-headed foreign policy toward the anticlerical secularism (*laïcité*) of the French government, and his uncompromising doctrinal fight against (quoting Ratzinger) "the mortal danger that threatened Catholicism at the first outbreak of the modern mind," which Pius compendiously termed "Modernism." Shaw introduces readers to Pius's doctrinal replies to the latter with the publication of *Lamentabili* and *Pascendi* as well as Pius's disciplining of Frs. Loisy and Tyrrell. Although Shaw doesn't explicitly say that Pius failed on both fronts, he suggests as much. On Pius's response to France, Shaw expresses sympathy toward history's judgment that the pope "added to the tensions," and on Modernism, Shaw quotes Ratzinger, who says that in Pius's "uncompromising opposition" – likening it to the sifting

of grain – "much real wheat was lost along with the chaff." At the same time, Shaw wishes to illustrate Pius's sanctity, a sanctity formally recognized by the Church in 1954: among other things, he promoted the daily reception of the Holy Eucharist, lowered the age of first communion to the age of reason, and lovingly admonished parents to "make every effort to see that these same children… approach the holy table often, and, if it can be done, daily."

Benedict XV (1914-1922) and the Great War. Before Joseph Ratzinger chose the regnal name Benedict, few Catholics knew much about his papal namesake. Shaw thinks the anonymity is undeserved. Benedict XV's papacy was occupied almost entirely with the events and devastation surrounding World War I (1914-1918) and its aftermath. The war began in July 1914; Benedict was elected the following September. The pope opposed the war from the beginning and refused to take sides, for which he was harshly criticized. Of his papacy's three chief diplomatic aims – preserving the Catholic Austro-Hungarian Empire, supporting the Ottomans against Russia and Russian Orthodoxy's expansionist ambitions, and keeping Italy out of the war – all were unsuccessful.

Nevertheless, Benedict's vigorous efforts at peace and at succoring wartime victims "marked the Holy See's reentry into serious world affairs after a century of being shunted aside." As for the two issues that dominated his predecessor's pontificate, Benedict was successful in reestablishing diplomatic relations with France, and he delighted the whole country with his initiative to canonize the French heroine St. Joan of Arc.

As for Modernism, Benedict "continued with the anti-Modernist line of his predecessor, though with notably less rigor." In addition, he zealously promoted the foreign missions emphasizing indigenous growth and especially promoting indigenous clergy. Keenly aware of European colonialist tendencies, Benedict warned his missionaries against serving the imperial ambitions of their home country to the detriment of the proclamation of the Gospel. In August 1917, he proposed to the allied powers a comprehensive peace plan full of foresight and balance, and entirely uninfected by the vindictive anti-German spirit that characterized the Versailles participants. Shaw notes regretfully, "but the consensus of the victorious powers at Versailles was disastrously different from Benedict's vision." The harsh reparations that crippled and humiliated Germany for two decades provided the seedbed for German resentment and gave a platform for demagogues to exploit.

Pius XI (1922-1939), Concordats and Contraception. Shaw's treatment of Pius XI tracks the main global issues in politics, economics, and morals between World War I and World War II, as the globe was both reeling from and preparing for a fratricidal bloodbath. In politics, social discontent facilitated by Versailles saw the rapid rise of collectivist governments (National Socialism in Germany,

Fascism in Italy, and Communism in the Soviet Union). In economics, following the predictable postwar prosperity bump, the Great Depression crashed on the world. And in morals the first signs of widespread popular rejection of traditional Christian teaching on marriage, the family, and sex.

Pius's motto, *Pax Christi in Regno Christi* (the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ), epitomized the content of his reply to each. In the political realm, Vatican diplomacy focused on the establishing of concordats, which, Shaw tells us, numbered eighteen! The most celebrated was his negotiation of the Roman Accords of 1929, in which the pope, admitting the inevitable, relinquished to the Kingdom of Italy, the city of Rome, and the territories formerly known as the Papal States in exchange for Italy's recognition of the Vatican as an independent country, a payout equivalent to a billion dollars for the territories effectively expropriated fifty years earlier, and the establishment of Catholicism as the national religion.

Pius also established the Feast of Christ the King, so that all men may "recognize" the truth of Christ's kingship "both in private and in public life." Within the Catholic community, the pope energetically promoted the lay movement Catholic Action in what can be seen as an early acknowledgment of what later would develop into the idea of the Apostolate of the Laity, an apostolate whose character is secular, aimed at spreading the Gospel to every dark corner of the secular realm. Catholic Action was not yet that, since it was still under clerical control, but it was a significant step in the right direction.

In economics, Pius's crowning achievement was the publication of *Quadragesimo anno* (On the 40th Anniversary of the Publication of *Rerum novarum*), a text that gave form to the developing principle of Catholic social teaching known as subsidiarity, which prescribes that authority should devolve onto the lowest social level compatible with effectively serving the needs of the community it governs. In the realm of morals, Pius's most notable achievement was the publication in 1930, on the heels of the Anglican Lambeth Conference's historic sanctioning of the use of contraception, of his great encyclical on Christian marriage, *Casti connubii*.

Pius XII (1939-1958) and World War II. With the election of Eugenio Pacelli, providence again dictated that the outbreak of world war should be occasioned by a new pope. Pius's qualifications for the position included his lengthy experience at the Secretariat of State, both as a staffer and later as the Cardinal Secretary, the duties of which included heading the Vatican's massive effort during World War I to locate and assist prisoners of war and distribute humanitarian aid. Pius also served as nuncio in Germany from 1917 to 1929. And as Secretary of State, he traveled the world, meeting, among others, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, with whom he remained in active contact during the war.

Like Pope Benedict XV, he inveighed unsuccessfully against world war, but once begun, he initiated a huge program of humanitarian relief, especially to prisoners of war. Shaw reviews the controversy about Pius's alleged inaction in the face of Nazi activity toward the Jews. As to whether Pius did all he should have done, Shaw writes:

> It is reasonable to think that a different pope in the same position…might have responded differently, with very different results for the Jews and the papacy alike. But along with being different, would those results have been any better or might they instead have been even worse? Who really knows? Pope Pius XII did what he believed was right; he was responsible for saving many Jews, and Jewish leaders after the war praised and thanked him for it – while the chief rabbi of Rome, Israel Zolli, upon converting to Catholicism in February 1945, chose as his baptismal name Eugenio.

John XXIII (1958-1963), Aggiornamento & Ressourcement. Three years after the aged Patriarch of Venice was elected pope and took the name John XXIII, he wrote: :When…the cardinals…chose me…at 77 years of age, everyone was convinced that I would be a provisional and transitional pope. Yet here I am…with an immense program of work in front of me to be carried out before the eyes of the whole world, which is watching and waiting. As for me, I feel like St. Martin [of Tours] who 'neither feared to die, nor refused to live'."

Shaw skillfully walks us through John's idea to invoke an ecumenical council and to direct it by the double themes of *aggiornamento* and *ressourcement*. By the former, John meant an updating in the Church's presentation of the Gospel, "though certainly not in the doctrine itself." The updating, John thought, was necessary to re-present before twentieth-century man the luminous figure of Jesus Christ so men could "anchor themselves on Him and His Church, and thus enjoy the blessing of light and joy, right order and peace" (John XXIII, "Opening Address to the Council"; Shaw, p. 81).

To do this correctly, John insisted that the Council return to the spiritual and doctrinal sources of Christianity (*ressourcement*), especially the sacred scriptures. "How well Vatican II succeeded in meeting this challenge," Shaw says, "will be debated for years to come." Shaw attempts no answer. The text also briefly considers the contents of John's two influential social encyclicals, *Mater et magistra*, published a year before the Council (1961) and *Pacem in terris*, published two months before John's death in 1963. To those who perpetuate the myth that John down deep was a doctrinal rebel intending to open the doors of the Church to alterations in fundamental Christian beliefs, Shaw quotes a note found attached to John's will after his death, which read, "It is with a joyful heart that I renew wholly and fervently the profession of my Catholic, Apostolic and Roman faith."

Paul VI (1963-1978) & Humanae vitae. A note was found among Paul VI's private writings after his death, which asked: "Am I Hamlet or Don Quixote?" Shaw illustrates that the Church's most recently canonized pope was a personification of neither tragedy nor futility. Shaw formulates his summary around three truly great documents in the field of moral theology that epitomize Paul's leadership, the two encyclicals *Populorum progressio* (1967) and *Humanae vitae* (1968), and the 1975 Apostolic Exhortation *Evangelii nuntiandi*. On *Populorum*, it is worth noting that both John Paul II (in *Solicitudo rei socialis*, 1987) and Benedict XVI (in *Caritas in veritate*, 2009) published daughter encyclicals in explicit succession, the latter writing:

> I intend to pay tribute and to honor the memory of the great Pope Paul VI, revisiting his teachings on *integral human development* and taking my place within the path that they marked out, so as to apply them to the present moment…. *Populorum Progressio* deserves to be considered 'the *Rerum Novarum* of the present age', shedding light upon humanity's journey towards unity. (*CV*, 8)

Volumes have been written on the process of drafting and publishing as well as the reception of *Humanae vitae*. Shaw doesn't mean to contribute anything new to these, but rather to highlight the significance of Paul's decision to reaffirm difficult truths about marital chastity; it was the pope's way of saying to Catholics, indeed to the whole world, that "since the Church did not make the moral law…it could not be its arbiter, only its guardian and interpreter."

Shaw notes the isolation Paul felt during those first years after the Council, years in which the world was experiencing Cold War fever, with the Cuban Missile Crisis, race riots, the Vietnam War, and the Summer of Love: "I was solitary [before I was elected pope], but now my solitariness becomes complex and awesome. My duty is to plan, decide, assume every responsibility for guiding others…. And so suffer alone." Shaw notes, and I agree, that an undisputed highpoint of his papacy was his decision to publish a document on evangelization, a document, like so many others published since the Council, that sets forth wise, farsighted, and Christ-centered ideas, and whose aims have gone largely unrealized. For those who are weary of a Church that seems fruitless both within and without (my words, not Shaw's), reading *Evangelii nuntiandi* would be a consolation.

Vatican II (1962-1965). Shaw's lengthiest section is on the Council. He states that "few if any events in the recent history of the Catholic Church have called forth so many opinions so intensely held as Vatican Council II." But one point no one disagrees on is that the Council was followed by a time of controversy, defections, and liturgical anomalies equal to none. Shaw is sympathetic of the interpretation of Robert Royal, who argues that the calamities that followed "were

not creatures of the council itself"; they followed, rather, from a great misunderstanding that set the "pastoral" in opposition to the "dogmatic."

Shaw tells the story of the Council's predecessor, Vatican I: how it was precipitously closed, not because it completed its work but because it was forced to cease by Italian nationalists occupying Rome. He tells us that both Piuses XI and XII seriously considered reconvening Vatican I, but that the idea would not mature until the papacy of John XXIII. And he tells us that the future pope, Cardinal Roncalli, at the papal conclave that elected him in 1958, raised the idea publicly for the first time, challenging two personal recollections of John himself, the first expressed in his speech at the Council's opening in October 1962, when he said that the "first sudden bringing up" of the idea was "in the presence of the Sacred College of Cardinals…on January 25, 1959" and that the idea was "completely unexpected, like a flash of heavenly light," as well as the additionally conflicting account from his personal journal where John recalls that "without any forethought, I put forward, in one of my first talks with my Secretary of State, on 20 January, 1959, the idea of an Ecumenical Council."

Shaw offers interesting Council trivia such as its overall cost – $7,250,000 – which comes out to an expenditure of $9.00 per day per bishop for 281 days; the number of attendees from each continent, with Europe, of course, holding the highest percentage at 39 percent, but with South America surprisingly at number two at 18 percent and North America coming in at a close third at 14 percent; and the total word count of the sixteen documents at 103,000 words in Latin.

Shaw avoids the politics of the Council, saying little more than that the German-speaking bishops exercised disproportionate influence because of their "superior organization." He offers short summaries of the Council's four important constitutions, On the Liturgy (*Sacrosanctum concilium*), On the Church (*Lumen gentium*), On Divine Revelation (*Dei Verbum*), and On the Church in the Modern World (*Gaudium et spes*). He ends with a discussion of Pope Benedict XVI's two ways of interpreting Vatican II, via "a hermeneutic of discontinuity and rupture" or a "hermeneutic of reform."

John Paul I (1978), The Smiling Pope. Although his pontificate lasted only thirty-three days, Shaw shows that John Paul I was on course to be a good and faithful servant of the servants of God. He supported *Humanae vitae*, "while taking a patient line with people who had difficult with it"; on female ordination, he argued that though women "are always admirable figures in the Gospels, more so than the apostles themselves," excluding them from priestly ordination "through the will of Christ…does not do wrong to women" (quoted by John Allen, *National Catholic Reporter*, 2012). Shaw also introduces us to the pope's unrealized six-point program: to implement Vatican II's reform of the Church; finish the revision of the Code of Canon Law (initiated by his predecessors);

promote evangelization; advance religious unity without compromising doctrine; encourage dialogue; and foster peace and justice in the world. Readers will enjoy Shaw's autobiographical aside telling of two dreams he had during the smiling pope's brief papacy during Shaw's tenure as communications chief at the NCCB/USCC. I offer here no spoilers!

John Paul II (1978-2005), "The First Postmodern Pope." For those of us who were awake to the Church and the world during the pontificate of John Paul II, Shaw's brief, accurate, but admittedly incomplete summary of this great man's papacy was a happy reminder of a Catholic life that seems very long ago. Shaw begins with the wistful words, "there were times when it seemed as if Pope John Paul II could do just about anything – do it well, in fact – if he simply set his mind to it." Some of us still think that, although we are more comfortable speaking about his limitations.

Shaw's dating of the pope's important writings helps us to situate him in the history of ideas that unfolded during the second half of the twentieth century. Pius XII ordained him a bishop in 1958, and he published *Love and Responsibility* in 1960, which means he was working through his personalist sexual ethics as a priest in the 1950s, a good deal before the Council and long before *Humanae vitae*. Pope Paul named Wojtyla Cardinal in 1967, and he published his profound account of human action in *The Acting Person* in 1969. It was in the latter 1960s that the erroneous account of action known as proportionalism was being conceived by European theologians.

This shows how on both of the most consequential topics of moral theology of the day – marriage and moral action – the future pope was in the vanguard of articulating some of the period's most cogent ideas, ideas that were adequate to engage and persuade – if any ideas could persuade – the postmodern mind, indeed, ideas on the splendor and consequences of the Christian moral life that were far ahead of the vast majority of Catholic theologians.

Shaw can do no more than mention the pope's role in the collapse of Soviet Communism, his relationships with Regan and Thatcher, and his historic trips to Poland. And he passes as quickly over his 104 trips outside of Italy, his canonization of more saints (482) than all his predecessors combined, and his extraordinary commitment to ecumenical dialogue, going so far (the pope, that is) as to ask members of separated communities to join him in "a patient and fraternal dialogue" on the role of Peter in sustaining Christian unity (*Ut unum sint*, 96). Shaw comments briefly on several of the papacy's most significant publications, *Veritatis splendor* (1993), *Fides et ratio* (1998), the two texts on liberation theology, *Libertatis nuntius* (1984) and *Libertatis conscientia* (1986), the series of 129 audiences delivered between 1979 and 1984 and the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (1997). He ends with a discussion of John Paul II's almost lethal

encounter with the assassin Mehmet Ali Agca, and his subsequent slow physical decline. Shaw ends with personal reflections about the pope's final days.

Afterword. Shaw's afterword pays tribute to the papacy as an institution that, while not always instilling optimism, nevertheless always inspires Christian hope, a hope born not of the qualities of the occupant, but of the trustworthiness of Christ, who in his wisdom has made the Office of Peter necessary to the dissemination of the mysteries of redemption. Those same mysteries, Shaw's text beautifully illustrates, can be glimpsed on the countenances of the eight men who occupied Peter's Chair during the tumultuous twentieth century.

He ends with a stunning quote from nineteenth-century Anglican historian Thomas Babington Macaulay, which illustrates the awe that even the papacy's enemies have for her. (Macaulay was no respecter of the papacy or the Catholic Church.)

> No other institution is left standing [in 1840] which carries the mind back to the times when the smoke of sacrifice rose from the Pantheon, and when camelopards and tigers bounded in the Flavian amphitheater. The proudest royal houses are but of yesterday, when compared with the line of the Supreme Pontiffs. That line we trace back in an unbroken series, from the Pope who crowned Napoleon in the nineteenth century to the Pope who crowned Pepin in the eighth; and far beyond the time of Pepin the august dynasty extends, till it is lost in the twilight of fable…. [The Catholic Church] saw the commencement of all the governments and of all the ecclesiastical establishments that now exist in the whole world; and we feel no assurance that she is not destined to see the end of them all.

John Corrigan. *The Problem of the Idea of Culture in John Paul II: Exposing the Disruptive Agency of the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła.* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020. 254 pp.

Reviewed by Joseph Pappin III, University of South Carolina

John Corrigan has made an important contribution to the understanding of St. John Paul II's legacy by the study of a somewhat neglected aspect of his thought, the problem of culture. The first part of the book considers the idea of culture philosophically from the viewpoint of phenomenology. In this section there is a focus on the human person through the lens of a person's actions. The second part is concerned with the essential characteristics of human culture through a consideration of three senses of the term: (1) organic culture, (2) culture as a way of life, and (3) human culture.

As the book's title indicates, the author is concerned to elucidate "the disruptive agency" of Wojtyła's philosophy. The term "disruptive" may seem initially puzzling, but Corrigan clarifies its meaning by noting that Wojtyła wrote

in the context of Polish communism. What he needed to provide in that setting was something deeply countercultural.

Corrigan sets before the reader the vital importance of having a sound culture for the authentic "self-development" of any person. To this end he critiques various aspects of contemporary culture that can distort the very meaning of personhood and exacerbate the challenges to human flourishing.

Philosophically, the driving theme of this book is the idea that culture ought to support the maturation of persons. Wojtyła's thought in this area shows clear influences from both the philosophy of being typical of his Thomistic roots and the philosophy of subjectivity that is prominent in phenomenology. The former approach presents an objectivist understanding of the person while the latter stresses the dynamic character of the subject. The role of consciousness is central to Wojtyła's thought, especially with regard to the mirroring and reflexive function of consciousness. Corrigan makes considerable use of a 1979 article by Wojtyła entitled "The Person: Subject and Community." There Wojtyła emphasizes "the specific importance of consciousness for [the understanding of] subjectivity." For Wojtyła, "this aspect was not much developed in the scholastic tradition." On this point Corrigan comments: "The tradition built up around ancient and medieval philosophy starts from the question of 'being,' while modern philosophy starts from the question of the content of human consciousness." This is to say that it is by the reflexive capacity of consciousness that a person can experience subjectivity. In Corrigan's assessment, it is "by reintroducing the objectivity of the person" that Wojtyła achieves the "reintegration of experience and objectivity" (73).

For Wojtyła, the idea of culture depends on the idea of the person. He takes the production of a human culture to be a "spiritual activity" that needs to include an openness to transcendence and thus to God for the proper unfolding of its "meaning and reality" (21). In this regard, Corrigan cites the work of Josef Seifert who explores the need for a culture to be rooted in God if it is to deal properly with death. According to Seifert, who knew Pope John Paul II personally, a mature culture will have sacred rituals and other ways of honoring the dead, for a healthy recognition of the inevitability of death can "encourage the spiritual development of the person" (193). Here Corrigan calls our attention to a greeting common among medieval monks: *Memento mori* (remember your death).

John Paul II used the term "culture of death" to describe a culture that accepts acts of suicide, euthanasia, abortion, and the like. Corrigan rightly notes a culture of death is not a real culture but only "a twisted kind of culture or 'anti-culture,' a fundamental denial of 'right reason' and even of the sovereignty of God" (192). This reminder brings to the fore Wojtyła's sense of the need for an authentic philosophy of the human person. A genuine philosophy of the human person will

bear witness to the "essential metaphysical characteristics of a true culture in its truly moral dimensions" (p. 196).

Corrigan has brought to bear a considerable arsenal of research on Wojtyła's writings. His aim was to provide an aid in comprehending Wojtyła's thought, and he has clearly provided us with a high-powered lens with which to understand the saint's reflections on the idea of culture.

Taylor Marshall. *Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within*. Manchester, NH: Crisis Publications, 2019. 307 pp.

Reviewed by Jeff Koloze, DeVry University

Taylor Marshall, renowned as one of Catholicism's foremost recent converts, presents an interesting thesis in his latest book. Its title and subtitle suggest that it was the intent of Freemasons to infiltrate the Catholic Church and to transform it into an institution, as the language of the *Alta Vendita*, a seminal Freemason document has it, "to secure to us a Pope according to our own heart" (14). A significant component of this claim is that the Sankt Gallen Mafia engineered the election of Jorge Bergoglio as pope. Lest these ideas be discarded as mere conspiracy theories worthy of any YouTube commentator, Marshall offers sufficient evidence to link nineteenth-century statements such as the *Alta Vendita* and other material with twentieth-century Church history.

A necessary bifurcation must first be made. Those who think that there is no problem with Pope Francis – whether regarding his teaching, his political opinions, or his public relations gaffes – will not accept Marshall's premise that the Church is in a time of crisis as severe as that which affected it post-Reformation or post-French Revolution. However, these persons may still find Marshall's chronology of Freemason influence on Church policies and beliefs an interesting historical study of the Church in the twentieth century.

In contrast, those who think that the Catholic Church now suffers from severe internal troubles will find Marshall's book not only enlightening regarding Freemason influence but also encouraging. As Marshall demonstrates, the Church has survived other seemingly insurmountable social or political attacks. There are tools, resources, and strategies available to guide the faithful through the current crisis, such as the litany of spiritual weapons identified in chapter 33 ("Spiritual Weapons against Demonic Enemies"), ranging from praying the rosary to living a life of sexual chastity.

Marshall's work is not a scholarly monograph, replete with academic jargon. While there are substantial footnotes and appendices, the audience for the book

is obviously popular, and it reads more as a call to action than as a dry academic exercise on the influence of Freemasons in the Church. Although there are some problems in the logical cohesion of his claims, Marshall builds a case to argue that Freemasons were involved at crucial points in the Church's history from the mid-nineteenth century to the current papacy. For example, the activity of Archbishop Annibale Bugnini, a Freemason who held high positions in the Vatican, should make even the most liberal Catholic wonder to what degree Vatican policies were influenced (if not actually formulated) by such men. Marshall elaborates at length on how delighted Freemasons are with the election of Pope Francis.

While the book contains mellifluous writing, it is worth noting that Marshall's ideas may be jarring, for he is iconoclastic in several respects. For example, those who revere Pope Paul VI, not only as a saint but also as the staunch defender of heterosexual normativity, may recoil at several of Marshall's claims and innuendoes about the pontiff. Calling Paul VI a "crypto-Modernist" involved in a "plot for a new style of pope, a new council, and new liturgy" may be more an *ad hominem* argument than a fact or reasoned conclusion (108).

Moreover, impugning the saint for his association with Saul Alinsky ("Montini had a dark side, as demonstrated by his friendship with Saul Alinsky") may be more a case of guilt by association than recognition of an effort by the pope to reach out to secular entities active in the culture of his time (108). This "reaching out" strategy is one that Pope Francis himself used when, for example, he cited the "work" of the infamous Italian abortionist Emma Bonino. The difference between the gestures of Paul VI and of Francis should be obvious. Contemporary critics are correct to dispute the purpose behind Francis's apparently blind support for her medical practice, wherein she brazenly advocated abortion. Recognizing the abortion work of such a prominent abortionist is something that St. Paul VI would not have done, conscious as he was that abortion is never an acceptable practice, as he stated in *Humanae vitae*.

These are not the only attacks on Paul VI. Marshall accuses the pope of "undermining the final days of ailing Pope Pius XII" and suggests that there was some validity in a claim, rejected by Paul himself, that he had a homosexual relationship with an Italian actor: "Paul VI denied the allegation of sodomy" (111, 171). These are mere conjectures, however. As a more significant item in his arsenal against Paul VI, Marshall quotes none other than another saintly colleague, St. Padre Pio, who, on the election of Paul VI, suggested that "Freemasonry has already arrived at the slippers of the Pope" (142).

Similarly, St. John Paul II is not exempt from Marshall's criticism. Marshall elaborates the controversy surrounding the Buddha statue incident where John Paul II allowed "an idol of Buddha *on top of a Catholic tabernacle* in the Chapel of San Pietro" (187, italics in original). Moreover, John Paul's kissing of a copy

of the Koran in 1999 leads to this exclamation: "How a pope of the Catholic Church could kiss the scriptures of Islam is unimaginable" (192).

These jarring attacks against two of the twentieth century's most iconic popes, however, fade against the chronological structure of the entire book, which supports the claim of Freemason activism within the Church. Thus, the penultimate chapter ("Solving the Current Crisis") is especially noteworthy, as Marshall explores the several choices that faithful Catholics not only should but must consider as they struggle to live their faith under a pope whose policies they consider problematic, if they do not consider the pope himself heterodox.

This chapter begins with an intriguing question: "Where does the scheming of the Sankt Gallen Mafia and the election and teachings of Pope Francis leave us?" The balance of the chapter systematically reviews the choices available to orthodox Catholics. Marshall rejects the option of becoming "a Modernist Catholic" by arguing that "Catholicism is a perennial religion, and by its nature it cannot change or contradict itself" (230). Becoming an atheist may seem an illogical option, but including this as a response to the current ecclesial crisis shows how aware Marshall is of contemporary religious practice. Who has not seen a decline in Mass attendance every Sunday, if not heard outright rejection of the Church by those who no longer fulfill the weekly obligation to participate in the most recognizable sacrament of Catholic spiritual life?

Marshall's rejection of "the Protestant position" is a testament to his own faith, for he explains that "I converted from Protestantism to Catholicism because of the patent testimony of Sacred Scripture for the mediated redemption of Christ through the sacraments He instituted and through the clergy in apostolic succession ordained by Him" (231). How can one quibble with such a succinct account of one's faith?

Marshall rejects "the Eastern Orthodox position" because the primacy of Rome has an indisputable importance for the Faith. He ends this section with a cautionary note that summarizes many objections to Pope Francis's statements: "It seems apparent to me that Pope Francis actually holds the Eastern Orthodox position on the papacy, collegiality, divorce, and the 'pastoral' notion of *economia* [which allows contraception, something which is anathema to Catholic belief] revamped as being true to conscience" (232).

Marshall rejects the sedevacantist position, which states that no valid papal election has occurred since 1958, thus negating not only the papacies since then but, more importantly, Vatican II. Likewise, he rejects two "versions of the resignationist" position, involving Pope Benedict (236).

What remains is the option that Marshall encourages faithful Catholics to pursue: "the Recognize and Resist position" that demands not only that the laity recognize the validity of the current pope but also that "the Catholic may in good

faith and conscience resist errors spoken by a pope on Twitter, on an airplane, or even in a papal document" (240).

Could Marshall's essential claim be too simplistic? Is it possible that other forces have created conflict in the Church? Marshall identifies the possibility of Communists infiltrating the seminaries; the rise of the Sexual Revolution, which sought to destroy traditional views on sex, marriage, and abortion; and the devastating influence of pedophiles and pederasts like ex-Cardinal McCarrick on the decline of the authority and respect for the Church. One can argue that these issues may have caused more damage to the Church than an obscure Freemason document from two centuries ago, even if key players in Vatican politics subscribed to its tenets. However, if further historical research can establish the connections between Church leaders and Freemason documents, then Marshall will have exposed a deeply troubling aspect of Church history, justifiably calling into question many Church pronouncements of the past century.

R. Jared Staught. *Restoring Humanity: Essays on the Evangelization of Culture*. Belmont, NC: Divine Providence Press, 2020. 193 pp.

Reviewed by Ryan Hanning, University of Mary, Bismarck, ND

Is there such a thing as a Christian civilization? If so, what is it? And is building such a civilization the goal of Christian life? These provocative questions undergird Staudt's thoughtful essays in *Restoring Humanity.* In the tradition of other great books that call for the re-Christianization of culture, Staudt makes a strong argument for recovering a sense of mission in bringing the Gospel to bear on the whole of life. He does so by carefully examining how the claims of Christianity lived out in the practice of our faith contribute to building a Christian culture.

What is remarkable about the text is that Staudt appeals to neither nostalgia, nor a bygone golden age, but rather the perennial call of the members of the Church to be pilgrims in a beautiful yet fallen world. "The mission of the Church consists in evangelization, the proclamation of the Good News of salvation…. Salvation implies healing – the forgiveness of sin and repairing of brokenness – as well as renewal – the communication of grace that transforms and elevates." He builds his case for healing and renewal in conscientious dialogue with those who question whether Christian civilization is the goal or simply a byproduct of Christian life. This dialogue produces a thoughtful and critical reflection on what is essential to evangelizing culture. It is a worthy read for the academic or layperson alike.

The book is organized into nine chapters developed from previous lectures and presentations that examine the substance of Christian culture and the particular places where that culture is built. In many ways these essays serve as homage to Christopher Dawson as well as to Don Briel and Fr. Matthew Lamb, to whom the book is dedicated. Pulling from a variety of theologians, magisterial documents, and numerous historians and philosophers, Staudt provides an impressive bibliography for each chapter. Thereby he supports a deeper appreciation for the task of evangelization and the way in which the Gospel is meant to penetrate and redeem every facet of human experience.

From the land to the family, education and the university, Staudt treats each with erudition and humility. He proposes neither a set plan nor an option, but a critical awareness and deeper appreciation for how our Catholic faith ought to integrate and in many cases restore these cultural institutions. Each chapter is a complete essay on its own. As a collection of essays, the book returns again and again to the main themes.

Particularly noteworthy are the chapters dedicated to the land, the family, and education. "The Land as a Place for Evangelization" examines the narrative of salvation history and the nature of the Church in light of the theology of place, inheritance, and home. The Church itself is both a symbol of holy land, a place where God's presence is given space and made known, and a steward of land that it must carefully till and keep. Staudt weaves together biblical exegesis, Catholic social teaching, and the agrarian insights of Wendell Berry into a compelling case for more seriously considering how being in right relationship with the land advances the healing and renewal of culture.

"The Family as Builder of Christian Culture" provides a summary of the central insights of the call by the last three pontiffs to rediscover the joy and mission of family life. It is the most prescriptive of the chapters. It provides an assessment of our current cultural moment and ways to reengage and resanctify family life. Staudt makes the bold claim that "there can be no Christian culture unless a supernatural, grace-filled relationship with God animates the life of the family." He provides four such ways in which a grace-filled relationship with God can be supported in the family: by a life of prayer, authentic education, meaningful work, and intentional community.

The sixth chapter ("Living the Truth: Forming Culture as the Goal of Education") not only elevates the task of education but examines what is lost if only a pragmatic paradigm is used. Staudt favors uniting the fundamental search for truth with the contemporary aim of utility. Here his experience in Catholic education paints a sober yet hopeful vision of Catholic schools that embrace the central aims of education as forming (not just acquiescing to) culture.

Is there such a thing as a Christian civilization? And is building such a

civilization the goal of Christian life? In short, Staudt's answer is yes, but neither in an oversimplistic way nor with a triumphalistic tone. Rather, he provides a thoughtful and well supported reminder that Christian culture is both the result and the catalyst of authentic discipleship. If we are to restore humanity, we must seek to restore ourselves and the institutions that contribute to our being. In the end, this book is deep but approachable, and many of its essays will make their way into my course readings this semester.

Books Received

Thomas C. Behr. *Social Justice and Subsidiarity: Luigi Taparelli and the Origins of Modern Catholic Social Thought*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019. 259 pp.

Thomas E. Blantz, C.S.C. *The University of Notre Dame: A History.* Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2020. 742 pp.

Christopher Kaczor. *Disputes in Bioethics: Abortion, Euthanasia, and Other Controversies.* Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2020. 225 pp.

Matthew Levering. *Engaging the Doctrine of Marriage: Human Marriage as the Image and Sacrament of the Marriage of God and Creation.* Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2020. 301 pp.

Aidan Nichols, O.P. *Balthasar for Thomists.* San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2020. 244 pp.

Steven A. Schoenig. *Bonds of Wool: The Pallium and Papal Power in the Middle Ages.* Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016. 545 pp.

Anna Silvas. *The Mystery of Christian Marriage through the Ages: The Scriptures and the First Thousand Years.* Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2020. 195 pp.

Paul C. Vitz, William J. Nordling, and Craig Steven Titus, eds. *A Catholic Christian Meta-Model of the Person: integration with Psychology and Mental Health Practice.* Sterling, VA: Divine Mercy University Press, 2020. 713 pp.

Hans Urs von Balthasar. *A Short Primer for Unsettled Laymen*. Translated by Michael Waldstein. Introduction by Angela Franks. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2020. 143 pp.

Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly

ISSN 1084-3035

Rev. Joseph W. Koterski, S.J,. Editor
Fordham University
Philosophy Department
441 E. Fordham Road
Bronx, NY 10458
koterski@fordham.edu

Dr. Elizabeth Shaw, Associate Editor
The Catholic University of America
School of Philosophy
620 Michigan Ave., NE
Washington, DC 20064
shaw@cua.edu

Please direct submissions and subscription requests electronically to the editor at koterski@fordham.edu. All submissions should be prepared for blind-review and should be accompanied by a letter from the author that confirms that the submission is not simultaneously under consideration elsewhere. Maximum length: 10,000 words, including all notes.

Membership in the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars includes a subscription to the FCSQ (print and online). Those who are not members of the FCS may subscribe to the journal at the following annual rates:

Domestic (individuals and institutions): $40.00 print.
International (individuals and institutions): $50.00 print

Fellowship of Catholic Scholars
Administrative Office
P.O. Box 7632
Springfield, Oregon 97475-1100

For information about joining the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, visit our website at www.catholicscholars.org.

Officers and Directors of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars

President:
Rev. Anthony Giampietro, C.S.B., Ph.D.
The Catholic University of America

Vice-President:
Grattan Brown, Ph.D.
Thales College

Secretary:
Msgr. Stuart W. Swetland, S.T.D.
Donnelly College

Elected Directors

(2017-2020)

Carol (Sue) Abromaitis, Ph.D.
Loyola University of Maryland

Max Bonilla, S.T.D.
Universidad Francisco de Vitoria

Grattan Brown, Ph.D.
Thales College

Rev. David V. Meconi, S.J., D.Phil.
Saint Louis University

(2018-2021)

Maria Fedoryka, Ph.D.
Ave Maria University

Patrick Lee, Ph.D.
Franciscan Univ. of Steubenville

R.J. Matava, Ph.D.
Christendom College

Rev. T. Weinandy, OFM Cap., PhD
Capuchin College

(2019-2022)

Betsy Ackerson, Ph.D.
St. Francis High School, Wheaton, IL

Rev. Anthony Giampietro, CSB, Ph.D.
The Catholic University of America

Rev. Peter Ryan, S.J., S.T.D.
Sacred Heart Major Seminary

Randall Smith, Ph.D.
University of St. Thomas, Houston